

**Bibliography<sup>1</sup>**  
**(Barbarossa Project)**

(**Note:** For sources collected after **Jan 10** – i.e., after I had completed my final notebook – I have often summarized key points in a detailed footnote. For example, see key Soviet General Staff and Soviet Air Force studies at end of this bibliography.)

**I. Reference Materials:**

Military Book Club, *Slaughterhouse: The Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front*. 2002.

PRC Publishing Ltd., *World War II: A Visual Encyclopedia*. 1999.

War Dept., *German Military Dictionary* (TM 30-506). May 1944.

War Dept., *Handbook on German Military Forces* (TM E 30-451). Mar 45

War Dept., *Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces* (TM 30-430). Nov 45.

Bartholomew, J.G., *Times Survey Atlas of the World*, 1922.

Bernau, G. & Hausen W., *Wegweiser durch die deutschen Soldatenjahrbuecher*. 2 Vols. 1953-77 & 1978-87.

Boatner, Mark M. III, *The Biographical Dictionary of World War II*. 1996.

Booth, Terrence, *Handbook of WWII German Military Symbols & Abbreviations 1943-45*. 2001.

Bradley, Dermot, *et al.*, *Die Generale des Heeres 1921-1945. Die militaerische Werdegange...* 1993

*Chicago Manual of Style. Sixteenth Edition*. 2010.

Dear (Gen. Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to World War II*. 2001.

De Vries, Louis. *German-English Medical Dictionary*. First Edition. 1952.

---

<sup>1</sup> Note: Vast majority of material listed in this bibliography pertains to German assault on Moscow (*Unternehmen "Taifun"*) and subsequent winter battles in 1941/42. Some of the documents address the first 10 days of Operation *Barbarossa*.

Dupuy, R. Ernest & Dupuy, Trevor N., *The Encyclopedia of Military History—from 3500 B.C. to the present*. 1986.

Fowler, Will, *The Atlas of Eastern Front Battles*. 2002.

*German-English dictionary of railway or technical terms*. At: [www.WorldRailFans.org](http://www.WorldRailFans.org)

*German Winter Warfare*. Prepared by Military Intelligence Division, War Dept., Dec 43 (Special Series, No. 18)<sup>2</sup>

Glantz, David, *Red Army Ground Forces in June 1941*. 1997.

Glantz, D., *Atlas and Operational Summary. The Border Battles: 22 Jun – 1 Jul 41*. 2003

Glantz, D., *Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-45) Vol I: The Summer-Fall Campaign (22 Jun – 4 Dec 41)*. 1999.

Glantz, D., *Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-45) Vol II: The Winter Campaign (5 Dec 41 – Apr 42)*. 1999.

Glantz, D., *Atlas of the Battle of Moscow: The Defensive Phase: 1 October – 5 December 1941*. 1997.

Glantz, D., *Atlas of the Battle of Moscow: The Soviet Offensive: 5 December 1941 – 20 April 1942*. 1998.

Hayden, Mark, *German Military Chaplains in World War II*. 2005.

Hubatsch, Walther (Hg.), *Hitlers Weisungen fuer die Kriegsfuehrung 1939-1945. Dokumente des OKW*. 1962

Keilig, Wolf, *Das Deutsche Heer 1939-1945: Gliederung, Einsatz, Stellenbesetzung*. 1956 (etc.).

Krivosheev, Col.-Gen. G.F. (Gen. Ed.), *Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century*. 1997.

Lucas, James, *Die Wehrmacht von 1939-1945. Zahlen, Daten, Fakten*. 2004 (German edition)

Mehner, Kurt, *Die Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtsfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: 1939-1945*. Vols 3/4 (Mar 41 – May 42). 1992.

---

<sup>2</sup> Note: This is War Dept.'s translation of *Taschenbuch fuer den Winterkrieg*, published in Aug 1942 (see below)

- Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr., *German Order of Battle. Vol. I: 1. – 290. Infantry Divisions in WWII*, 2007.
- Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhart, *Das Herr 1933–1945: Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues*. 1956 (etc.).
- Nafziger, George F., *The German Order of Battle: Infantry in World War II*. 2000.
- Nafziger, G., *The German Order of Battle: Panzers & Artillery in World War II*. 1999.
- Nafziger, G., *The German Order of Battle: Waffen SS and other Units*. 2001.
- Overmans, Ruediger, *Deutsche Militaerische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. 2004 (3. Auflage)
- Pitt, Barrie & Frances, *The Month-by-Month Atlas of World War II*. 1989.
- Russian-English / English-Russian Military Dictionary: Green Volume*. 1983.
- Saiz, Agustin, *Deutsche Soldaten: Uniforms, Equipment & Personal Items of the German Soldier 1939-45*. 2008.
- Seidler, Franz W. & Zeigert, Dieter, *Hitler's Secret Headquarters. The Fuehrer's Wartime Bases from the Invasion of France to the Berlin Bunker*. 2004.
- Snyder, Louis L., *Encyclopedia of the Third Reich*. 1998 (reprint).
- Taktische Zeichen von Wehrmacht u. Bundeswehr (NATO) in Gegenueberstellung*. Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft. 1961 (2. Aufl.)
- Taschenbuch fuer den Winterkrieg*. Dritte Auflage (1996) (first published Aug 42)
- Taylor, Brian, *Barbarossa to Berlin: A Chronology of the Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1945. Vol. I. Jun 41 – Nov 42*. 2003.
- Tessin, Georg, *Verbaende und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS*. (different dates of pub.)
- Thies, Klaus-Juergen, *Der Ostfeldzug: Heeresgruppe Mitte. Eine Lageatlas der Operationsabteilung des Generalstabs des Heeres* (in: *Der Zweite Weltkrieg im Kartenbild*). 2001.
- Trevor-Roper, H.R. (ed.), *Hitler's War Directives—1939-1945*. 1966.

Yerger, Mark C.,<sup>3</sup> *German Cross in Gold: Holders of the SS and Police. Vols I & II.* 2002 / 2005.

Weiss, Hermann (Hrsg.), *Biographisches Lexikon zum Dritten Reich.* 2002.

Zabecki, David (ed.), *World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia.* 1999.

Zaloga, Steven J., et al., *Red Army Handbook: 1939-1945.* 1998.

## II. Archival Materials:

### a. *Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) (Maxwell AFB):*

“Die dt. Flugzeugverluste...in Russland...” 6. Abt. des OKL (in: *Karlsruhe Document Collection* (KDC))

“Der Luftkrieg im Osten gegen Russland 1941.” 8. Abt. des OKL (KDC).

“Die Unterstuetzung des Heeres im Osten 1941 durch die dt. Luftwaffe.” 8. Abt. des OKL (KDC)

“Der Luftkrieg in Russland 1942.” 8. Abt. OKL (KDC)

“Ueberblick ueber den dt. Luftkrieg gegen Russland: Jun – Dec 41.” (no author listed) (KDC)

Allmendinger, K., “**MS-055:** “*Small Unit Tactics. Beispiel #1. Der erste Zusammenstoss mit Partisanen.*” (KDC) (V. AK on 22.6.41 near Suwalki)

Bechtolsheim, v., “*Sicherung der rueckwaertigen Verbindungen im Osten bei der Hr.Gr.Mitte...Sep 41 – Feb 43.*” (KDC)

Deichmann, Paul, *German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army.* USAF Historical Study #163. 1962.

Halder, Franz, “*Einsatzbereite dt. Flugzeuge an der Ostfront.*” (Sep / Dec 41). (Auszuege aus dem Tagebuch Halder) (KDC)

Heinemann, Lothar v., “*VIII. Fliegerkorps: Erste Kaempfe vom 22.6. bis 3.7.41...*” (KDC)

Pabst, H., “*Berichte aus Russland Sommer 1941.*” (KDC) (Pabst was *Staffelkapitaen* in a *Stukagruppe*)

---

<sup>3</sup> These volumes address holders of the medal in *Das Reich* division.

Plocher, Genlt. Hermann, “*Einsatz gegen Moskau im Jahr 1941.*” (KDC) (overview of air attacks on Moscow)

Plocher, Genlt. H., *The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941.* USAF Historical Study 153. 1965.

Reinhardt, Hans, “*Krisenlage im Ruecken der Hr.Gr.Mitte Anfang 42 u. ihre Ueberwindung.*” (KDC)

Schwabedissen, Genlt. Walter, *The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders.* USAF Historical Study #175. 1960.

Seemueller, H., **C-037:** “*‘Geisterwaelder.’ Feindliche Freischaerler hinter der Front.*” (KDC)

Suchenwirth, Richard, *Command and Leadership in the German Air Force.* USAF Historical Study 174. 1969.

Suchenwirth, R., *Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort.* USAF Historical Study 189. 1959.

Uebe, Genlt. Klaus, *Russian Reactions to German Airpower in World War II.* USAF Historical Study 176. 1964.

**b. *Bibliothek fuer Zeitgeschichte (BfZ) (Stuttgart):***

--*Feldpostbriefe* from following units (attached to Hr.Gr. Mitte) for the periods Jun – Jul 41 & Oct 41 – Apr 42 : **6. ID, 7. ID, 23. ID, 29. ID (mot), 35. ID, 78. ID, 129. ID, 131. ID, 253. ID, 260. ID, 292. ID; 2. PD, 4. PD, 5. PD, 6. PD, 7. PD, 10. PD, 11. PD, 17. PD, 18. PD** (Note: For some of these units, only a small number of letters; for others, large numbers.)

**c. *Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv (BA-MA) (Freiburg):***

**Tagebuch Lt. Sittig** (Inf.Rgt. 8, 3. ID (mot.)) (Depositum Sittig)

**MSg 1/1147 & 1/1148:** Tagebuch Gen. Lemelsen<sup>4</sup> (“Russlandfeldzug” Band I: 6. Jun – 8. Okt 41 & Band II: 10. Okt 41 – 24. Apr 42)

**MSg 1/1507** (until 19.12.41) & **1/1508** (from 20.12.41): KTB Gen. Lt. v. Gyldenfeldt (1. Band) (Ia OBdH)<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Lemelsen diary courtesy of Dr J. Foerster. Transcribed from the *Suetterlinschrift* by Frau Marianne Miethe. Part from 10.6 – 1.9.41 transcribed by Felix Romer, a student of Dr. Foerster’s.

<sup>5</sup> Key portion of diary (5.-20.12.41) transcribed for me by Dr Christian v. Gyldenfeldt (Oberst a.D.); also in my possession: 26.9.-14.10.41; 6.-17.11.41; 20.12.41-14.4.42 (**Note:** J. Foerster (17.8.07): “Also bei einer

**N 19/9:** Nachlass von Weichs (Ostfeldzug 1941/42)  
**N 51/2,3:** Nachlass Hoepfner. (“*Die Operation auf Moskau*,” Berichte ueber dem 8.1.42, etc.)  
**N 245 / 2,3:** Sammlung, Gen. H. Reinhardt (Briefe an seine Frau; Tagebuch)  
**N 598/4:** Tagebuch Grossmann (Kdr. 6. ID)<sup>6</sup>  
**N 664 / --:** Tagebuch Thilo (Op.Abt. des Heeres) (courtesy J. Foerster)  
**N 671/8:** Tagebuch Richtofen (VII Fliegerkorps)<sup>7</sup>  
**N 813:** Tagebuch Muenchhausen 1941 (courtesy J. Foerster)<sup>8</sup>

**R 14/4D:** Tagebuch Chef d. Stabes der Heeresruestung (H. Ruest.) u. Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres (BdE) (19.12.41-2.3.42) (Courtesy of J. Foerster)<sup>9</sup>

**RH 19 II/120-22:** KTB Hr.Gr.Mitte (Okt. – Dez. 41)

**RH 19 II/128,132-35,352,390:** Anlagen zum KTB H.Gr.Mitte (22.6.-1.7.41 & Okt. - Dez. 41); Tagesmeldungen; Gefechtsberichte; Verlustliste; Kraeftestaerke; Beute- & Gefangenzahlen; etc.

**RH 20-4 / 337:** “*Kaempfe der 4. Armee im ersten Kriegsjahr gegen den Sowjet Union*“ (22.6.41-22.6.42)

**RH 20-4 / 1199:** KTB AOK 4 (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RH 20-4 / 188,192:** Anlagen zum KTB AOK 4 (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RH 20-9 / 13b:** KTB AOK 9 (30.9.-31.12.41)<sup>10</sup>

**RH 20-9 / 16:** Ia KTB AOK 9 (25.8.-17.9.41)<sup>11</sup>

**RH 20-9 / 26:** Anlagen zum KTB AOK 9 (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RH 20-9 / 66:** “*Die Winterschlacht von Rshev*,” (9. AOK)

---

flüchtigen Überprüfung der beiden Texte - Original und Auszug - konnte ich sofort feststellen, *dass der bekloppte Sohn* [sic/nephew] *alle wichtigen Verhandlungen auf höchster Ebene weggelassen hat.* Außerdem muss es gleich in der erste Zeile des 5.12. 1.PzArmee(!) heissen!” Dr Foerster’s reference is to portion of diary transcribed for me by Dr C. v. Gyldenfeld. On 4 Dec 07, in San Diego (GSA conference), Juergen provided me copy (portions) of 1/1507 & 1/1508 (20.12.41-14.4.42)).

<sup>6</sup> Excerpts from Tgb from 24.4.41-19.4.42. Portions transcribed for me by M. Miethe.

<sup>7</sup> Covers 27.9-31.12.41.

<sup>8</sup> Several pages transcribed for me by Christoph Nehring. Entire document transcribed by M. Miethe (Jun 09).

<sup>9</sup> Key points: a) **19.12.41: 22.45** Uhr Anruf Oberstlt. v. Gyldenfeldt: “Nach bisheriger Planung sollen ersetzt werden Gen.Oberst Halder durch General Jodl, General Jodl durch General v. Manstein, sobald letzterer in der Krim frei wird;” (4) b) **19.12.41 1.45** Uhr Fernspruch: Tagesbefehl GFM v. Brauchitsch: “Tagesbefehl an das Heer. Soldaten! . . .” (5); c) **23.12.41:** Vortrag des Chef H Ruest u. BdE beim Fuehrer: (See text for details; fascinating discussion re: strategies for increasing weapons production; need to dramatically raise Army’s allotments of raw materials, weapons production, etc., vis-à-vis Luftwaffe and Navy; efforts to raise additional troops; “*Walkuere-Div.*,” Hitler’s concern that new troops going to front have winter clothing; etc.) (18-26).

<sup>10</sup> I have section from 1.11.-31.12.41.

<sup>11</sup> Received from J. Foerster (Oct 11).

**RH 21-2 / 244:** KTB Pz.AOK 2<sup>12</sup>

**RH 21-2 / 876,927:** KTB Pz.AOK 2 / Pz.Gr. 2 (22.6.-1.7.41 & Battle of Moscow)

**RH 21-2 / 928:** KTB Pz.AOK 2 / Pz.Gr. 2 (22.7.-20.8.41)<sup>13</sup>

**RH 21-2/ 910:** Pz.AOK 2 Stabschef (Liebenstein) Studie ueber die Schlacht bei Moskau

**RH 21-3 / 788:** KTB Pz.Gr. 3 (22.6.-1.7.41)<sup>14</sup>

**RH 21-3 / 43,732:** Anlagen zum KTB Pz.AOK 3 (22.6.-1.7.41 & Gefechtsberichte Russland 41/42)

**RH 21-4 / 50,51:** KTB Pz.AOK 4<sup>15</sup>

**RH 21-4 / 478:** Pz.AOK 4: “Sturm bis vor Moskaus Tore. Kampfe vom 14.10. – 5. 12. 1941.”

**RH 24-23 / 68:** Anlagen zum KTB 23. AK (Gefechtsberichte, Verluste, etc.)

**RH 24-23/68:** Bericht ueber den Verlauf der Kampfhandlungen der 253. I.D. vom 9.-22.1.42...

**RH 26 - / “Berichte der 56. ID., 112. ID, 167. ID”**

**RH 26-6 / 8:** KTB 6. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RH 26-6 / --:** KTBer / Anlagen / Gefechtsberichte, 6. ID (Oct 41 – Mar 42)

---

<sup>12</sup> I have section from 1.12.-26.12.41.

<sup>13</sup> **Note:** Received from J. Foerster (Oct 11).

<sup>14</sup> **Note:** Detailed account of **PzGr 3** operations during the first week of “Barbarossa.” Highlights include: a) **22.6.41 9.30 Uhr:** “Die Herrschaft im Luftraum war nahezu voll am ersten Angriffstag erkaempft;” b) initial impressions of their Red Army opponent; c) problems advancing on poor roads, clogged w/ too many troops and vehicles (including foot infantry and Luftwaffe elements which disrupted advance of mechanized units on the *Panzerstrassen*; d) tank battles involving **7. PD**, including on **22.6.41** “ihre schwerste Panzerschlacht seit Kriegsbeginn;” e) disagreements w/ H.Gr.Mitte over execution of the envelopment at Minsk; f) problems w/ vehicles/equipment: “Der Funkverkehr war durch lange Maersche der Staebte haeufig stundenlang unterbrochen, neue franz. Geraete waren ausgefallen, da sie den Marsch auf den schlechten Wegen nicht aushielten;“ g) **25.6.41:** „Tempo des Vormarsches teils durch vereinzelt Feindwiderstand, vor allem aber durch die immer schlechter werdenden Wege ausserordentlich verlangsamt wird;“ h) **27.6.41:** Appears Gen. Hoth is paying closer attention to his orders from GFM v. Boch than is Guderian !; i) **28.6.41:** „**7. PD** wird von ihren Kolonnen abgeschnitten. . .“ (not infrequent occurrence for „schnelle Verbaende“ in opening days of campaign; j) **28.6.41:** „Bei **7. PD** faellt der bewaehrte Kdr. des Pz.Rgt., Oberst Rothenburg, nach leichter Verwundung auf der Fahrt zum [HVP], die durch feindbesetztes Gelaende fuehrt;“ k) **28.6.41 20.30 Uhr:** „Erfaeht die Pz.Gr., dass um **1600 Uhr Minsk** von **12. PD** genommen worden ist;“ l) **28.6.41:** “**20. PD** hat den ganzen Tag ueber noch verbissene Bunkerkaempfe u. erleidet dabei staerkere Verluste;“ m) **29.6.41:** „Am Abend . . . hat **7. PD** auch wieder Verbindung mit ihren rueckwaertigen Teilen, nachdem sie **48 Stunden** abgeschnitten war u. sich nach allen Seiten hatte verteidigen muessen;“ n) **29.6.41:** „Die Divisionen wurden mehrere Tage lang ausser von Sueden auch von Osten, Suedosten u. Norden angegriffen. Alle Angriffe konnten unter schweren Verlusten fuer den Feind abgewiesen werden, kein Russe hat die Front der Pz.Gr. durchbrochen, **20.000** Gefangene u. Ueberlauerer (von letzteren allein nach einem Feuerschlag einer **Neb.-Werf. Battr. d: 600**);“ o) **29.6.41:** „Zweimal Tieffliegerangriffe auf den Gef.Std. der Pz.Gr., dabei **1 Toter, 3 Verwundete**;“ p) **30.6.41:** Hoth and Guderian meet; war diary contains criticism of Guderian’s attempt to solve both assignments simultaneously – i.e., „Kesselschlacht“ at Minsk and continued drive east toward Dnieper crossings; Guderian’s failure to firmly close his part of the pocket results Red Army elements escaping to the SE (so notes the war diary); q) **1.7.41:** „Weitere **450** Russen sind am **1.7.** nach dem ersten Feuerschlag einer **Neb.-Werf. Battr. (d)** uebergelaufen.“

<sup>15</sup> I have sections from 6.12.41-31.1.42.

**RH 26-14 / --:** KTBer, etc., 14. ID (mot.) (Oct 41 – Mar 42)  
**RH 26-29 / 6:** KTB 29. ID (mot.) (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-29 / 15:** Anlagen zum KTB 29. ID (mot.) (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-45 / 20:** KTB 45. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-45 / 26-27:** Anlagen zum KTB 45. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-78 / 26:** KTB 78. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-78 / 27,30:** Anlagen zum KTB 78. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-112 / 95:** “*Taetigkeitsbericht Divisionartz,*” (112. ID)  
**RH 26-129 / 3:** KTB 129. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-137 / 4:** KTB 137. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-137 / 5:** Anlagen zum KTB 137. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-256 / 12:** KTB 256. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 26-292 / --:** KTBer/Anlagen/Gefechtsberichte, 292. ID (Oct 41 – Mar 42)  
**RH 26-292 / 7:** KTB 292. ID (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RH 27-3 / --:** KTBer/Gefechtsberichte/etc., 3. PD (Oct 41 – Mar 42)  
**RH 27-3 / 14:** KTB 3. PD (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 27-7 / 46:** KTB 7. PD (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 27-11 / --:** KTBer/etc., 11. PD (Oct 41 – Mar 42)  
**RH 27-18 / 20:** KTB 18. PD (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 27-18 / 31-34,66:** Anlagen zum KTB 18. PD (22.6.-1.7.41)  
**RH 27-18 / 69:** Gefechts- u. Kampfstaerken (10.41-3.42); *Gefechtskalendar* (18. PD) (20.10-13.12.41)

**RH 37 / 6332:** Tagebuch Olt Beck-Broichsitter (Inf.Rgt. “GD”) (Nov 41 – Jan 42)  
**RH 37 / 6334:** Tagebuch Gefreiter Rehfeldt (8. (MG)/II./IRGD) (Dec 41 – Jan 42)

**RL 8 / 49:** “*VIII Flieger-Korps Russland-Feldzug,*” (Sep 41–Jan 42) (H.W. Deichmann)  
**RL 12/214:** I./FlakRgt 38: “*Winterfeldzug vor Moskau,*“ *Taetigkeitsberichte,* etc. (Okt.-Dez. 41)  
**RL 12/454:** *Der Flakpanzerzug der II./FlakRgt 4: Erlebnisbericht 15.-25.1.42* (Raum Rshew)  
**RL 12/538:** Bericht ueber Einsatz des Flak Rgts 12 ab Nov 41 (Raum Kalinin)  
**RL 12/539:** *Gefechtsbericht II./FlakRgt 14*  
**RL 12/540:** II./FlakRgt 4: *Abwehrgefechte von Kalinin bis Rshew vom 5.12.41 bis 25.1.42,* etc.  
**RL 200 / 17:** Tagebuch General von Waldau (Luftwaffe CofS) (Jun – Dec 41)

**RS 3-2 / 5:** Anlage zum KTB SS “*Das Reich,*” (22.6.-1.7.41)

**RW 2/ v. 145,149,153:** *Wehrmachtuntersuchungsstelle:* “Kriegsverbrechen der russ. Wehrmacht 1941/42“



d. *Feldpost-Archiv Berlin:*

--Becker, Klaus (Flak Einheit / Hr.Gr.Mitte) -- *Feldpostbriefe*

--Neuser, Uffz Walter (AR 59 / 23. ID) -- *Feldpostbriefe*

--Sartorio, H. (Pz.Pion.Btl. 98 / 18. PD) -- *Feldpostbriefe*

e. *Foerderverein „Militaermuseum Brandenburg-Preussen“ e.V.*<sup>16</sup>

**Eduard Kaumann Nachlass (IR 9 / 23. ID):**

--“Das Potsdamer Inf.-Regiment 9 im Kampf um Moskau,” (signed by Genlt. Raegener, former division commander, Feb. 1953, but Moritz believes Kaumann wrote it.)

--“Kurzer Bericht ueber den bisherigen Einsatz des Inf.Rgts. 9 im Russlandfeldzug“ (Inf.Rgt. 9/Abt. Ic) (18. Aug. 41)

--Maps, etc.

f. *Hoover Institute (Stanford University):*

--*Tagebuchnotizen GFM Fedor v. Bock.* (22 Jun 41 – 5 Jan 42) (war diary of cdr Hr.Gr.Mitte).

--**Gisela Lauer Papers** (*Feldpostbriefe* from **K. Schrauder** to his fiancée)

--**Hedwig Sellmann Papers** (*Feldpostbriefe* from **E. Vaupel** to his mother)

g. *Institute fuer Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) (Munich/Berlin):*

--**MS 506: R. Rupp (63. Pz.Gren.Rgt. / 17. PD)** -- *Feldpostbriefe*<sup>17</sup>

--**MA 1621:** „*Gefechtsbericht ueber die Kampfhandlungen der 45. ID vom 5.12.-17.12.41.*“ (**45. ID / Abt. Ia**) (Courtesy of C. Hartmann)<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Kaumann *Nachlass* courtesy of Herrn Matthias W. Moritz, a member of the *Foerderverein*. According to brochure: “Seit 1999 existiert in Potsdam der Verein “Militaermuseum Brandenburg-Preussen” e.V. Ziel und Zweck des Vereins ist es, den Aufbau eines Museums zur Darstellung der brandenburgisch/preussischen Militaergeschichte zu befoerdern, dessen Standort Potsdam sein soll...Fuer das geplante Museum sammelt der Verein militaerhistorische Gegenstaende, Ausruestungsstuecke, Bilder u. Dokumente...”

<sup>17</sup> Christoph Nehring has transcribed portions of the Rupp FPB for me. These FPB had been recopied by Uffz Rupp’s wife in *Suetterlinschrift*.

<sup>18</sup> **Note:** Very useful study of first two-weeks of withdrawal of **45. ID**. Die Verluste von **5.-17.12.41** betragen: **233** Gefallene u. **232** Vermisste, **567** Verwundete, die auf Schlitten unter schwierigsten Verhaelt-nissen mitgefuehrt worden waren. Die materiellen Verluste betragen: **76** l.MG, **41** s.MG, **13** l.Gr.W., **8** s.Gr.W., **40** le.Pak, **4** m.Pak, **7** le.I.G., **2** s.I.G., **22** le.F.H., **2** s.F.H., **355** besp.Fahrzeuge, **440** Lkw., **281** Pkw., **469** Kraeder. Alle Waffen, die, weil unbeweglich, dem Feind ueberlassen warden mussten, waren zerstoert worden. (**Note:** Division lost **50%** of its Zollstaerke of **48** artillery pieces during this two week period.) (pp 82-83) State of Div. **Nov-Dec 41:** a) **45. ID** war Anfang **Nov 41** ueber Fatesh in die Winterausgangsstellung suedosw. Maloarchangelsk vormarschiert (etwa **150** km Marsch). Der Vormarsch [nach Jeletz] wurde am **24.11.41** befohlen Die Anordnung des Vorstosses nach Jeletz u. zum Don beruhte

**h. Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA):**

“Verteidigung an der OKA: das LIII Armeekorps im Rahmen der 2. Pz. Armee vom Dez. 41 bis Jan. 42,” (Bearb. von Oberstlt. H.P. Stein)

“Ohne Ruecksicht auf Verluste: Die ‘Walkuere-Divisionen als letzte Aushilfe in der Krise im Mittelabschnitt der Ostfront im Winter 1941/42: Dargestellt am Beispiel der 330. I.D. an Hand von Dokumenten u. Kriegstagebuechern,” (unpubl. manuscript by Gunther Rathke, 1995)<sup>19</sup>

“Arbeitsmaterialien zum Beispiel OKA,” (series of reports/primary documents addressing winter fighting near Moscow)

**i. National Archives & Records Administration (NARA):**

**T-77 RG 77 / Army Map Service 6203 (Moscow area / 1: 2,000,000)**

---

u.a. auf der Feindbeurteilung, dass der Russe *keine kampfkraeftigen Truppen* mehr habe. Diese Feindbeurteilung hatte sich in den ersten Dezembertagen als nicht zutreffend herausgestellt: Der zuerst nicht nennenswerte Feindwiderstand hatte allmaehlich zugenommen u. war bei Jelez stark: **IR 135** hatte hier beim ersten (vergeblichen) Handstreich auf die Stadt bedeutende Verluste; b) Vor allem fuehrte der Russe immer staerkere Kraefte in die offene Flanke der **45. ID**; *rollende russ. Luftangriffe* zehrten seit Tagen stark an der Gefechtskraft der Truppe, eigene Luftstreitkraefte oder Bodenabwehr wurden trotz wiederholter Bitten der Div. nicht eingesetzt, auch keine Luftaufklaerung gesehen, die angesichts der sehr tiefen offenen Flanke von der Div. staendig erbeten worden war. (1-2); c) lack of supplies, see, p 2; d) der harte Frost, der alle Wege zu holprigen Sturzaeckern erstarren liess, verursachte Fahrzeug- u. Waffenausfaelle: Achsen, Raeder u. anderes Geraet zersprangen in der Kaelte wie Glass (2); e) Im Laufe des Vormarsches u. der Angriffe hat sich seit Ueberschreiten des Tim am **26.11.41** bis in Gegend suedlich Jelez eine *tiefe offene Flanke* gebildet. Die **95. ID** als rechter Nachbar war zunaechst ueberhaupt nicht mit angetreten. . . Spaeter ging sie, auf die dauernden Bitten der **45. ID** u. nach Unterstellung der **95. ID** unter das Hoeh.Kdo.**34** mit unzureichenden Kraeften vor, hing aber weit ab. Verbindung zu ihr konnte ausser durch Funk wegen des Betriebsstoffmangels nicht aufgenommen werden. Diese offene Flanke konnte die Div. gegen den aktiven Feind nicht ausreichend sichern u. aufklaeren, zumal die mot. Einheiten haeufig unbeweglich waren, da, wie geschildert, kein Betriebsstoff herankam; f) lack of winter clothing (3); g) Die Div. befand sich in einer Lage, die den Div.Kdr. mit umso ernsterer Besorgnis erfuellte, als die letzten Reserven ausgegeben waren. (3); h) Auftrag fuer **5.12.41**: Angriff auf Jelez. (See additional notes in **45. ID** division file for details on period from **5.-17.12.41**.)

<sup>19</sup> **Note:** Fascinating account of the **330. ID** in Russia in early **1942**. This was one of the so-called “Walkuere” Divisions, hurled into the cauldron of the Eastern Front to help plug the gaps following Soviet counteroffensive. There were four (4) total of these divisions (all employed in central sector?). **330. ID** had originally been intended for duty as a “Besatzungstruppe” in Denmark; “nach nur 8taegiger Ausbildung nach dem Osten verladen.” Division very poorly trained, equipped and outfitted w/ personnel (very few personnel have combat experience; see text for details). Inserted in “Abschnitt Demidow,” subordinated to **59. AK (3. PzArmee)** and immediately thrown into battle. Results are catastrophic: From **1.-5. Feb 42** division suffers **782** losses (KIA, wounded, sick). Most high-ranking officers (rgt.- and btl. commanders become casualties very quickly; officers in general lack experience to put their orders into practice; men panic at sight of enemy tanks, etc.

**T-78 / 200:** “*Erfahrungsberichte ueber den Winterkrieg (1942)*,” (detailed reports from 5. PD, 7. ID, 35. ID, 78. ID, 87. ID, 197. ID, 252 ID, IX AK, XX AK)  
**T-354 / 121:** KTBer / Anlagen SS-Rgt. “Deutschland” (SS Div. “Das Reich”)

j. **Staats- u. Personenstandsarchiv Detmold:**<sup>20</sup>

--2.1: *Das Infanterie-/Grenadier-/Volksgranadier-Regiment Nr. 18:*

**D 107/56 Nr. 04:** *Regimentsgeschichte 1941/42*

**D 107/56 Nr. 10:** *Die Zeit der Wehrmacht: Russlandfeldzug (1941/1942)*

**D 107/56 Nr. 11:** *Die Zeit der Wehrmacht: Russlandfeldzug, Die Schlachten um Rshew (1942)*

**D 107/56 Nr. 14:** *Darstellungen ehemaliger Regimentsangehoeriger 1952-1988.*

III. **Foreign Military Studies (FMS) / Dept of Army Pamphlets:**<sup>21</sup>

**D-034:** “*Diseases of Men and Horses Experienced by the Troops in Russia.*” Dr Erich Rendulic. 1947.

**D-035:** “*The effect of extreme cold on weapons, wheeled vehicles and track vehicles.*” Dr Rendulic. 1947.

**D-036:** “*The Fighting Qualities of the Russian Soldiers.*” Dr Rendulic. 1947.

**D-054:** “*War Experiences in Russia. Chapter IV: Kirov and the 40-km. Gap...*” Genlt. Walter von Unruh. 1947 (addresses withdrawal of 4th Army)

**D-055:** “*War Experiences in Russia. Chapter III: KALUGA and the 80-km. Gap.*” Genlt. Walter von Unruh. 1947. (addresses right wing of 4th Army in Dec 41)

**D-073:** “*Rocket Projectors in the Eastern Theater.*” Genmaj. Ernst Graewe. 1947

**D-078:** “*Winter Fighting of 253d Infantry-Division in the Rzhev Area 1941/42.*” Gen Otto Schellert. 1947.

**D-098:** “*Horse Diseases during the Eastern Campaign (1941-45).*” Dr Maximilian Betzler. 1947.

---

<sup>20</sup> I visited archive in Dec 06. Documents include FPB, *Gefechtsberichte*, *Gefechts- u. Verpflegungsstaerke*, etc. All documents concern **IR 18 / 6. ID**. “D” numbers are file numbers.

<sup>21</sup> Most of these FMS studies received from the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Several FMS studies are also listed among the holdings of the Karlsruhe Document Collection (KDC) of the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA). See above.

- D-102:** “*Protection of the Lines of Communication in the East.*” Gustav von Bechtolsheim. 1947.
- D-130:** “*Second Army Gets out of the Mud.*” Gen Gustav Harteneck. 1947.
- D-137:** “*Winter Battles of Rzhev, Vyazma, and Yukhnov, 1941-42.*” Gen Oberst Otto Dessloch. 1947.
- D-184:** “*Winter Campaign 1941-42: Campaign of 255. ID East & South of Temkino (Dec 41 – Apr 42).*” Genlt. Walter F. Poppe. 1947.
- D-187:** “*The Capture of Smolensk by the 71st Motorized Inf. Rgt. on 15 Jul 41.*” Genlt Wilh. Thomas. 1947.
- D-221:** “*An Artillery Rgt. On the Road to Moscow (Jun – Dec 41).*” Genmaj. Gerhard Grassmann. 1947.
- D-237:** “*XXIII Corps (Oct 41 – Mar 42).*” Oberstlt. Dietrich Lemcke. (Supply in Russia, particularly by air)
- D-240:** “*Advance and Battles of the 110. Inf.-Div. within framework of Ninth Army... Jun to Nov 41.*” Genmaj. Heinz Gaede. 1947.
- D-247:** “*German Preparations for the Attack against Russia (The German Build-up East of Warsaw).*” Genlt. Curt Cuno. 1947. (17. PD crossing the Bug on 22 Jun 41)
- D-253:** “*Antitank Defense in the East.*” Genlt. Erich Schneider. 1947. (Lessons from the combat in autumn 1941)
- D-272:** “*Das Inf.-Rgt. 488 in der Wjasma-Schlacht 2.-11.Okt.41.*” Wilhelm Koehler. 1954.
- D-285:** “*The 35th Inf.-Div. Between Moscow & Gzhatsk (Dec 41 – Apr 42).*” Gen Rudolf v. Roman. 1947.
- D-289:** “*The 547th Inf.-Rgt. Advance & Fighting under Winter Conditions (Jan – Mar 42).*” Genmaj. Karl Becher. 1947.
- P-039:** “*March and Traffic Control of Panzer Divisions w/ Special Attention to Conditions in Soviet Russia...*” Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, *et al.* 1949.
- P-040:** “*Tank Repair Service in the German Army.*” B. Mueller-Hillebrand, *et al.* 1951.
- P-041a:** “*Organization of the Army High Command.*” B. Mueller-Hillebrand. 1948.
- P-052:** “*Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps.*” Hans v. Greiffenberg. 1951.

- P-059:** “*German Tank-Strength and Loss Statistics.*” B. Mueller-Hillebrand. 1950.
- P-062:** “*Frostbite Problems in the German Army during World War II.*” Genmaj. Alfred Toppe. n.d. (?)
- P-107:** “*Stellungs- u. Abwehrkaempfe eines mot. Gren. Rgts. im Winter 41/42 an der OKA...*” (author / date?)
- P-119:** “*Transportation of Replacements by Post Office Busses to Eastern Front in Winter 41/42.*” Hermann Hans Guenther Keil. 1954.
- P-190:** “*Verbrauchs- u. Verschleissaeetze waehrend der Operationen der deutschen Heeresgruppe Mitte (Jun – Dec 41).*” Genmaj. Alfred Toppe, *et al.* 1953.
- P-201:** “*Personal Diary Notes of the G-4 of the German 9th Army, Aug 41 to Jan 42.*” Genmaj. Josef Windisch. 1953.
- T-6:** “*Eastern Campaign, 1941-42. (Strategic Survey).*” Genlt. Adolf Heusinger. 1947.
- T-7:** “*Comments on Russian Railroad and Highways.*” Genlt. Max Bork. 1953.
- T-28:** “*Battle of Moscow (41-42).*” Gen. Hans v. Greiffenberg, *et al.* n.d. (Greiffenberg was Stabschef of Hr.Gr.Mitte)
- T-34:** “*Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign.*” Multiple authors. 1950.
- Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-201:** “*Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign.*” 1951.
- Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-230:**<sup>22</sup> “*Russian Combat Methods in World War II.*”
- Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-233:** “*German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs.*” 1951.
- Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-240:** “*Rear Area Security in Russia: The Soviet Second Front...*”
- Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-244:** “*The Soviet Partisan Movement: 1941-44.*” 1956. Edgar M. Howell.

---

<sup>22</sup> This is one of the better reports (prepared by Gen. Erhard Raus, *et al.*) addressing the Soviet war machine among the 16 pamphlets produced as part of the *German Report Series* (which was part of the U.S. Army Historical Division’s German FMS program). (**Note:** The pamphlets in the *German Report Series* were considered the most critical and to have the most practical use to contemporary U.S. Army and civilian leaders at the time.)

Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-261a**: “*The German Campaign in Russia—Planning and Operations (1940-42)*.” George E. Blau. 1955.

Dept of Army Pamphlet **20-269**: “*Small Unit Actions during the German Campaign in Russia*.”

CMH Publication **104-6**: “*Effects of Climate on Combat in European Theater*.”

CMH Publication **104-7**: “*German Tank Maintenance in World War II*.” Mueller-Hillebrand, *et al.*

CMH Publication **104-22**: “*Small Unit Actions during the German Campaign in Russia*.”

#### IV. Unit Histories / Manuscripts / Bildbaende (pub./unpub.):<sup>23</sup>

*Die Aufklaerer (Rf.1, K4, PzAA24) der 1. Kavallerie-Division/24. Panzer-Division.* Hubertus Schulz (*et.al.*). 1993.

*Geschichte des Reiter-Regiments 1. Teil II: 1939 – 1941.* Dietrich Kuehn. n.d. **(1. Kav.-Div.)**

*Die 24. Panzer-Division vormals 1. Kavallerie-Division: 1939-45.* Dr. F.M. v. Senger u. Etterlin. 1962.

*Unser Regiment. Reiter-Rgt. 2 – Pz.-Rgt. 24.* Gert-Axel Weidemann. 1983. (2. Auflage) **(1. Kav.-Div.)**

*Erinnerungen I: Ritter, Reiter, Russen.* Hans Ludwig von Stockhausen. 2003. **(1. Kav.-Div.)**

*3. Infanterie-Division 3. Infanterie-Division (mot.)...* Gerhard Dieckhoff. 1960.

*Geschichte der rheinisch-westfaelischen 6. Inf.-Div. 1939-45.* Horst Grossmann. 1958.

*Das Rheinisch-Westfaelische Infanterie-/Grenadier-Regiment 18, 1921-1945. Nach Tagebuechern, Briefen u. Berichten zusammengestellt von Ernst-Martin Rhein.* 1993 (Courtesy of author / veteran of **6. ID**)

*La Guerre a l'est.* August Kageneck. 1998 & 2002. **(IR 18 / 6. ID)**<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Note: Infantry divisions / units listed first in numerical order; followed by Panzer divisions / units.

<sup>24</sup> August Kageneck (deceased) had brother (Leutnant) who served in IR 18 and was killed in Dec. 41. Portions of this book has been translated for me from French to German by Ms Olivia Schulze, granddaughter of Herr Guenter Schulze (former **O.O. beim Kdr., 18. PD**)

“*Der Marsch- u. Einsatzweg der III./AR 6 vom 23.3.1941 bis 18.1.1942,*”  
zusammengestellt im Sommer 1942 von Lt. Kleine, NO der III./AR 6 (courtesy of H.-J.  
Dismer) **(6. ID)**

*Regimentsrundbriefe Nr. 19,50,51,52,58. Traditionsverband des 37. Inf.-Rgts.* **(6. ID)**  
(Courtesy of Herr Guenter Wegmann [*Geschaeftsfuehrer des Traditionsverbands*] and  
Heinrich Stockoff (No. 19 only).

*Das Pionier-Bataillon 6 im Feldzug gegen Russland 1941-1945.*<sup>25</sup> Dr. Hellmuth Voss.  
1976. **(6. ID)** (Courtesy of Wolfgang Langer)

*Geschichte des Fsch. MG-Btl. und des Fsch. Gr.Werferbtl.1 1940-1945.* Guenther  
Klitzing (Excerpts from / Courtesy of F. Strienitz)<sup>26</sup>

*Chronik der 7. Infanterie-Division.* Wilhelm Hertlein. 1984.

*Der Krieg der Infanterie.* Emanuel Selder. (62. Inf.-Rgt. / 7. Inf.-Div.)

*Geschichte der 10. Division 1933-45.* August Schmidt. 1963.

*Geschichte des 11. (Saechs.) Inf.-Rgts., spaeteren Inf.-Rgts. 11 und Gren.-Rgts. 11 von  
1918-1945.* n.d. **(14. ID (mot.))**

*Kurzgefasste Geschichte des Leipziger Inf.Rgts. 11. Vortrag von Dr. Wolfgang Rust bei  
der Mitgliederversammlung des Vereins “Saechsische Militaergeschichte e.V.” am 19.  
September 1998...”* **(14. ID (mot.))**

*Kurzgeschichte des I.R. 53 (mot.)* **(14. ID (mot.))** (author unknown; courtesy of Guenter  
Werner).<sup>27</sup>

*67. Inf.-Rgt. (23. ID).* (excerpts from in-house history)

*Zwischen Gehorsam u. Gewissen. Richard v. Weizsaecker u. das Inf.-Rgt. 9* **[23. ID]**,  
Mainhardt Graf v. Nayhauss-Cormons, 1994.

Knecht Wolfgang & Hocker, Rolf, *Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments 77: 1936-1945.*  
**(26. ID)** 1964 (von Hocker bearbeitet 1996). Kameradschaftliche Vereinigung des ehm.  
I.R. 77. (Courtesy of W. Vollmer)

---

<sup>25</sup> Compilation of materials, including manuscript prepared by Lt Voss in 1943; **KTB 2./Pi.Btn 6/6.ID**,  
from Jun – Dec 41, etc.

<sup>26</sup> Unit in question is: **Fallsch. MG Batl. 7** of the *verstaerktes Sturmregiment*. It was a *Luftwaffe* unit of  
**(Flieger-Division 7)** that fought alongside **6. ID** in early 1942.

<sup>27</sup> **Note:** G. Werner found this document at the *Stadtarchiv Naumburg (Verfasser unbekannt)*. Title  
*(Kurzgeschichte)* is that used by Werner.

*Vom Regiment “von Luetzow” zum Inf.-Rgt. 78—Geschichte eines rheinischen Regiments aus Aachen. (26. ID)* (courtesy of August Meyer)

*29. Inf.-Div. 29. Inf.-Div. (mot.)...Falke-Verband.* 1960.

*Die 29. Falke-Division 1936-1945.* Franz Goette & Herbert Peiler. n.d.

*Infanterie im Ostfeldzug 1941/42.* Friedrich Hossbach, Gen. a. D. 1951. (**Inf.-Rgt. 82 / 31. Inf.-Div.**)<sup>28</sup>

*Das Inf.-Rgt. 12 (3. Folge von 1933-45): Sein Kriegsschicksal im Verbands der 31. (Loewen-) Division.* Albert Bollmann, et al. (**31. Inf.-Div.**)

*Der Osten blieb unser Schicksal 1939-1945: Panzerjaeger im 2. Weltkrieg.* Dr Erich Bunke. 1991. (**Pz.Jaeg.Abt. 31 / 31. Inf.-Div.**)

*34. Infanterie-Division: Einsatz- u. Gefechtsuebersicht 1939-45.* Heinz Schulz. 1954.

*Die 35. Inf.-Div. im 2. Weltkrieg 1939-45.* Hans Baumann. 1964.

*Die 35. Infanterie-Division—1939-1945.* No author listed. n.d. (ca. 2004)

*Geschichte der 3. Kompanie des Infanterie-Regiments 109 im Krieg 1939 – 1945.* Alfred Gutenkunst. 1991 (gift from E. Dihlmann)

*Die 11. Kompanie des Infanterie-Regiments 109 vom 20. Nov 40 bis 10. Jan 42.* Alfred Gutenkunst. 1988. (courtesy of author)

*Geschichte der 1. (Fernsprech) - Kompanie der Nachrichtenabteilung 35 (der 35. ID).* Erich Dihlmann. 1990s. (courtesy of author)

*Rueckzug vor Moskau Winter 41/42: Aus der Geschichte der 36. Inf.-Div. (mot.) 6.12.41 – 23.1.42.* Alexander Conrady. 1974.

*“Vorstoss und Kampf um Kalinin der 36. Inf.Div. (mot.)”* bearbeitet durch 36. Inf.Div. (mot.), Abteilung Ic (Privatbesitz / courtesy of J. Foerster)

*Mein Weg mit der 45. Inf.-Div.* Rudolf Gschoepf. 1955.

*Geschichte der 56. Inf.-Div.: 1938-45.* Arbeitskreis der Division. n.d.

---

<sup>28</sup> **Note:** See my notes (6 pp) gleaned from Hossbach’s book, mostly addressing conditions, fighting, losses, etc. in fall/winter **1941/42**. Lots of terrific details on peculiar conditions of winter fighting, for example. Also detailed account of the final attack of elements of **31. ID** in Tula sector on **5.12.41**. (Notes located in **31. ID/82. IR** “Hossbach” file.)



*Das Buch der 78. Sturm Division.* Kameradenhilfswerk der 78. Sturmdivision, e.V. 1955.

*Die 78. Inf.- u. Sturm-Div.: Eine Dokumentation in Bildern.* No author listed. n.d.

*Die 78. Infanterie- und Sturm-Division 1938-1945.* Fritz Vetter. n.d.

*Der Ostfeldzug: 28.VI.1941 – 4.XI.1943. Der 86. Rhein-Westf. Inf.-Div.* ca. 1962 (no author listed) (courtesy of Helmut Bruenger)

*Der Weg der 87. Inf.-Div.* Hermann Oehmichen, *et al.* 1969.

*Das Kriegstagebuch der 87. Infanterie-Division.* Traditionsgemeinschaft der ehem. 87. Inf.-Div., n.d.

*Kampfu. Untergang der 95. Inf.-Div.* Karl Knoblauch. 2008.

*Kampfu. Ende der Fraenkisch-Sudetendeutschen 98. Inf.-Div.* Martin Gareis. 1956.

*Wir waren dabei—Die 240er (IR 240 / 106. ID).* Heinz Spenner. n.d. (courtesy of W. Vollmer)

*Der Kampf des I.R. 240 im Osten 26.6.41 – 20.4.42.* Obstlt. Ringenberg (**106. ID**). Prepared in Jul 42 (courtesy of W. Vollmer)

*Infanterie-Regiment 241 1940-1944.* August Meyer, *et al.* (**106. ID**) (Verlag Kameradschaftliche Vereinigung des ehem. Rgts. 77.) 1999 (Courtesy of Aloys Gassmann)

*Geschichte der 110. Inf.-Div.* Ernst Beyersdorff. 1965.

*Halten oder Sterben.* Heinrich Boucsein. 1998. (129. Inf.-Div. in Russia 41-45)

*Im Zeichen des Schwertes: Erinnerungen an den Weg der 131. Inf.-Div.* Wilhelm Blankenhagen. 1982.

*Die 137. Inf.-Div. im Mittelabschnitt der Ostfront.* Wilhelm Meyer-Detring. 1962.

*Unser Einsatz im West und Ost: 1939-45.* Traditions-Gemeinschaft der 197. Inf.-Div. (Willi Nickel)

*Vom Kampfverband zur Traditionsgemeinschaft: 50 Jahre 197. Inf.-Div.* Traditions-Gemeinschaft der 197. Inf.-Div. (Willi Nickel, *et al.*)

*Taten u. Schicksal der...197. Infanterie-Division (Gedaechtnisstuetze).* F.W. Kueppers. n.d. (booklet)

197. *Inf.-Div. Bilderheft*. 1943. (in: BfZ Stuttgart / Weltkriegsbucherei)

*Erinnerungsbuch der 215. Inf.-Div.* Walter Schelm, *et al.* (2000 reprint of 1955 book)

*Geschichte der 252. Inf.-Div.* W. Melzer. Bad Nauheim. 1960.

252. *Inf.-Div. 1939-45: Der Weg der Eichenlaub-Div. 1939-45 in Bildern.* Such- u. Hilfsgemeinschaft der Div.

253. *Inf.-Div. Weg u. Ende einer rheinisch-westfaelischen Division im Osten 1941-45.* C. Frhr. v. Boeninghausen. Coesfeld. 1972. (unpublished manuscript)

*Kampf u. Ende rheinisch-westfaelischer Infanterie-Divisionen an der Ostfront.* C. Frhr. v. Boeninghausen. Coesfeld. 1980. (unpublished manuscript)

“*Menschenmaterial*”: *Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront.* Christoph Rass. 2003. (sociological study of **253. Inf.-Div.**)

*Der Gruene Rgt.: Der Weg der 256. Inf.-Div. aus der Sicht des Rgts. 481.* Barbara Selz. 1970.

*Geschichte der 258. Inf.-Div.* Vico v. Rieben & H.J. Pflanz. 1978.

*Die 260. Inf.-Div. 1939-44.* Werner Haupt. 1970.

*Die 260. Infanterie-Division—1939-1944.* No author listed. n.d. (ca. 2004)

*Bug Moskwa Beresina—Der Weg eines bespannten Art.-Rgt...* Dr Rolf Hinze. 1978. (**AR 267 / 267. Inf.-Div.**)

*Gefechtsberichte IR 488/499*, etc. (**268. ID**) (courtesy of Konrad Distler)<sup>29</sup>

*Die 290. Inf.-Div. 1940-45.* Josef Bauer, *et al.* Eigenverlag. 1960.

*290. Infanterie-Division: Chronik in Bildern.* Heinrich Behrens. Selbsverlag. 1970.

*Die 292. Infanterie-Division.* Guenther Nitz. 1957.

*Tagebuch: I./I.R. 509 & I./I.R. 507.* Batl.-Schreiber Ofw. Jakubowski. (**292. Inf.-Div.**) (personal diary prepared “an Ort u. Stelle”)<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> **Note:** K. Distler’s uncle had served with **260 ID** (11./IR 480). Killed in Nov 41.

<sup>30</sup> **Note:** This and following half-dozen entries re: **292. ID** prepared by former division members and provided to author by Rudolf Mobius (of **292. ID**). They are all unpublished.

“Feldzug gegen Russland...” Leutnant J. Hahn (AR 292 / 292. Inf.-Div) (Feldpostbriefe u. Erinnerungen)

“Krieg gegen Russland (21 Jun – 2 Okt 41).” Genlt. a.D. Dehmel. (He was cdr of 292. Inf.-Div.)

“Ganze Batterie Feuer.” Leut. der Artillerie Guenther Nitz. (292. Inf.-Div.)

Artillerie Regiment 292 (KTB Nr. 2: 1 Jan – 31 Dez 42). (292. Inf.-Div.)

Erlebnisberichte (misc.) (292. Inf.-Div.)

Nachrichtenaufklaerung. Jun – Sep 41. V.D. Heydorn. (292. Inf.-Div.) (letters, post-war narrative)

Bildband zur 292. Inf.-Div. 1940-45. Andreas Altenburger. 2003.

“Die Truppe u. der Weg des Inf. – (Grenadier) Rgts. 521 der 296. ID, 1940-44.“ (Autor = „K.H.“) (Courtesy of C. Hartmann)<sup>31</sup>

„Rueckblick u. Erinnerung an den Einsatz der 296. ID im Osten aus der Sicht des II./IR 521.“ (Autor = „K.H.“) (Courtesy of C. Hartmann)<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> **Note:** The **296. ID** began “Barbarossa” as component of H.Gr.Sued. Appears that by late **Oct 41** it was in transit to von Weich’s **2. Armee**. In late **Nov-Dec 41**, served w/ Guderian’s **2. Pz Armee**. In **Dec 41**, its **IR 521** in following sectors: “Sicherung an der Upa . . . Ausweichbewegungen auf die Oka . . . Kaempfe zwischen Plawa u. Oka; Winterstellung an der Oka . . . Erbitterte Kaempfe um Brueckenkopf u. Stadt Belew. Unterstuetzung durch Btl.Braeutigam (2.Kp. mit je **50** Mann), Teile der **4. PD, A.R. 296, Pi.296, Pz.Jaeger Abt. 296 u. I./Fla Rgt. 11**. Letztere stand mit **32 2cm u. 8 8.8 cm** Kanonen an erhoekten Ostufer der Stadt Belew feuerbereit. . . Am **31.12.1941** heftige Kaempfe im Nordteil der Stadt. Nahkaempfe um die Beherrschung der die Stadt quer durchziehenden, langen Schluchten.“ Belew evacuated that night. **1.1.1942:** “Der Div.-Kdr. Gen.-Maj. Stemmermann verabschiedet sich beim Regiment. Sein Gesundheitszustand war nach seiner Verwundung am **1.8.1941** bei dem Kaempfen . . . zunaechst den harten Anforderungen des Winterfeldzuges nicht mehr gewachsen.“ **Jan-Feb 42:** „Abwehrkaempfe an der Wyra, suedwestlich Belew.“ **23.1.42:** „Btl.-Adjutant [beim **III./IR 521**] . . . meldet eine Frontstaerke von **250** Offz., Uffz., Mannsch. Winterbekleidung laeuft an. Mangel an Sprengmaterial zum Bau von Stellungen u. Unterkuenfte, Schanzzeug u. Grabenoefen, Verpflegung knapp.“ **5.2.42:** “Frontstaerke des **III./IR 521:** **1** Offz., **10** Uffz., **28** Mannsch.” **20.2.42:** “Durch eingetroffenen Ersatz wird **III. Btn.** wieder bedingt einsatzbereit.“ **Mar 42:** „Der neu bezogene Kampfraum [**IR 521**] ist huegelig. . . Die Doerfer [long list of villages named] wurden mit vereinten Kraeften als Stuetzpuenkte ausgebaut. Die HKL verlaeuft . . . Auch diese z.T. sehr unuebersichtliche Stellung hat eine Abschnittsbreite von rund **20km**, sodass Besetzung der HKL u. oertliche Reserven nur schwach. Die Gefechtsstaerken der Kp. betragen durchschnittlich **50** Mann.”

<sup>32</sup> **Note:** This account by “K.H.” a soldier in **IR 521 (296. ID)** offers a quite graphic account of his battalion’s retreat in **Dec 41**. “K.H.” appears to have served in a signals unit (Fernsprecher). Key points: a) division enjoyed “schoene Tage” in France – Kuestenschutz beiderseits Duenkirchen – until transferred to east ca **Apr 41**; b) In Russia, division initially w/ H.Gr.Sued (captured Kiev on **19 Sep 41**, then transferred to H.Gr.Mitte); c) **Oct 41:** Division clearing massive forests east of the Desna (Bryansk sector?); d) **Nov 41:** author’s battalion takes part in “Panzerzugunternehmen” (two trains / one armored) deep into Soviet territory as far as Kursk (detailed account, runs several pp); e) Vormarsch weiter nach Maloarchangelsk (no date); f) **Dec 41:** Tula sector at start of month (near Fodorowka on the Oka);

“Aufklaerungs-Abteilung / Schnelle Abteilung 238.” Walter Lissek. In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1971. (328. Inf.-Div.)

“Ohne Ruecksicht auf Verluste: Die ‘Walkuere-Div...Dargestellt am Beispiel der 330. Inf.-Div...” Gunther Rathke. 1995. (unpublished manuscript)

*Grossdeutschland: Guderian’s Eastern Front Elite*. Michael Sharpe, et al. 2001.

*Grossdeutschland: Die Geschichte des Panzerkorps*. Helmuth Spaeter. 1958.

*Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland*. Horst Scheibert. 1977.

*Die Einsaetze der Panzergrenadier-Division ‘Grossdeutschland.’* Helmuth Spaeter. n.d.

*Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland im Einsatz*. Hans-Joachim Jung. 2000.

*Division Das Reich: Der Weg der 2. SS-Pz.Div. ‘Das Reich.’* Otto Weidinger. 1973.

*Das Reich (Vol. III), 1941-1943: The History of the 2. SS. Pz.-Div. ‘Das Reich.’* Otto Weidinger. 2002 (trans. of 1973 book).

*Division Das Reich im Bild*. Otto Weidinger.

*SS-Das Reich. The History of the Second SS Division, 1941-45*. Gregory L. Mattson. 2002.

*Das Reich Waffen-SS Armored Elite*. Michael Sharpe & Brian Davis. 2003 (Spearhead Series)

*Das Reich: The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division*. James Lucas. 1991.

*Kameraden bis zum Ende: Der Weg des SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 4 ‘DF’ 1939-45*. Otto Weidinger, et al. 1962.

---

g) ca. **5.-24.12.41**: “[Diese Tagen] waren fuer uns die schwersten, die wir ueberhaupt erlebten. . .;” path of withdrawal over this **19**-day period *roughly* as follows: Temenowo – Fedorowka – Balakirewo – Katunka – Krawpiwna – Chansowo – Stojanowo – Beleff (on the Oka / 24.-31.12.); h) key themes of withdrawal include: constant threat of encirclement; isolated columns (Tross, etc.) sometimes overtaken and destroyed; sometime life-or-death reliance on local Russians to guide them in proper direction; relentless pursuit of Red Army; scorched earth tactics (horizon often lit by fires of burning villages); savage nature of Russian winter (snowstorms, etc.); “Tag von Chansowo wird fuer jeden unvergesslich sein” – Russians attack repeatedly, before sector of **7./II** some **700** dead Russians, “bei den uebrigen Kp. War der Erfolg nicht weniger gross;” i) **Jan 42**: “Fuer uns begann die Zeit des bisher nicht gekannten Stellungskrieges” (i.e., in Kusnecowo / near Bolchow); battalion would hold this position for some **3** months against ceaseless enemy attacks: “Seine Angriffe gegen die Rollbahn liessen waehrend des ganzen viertel Jahres nicht einen Tag nach. Seine Staedte Bolchow u. Orel wollte er wieder haben. Es kam nicht soweit.”

*Im Lufttransport an Brennpunkte der Ostfront.* Wilhelm Tieke. 1971. (History of the **SS-IR 4** (mot.)/"Lang.")

"*Die dt. 4. Armee vor Moskau.*" Wilhelm Tieke. In: *Deutsches Soldatenjhrbuch.* 1971.

*Das IX. Armeekorps im Ostfeldzug 1941.* Hermann Geyer. 1969. (Wehrmacht im Kampf Series / Band 46)

*The 1st Panzer Division 1935-45: A Pictorial History.* Horst Reibenstahl. 1990.

[*Erste*] *1. Pz.-Div. 1935-45. Chronik einer der drei Stamm-Divisionen...*Rolf O.G. Stoves. 1961.

*Die 1. Pz.-Div. 1935-45: Aufstellung, Bewaffnung...*Rolf O.G. Stoves.

*Die 2. Pz.-Div. 1935-45: Bewaffnung, Einsaetze, Maenner.* Franz Steinzer.

*Friedens- u. Kriegserlebnisse einer Generation.* F.J. Strauss. 1961. (Pz.-Jaeg.-Abt. 38 (Sf) / **2. Pz.-Div.**)

*Die Geschichte der 2. (Wiener) Panzer-Division.* F.J. Strauss.<sup>33</sup>

"*Panzerjaeger vor dem Toren Moskaus.*" Hans Erich "Hosiner" (Braun). (Pz.-Jaeg.Abt. 38 / **2. Pz.-Div.** (Ausschnitt aus dem Heft vom Verfasser)

*Geschichte der 3. Pz.-Div. Berlin-Brandenburg 1935-45.* Traditionsverband der Division. 1967.

"*Vormarsch ueber Orel nach Tula—30.9. – 31.12.1941.*" Unpublished manuscript by Willy Wothe & Gerhard Tietz (both **3. PD**). n.d. (courtesy of Herr Wothe)

*Die 4. Pz.-Div. 1938-43.* Joachim Neumann. 1985.<sup>34</sup>

*4. Panzer-Division on the Eastern Front (1) 1941-1943.* Armor at War Series. Robert Michulec. 1999.

*Knight's Cross Panzers: The German 35. Tank Rgt. in WWII.* (**4. PD**). Hans Schaeufler. 2010.

---

<sup>33</sup> This book repackages his *Friedens- u. Kriegserlebnisse* and includes a history of Pz.Rgt 3.

<sup>34</sup> **Note:** Terrific study – crafted like a war diary – by former Div. member. See detailed notes in division file (**4. PD**), including: a) detailed account of reorganization & re-equipping of division after French campaign; b) detailed "run up" of division activities on eve of "Barbarossa;" c) activities of division in opening two weeks of campaign; d) partial re-equipping of **Pz.Rgt. 35** on eve of "Taifun;" e) "Vormarsch auf Orel."

*Die Geschichte der 5. Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945.* Anton Detlev v. Plato (Genlt. a.D.) 1978.

*The 6th Panzer Division 1937-45.* Helmut Ritgen. 1982.

*Bildband der 6. Pz.-Div. 1939-45.* Horst Scheibert. 1958.

*Brennpunkt: Die Geschichte der 6. Pz.-Div. (1. leichte) 1937-45.* Wolfgang Paul. 1977.

*Panzer-Regiment 11 Panzerabteilung 65 1937 – 1945.* Michael Schadewitz (courtesy of Klaus Voss, Trad.Gem. d. ehem. **6. PD**)

*Die 7. Pz.-Div. 1935-45: Die “Gespenster-Division.”* Hasso v. Manteuffel. 1978.

*Die 7. Panzer-Division. Bewaffnung, Einsaetze, Maenner.* Hasso v. Manteuffel. n.d.

*Die Gespenster-Div. Eine dt. Pz.-Div. (7) im Zweiten Weltkrieg.* Horst Scheibert. 1981.

*Deutsche Panzerdivisionen im Bild: Die 9. Panzerdivision 1939-45.* Carl Hans Hermann.

*Weg u. Einsatz der I./Pz.Rgt. 33 (1939-45).* Erwin Simon. Kameradschaft der 9. Pz.-Div. n.d.

*Die 9. Panzer-Division: Bewaffnung, Einsaetze, Maenner. 1938-1945.* Carl Hans Hermann. n.d.

*Die Zehnte P.D.—Die Geschichte der 10. Pz.-Div. 1939-45.* Albert Schick. 1993.

*Der Weg der 11. Panzer-Division.* Donnhäuser & Drew. Selbstverlag. 1982.

*Die 11. Pz.-Div. “Gespenster-Division.” Bilddokumente 1940-45.* G.W. Schrodek. 1984.

*Ihr Glaube galt dem Vaterland: Geschichte des Pz.-Rgts. 15.* G.W. Schrodek. 1976. **(11. Pz.-Div.)**

*Die Vierziger: Chronik des Regiments.* Oberstlt. a.D. Joseph Dingreiter. n.d. **(17. Pz.-Div.)**<sup>35</sup>

*Geschichte der 18. Pz.-Div. 1940-43.* Wolfgang Paul. 1975.<sup>36</sup> (courtesy of Christoph Nehring)

---

<sup>35</sup> Includes detailed report from battalion doctor on effects of winter on men and equipment!

<sup>36</sup> The photocopies I have from the 1975 *Auflage* of this book—courtesy of Christoph Nehring. The copies are from his father’s, Pz.Gen. Walter K. Nehring’s, personal copy!) I also have copies from a 1989 edition of this work.)

*Geschichte der niedersaechsischen 19. Pz.-Div.* Otto v. Knobelsdorff. 1958.

*19. Infanterie- und Panzer-Division—Divisionsgeschichte aus der Sicht eines Artilleristen.* Rolf Hinze. 1997 (reprint)

*Die 19. Panzerdivision 1939-45.* Rolf Hinze. 2003. (reprint)

*Die 19. Pz.-Div.: Bewaffnung, Einsaetze, Maenner...*Rolf Hinze.

*Hitze, Frost u. Pulverdampf: Der Schicksalsweg der 20. Pz.-Div.* Rolf Hinze. 1981.

#### V. Memoirs / Biographies / Diaries:<sup>37</sup>

Adamczyk, Werner, *Feuer! An Artilleryman's Life on the Eastern Front*, 1992.

Andres, K.W., *Gegen das Vergessen u. die Verleumdung: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen [von] Panzersoldaten im Russlandfeldzug 1941-1945.* (20.PD) (unpublished; courtesy of author)

Andrew, K. & Garden, D (eds.), *The War Diaries of a Panzer Soldier. Erich Hager w/ the 17<sup>th</sup> Pz.-Div. on the Russian Front 1941-45.* 2010.

Assmann, Kurt, *Deutsche Schicksalsjahre. Historische Bilder aus dem zweiten Weltkrieg u. seiner Vorgeschichte.* 1951.<sup>38</sup>

„Aus dem KTB eines Sanitaetsunteroffiziers,“ (ab Jan 42) (45. ID), in: *Linzer Turm* (Mitteilungsblatt des Frontkaempferbundes der 45. ID Linz u. Wels / versch. Ausgaben) (Courtesy of C. Hartmann)

Baese, Otto, *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen* (IR 254/100. ID) (unpublished; courtesy of author)<sup>39</sup>

Barkhoff, Guenther, *Ostfront 1941-1945. Ein Soldatenleben.* 1994/1998 (26. ID) (unpublished; courtesy of author)

Bauer, Ludwig, *Wo Panzer sind ist vorn!* 2007. (3. PD) (book signed by author)

Baur, *Flugkapitaen* Hans, *Mit Maechtigen zwischen Himmel u. Erde.* 1971. (gift of Erich Mieth)

---

<sup>37</sup> Note: Some diaries (OKW, etc.) also in Section 11 (“Primary Materials”). Some of these diaries, etc., are unpublished.

<sup>38</sup> Note: During WWII, K. Assmann served as *Chef der Historischen Abteilung des Oberkommandos der Kriegsmarine.*

<sup>39</sup> Note: Partial copy of *Tagebuch* received earlier from Horst Paul, Vorsitzender, Trad. Verb. 110 ID.

Becker, Hans (pseudonym), *Devil on my Shoulder*. 1957. (12. PD)

Below, Nicolaus v., *At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant: 1937 – 1945*.<sup>40</sup>

Below, Nicolaus v., *Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-1945*. 1980.

Beyrich, Dr Martin.<sup>41</sup> *Tagebuchauszuege* (Jul-Aug 41) (Courtesy of Guenter Werner)

Bidermann, Gottlob Herbert, *In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier's Memoir of the Eastern Front*. 2000.

Boeselager, Philipp Freiherr v., *Der Widerstand in der Heeresgruppe Mitte*. Beitrage zum Widerstand 1933-1945. (Courtesy of author / **Mar 07**).<sup>42</sup>

Boeselager, Philipp Freiherr v., “*Henning von Tresckow*.” (talk given in Potsdam, Jul 03; courtesy of author / **Apr 07**)

Boeselager, Philipp Freiherr v., *Valkyrie. The Story of the Plot to Kill Hitler, by its Last Member*. 2009.

Bopp, Gerhard, *Kriegstagebuch. Aufzeichnungen waehrend des II. Weltkrieges 1940-43*. 2005. (35. ID)<sup>43</sup>

Bork, Bruno, *Die Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 191 – Die „Bueffelbrigade“ im Einsatz auf dem Balkan u. in den Weiten Russlands 1940-45*. 2009.

Bose, Georg, *Die Chronik der Sturmgeschuetz-Brigade 177*. 2007. (book signed by author)

Bradley, Dermot, *Generaloberst Heinz Guderian u. die Entstehungsgeschichte des modernen Blitzkrieges*. 1986.

Braun, Ernst. *Der verlorene Haufe*. 1988.

Bremer, Walter H., *Die Verlorene Jugend. Jahrgang 1923. Geschriebene u. gezeichnete Skizzen ueber den 2. Weltkrieg u. dessen Vorbereitungen*. (IR 278 / 95. ID) (Courtesy of author)

---

<sup>40</sup> **Note:** This English translation is severely reduced in size (less than **250** pp) compared to German original (**425** pp).

<sup>41</sup> Dr Beyrich was Abt. Kdr **II./AR 14/14 ID(mot.)**

<sup>42</sup> Boeselager served as GFM v. Kluge's *Ordonnanzoffizier* from Apr 42 – Apr 43. He had covered the title of this brochure and added a new title: “Mein Weg zum 20. Juli.”

<sup>43</sup> **Note:** Fotos in this book are absolutely spectacular!



Brockdorff, Werner, *General Walther Nehring: Stabchef Guderians, Kommandierender des Afrika-Korps...n.d. (Der Landser)*

Bub, Emil, *Ein verlorenes Jahrzehnt. (Flak Abt. 303)* (unpublished diary courtesy of Robert Gehrman).

Buddenbohm, Wilfried, *Das Leben des Soldaten Wilhelm Buddenbohm und der Weg des Osnabruecker Infanterieregimentes I.R. 37 von 1939 bis 1943 (6. ID)* (courtesy of author)

Buecheler, Heinrich, *Hoepner: Ein dt. Soldatenschicksal des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.* 1980.

Cassidy, Henry C. *Moscow Dateline, 1941-1943.* 1943.

Colvin, John, *Zhukov. The Conqueror of Berlin.* 2004.

Chertok, Boris, *Rockets and People.* Vol. I. (NASA History Series). 2005.

Ciano, Count Galeazzo, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-45. The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano.* 1946.

Craemer, Uffz. Otto, *Persoenliches Tagebuch (IR 37 / 6. ID)* (Courtesy of Heinrich Stockoff.)

De Beaulieu, Walter Chales, *Generaloberst Erich Hoepner: Militaerisches Portraet eines Panzer-Fuehrers.* 1969.

De Caulaincourt, Armand, *At Napoleon's Side in Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza.* 2003. (orig. published 1933)

Deck, Josef, *Der Weg der 1000 Toten.* 1978.

de Maiziere, Ulrich, *In der Pflicht. Lebensbericht eines dt. Soldaten im 20. Jahrhundert.* 1989. (Ib / 18. ID (mot.))

Dicke, Dr Werner, *Erinnerungen* (excerpts from unpublished memoir; courtesy of author) 2006. (26. ID)

Diedrich, Torsten, *Paulus. Der Trauma von Stalingrad. Eine Biographie.* 2008.

Dietrich, Otto, *The Hitler I Knew. Memoirs of the Third Reich's Press Chief.* 2010.

Dill, Haupt. Hans Joachim, *Der Feldzug im Osten vom September bis Dezember 1941* (self-published; courtesy of E. Weingarten) (10./SR 304/ 2. PD)

Dismer, Hans-Joachim, *Artillerie-Offizier im II. Weltkrieg. Vom Beobachter bis zur Kriegsakademie*. 1992 (Selbstverlag) (courtesy of author / **AR 6 / 6. ID**)

Diesel, Dr Hans H. (Hg.), *Gefallen! . . . und umsonst – Erlebnisberichte deutscher Soldaten im Russlandkrieg 1941-45*. 1993. (Courtesy of J. Foerster)

Engel, Major, *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938-43*. 1974.

Fest, Joachim, *Speer—The Final Verdict*. 1999.

Feuersenger, Marianne, *Im Vorzimmer der Macht: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Wehrmachtfuehrungstab u. Fuehrerhauptquartier 1940-1945*. 1999.

Franze, Herbert, *Kriegskamerad Pferd*. 2001. (**263. ID**) (Note: Brief personal memoir of his experience w/ horses; courtesy of author)

Freitag, August, *Aufzeichnungen aus Krieg u. Gefangenschaft (1941-1949)*. 1997 (**6. ID**) (Courtesy of Irina Moltschanowa in Rzhew / May 05)

Frisch, Franz, A.P. (w/ Wilbur D. Jones, Jr.), *Condemned to Live. A Panzer Artilleryman's Five-Front War*. 2000.<sup>44</sup>

Fritze, Eugen, *Unter dem Zeichen des Askulap. Tagebuch 1940-45 eines Soldatenarztes bei der 6. Pz.-Div*. 2004.

Fuehrer, Fritz, *Persoenliches Tagebuch (IR 37 / 6. ID)* (Courtesy of Heinrich Stockhoff).

Gerbet, Klaus (ed.), *GFM Fedor von Bock. Zwischen Pflicht und Verweigerung. Das Kriegstagebuch*. 1995 (courtesy of C. Nehring)

Gersdorff, Rudolf-Christoph Frhr., *Soldat im Untergang*. 1977. (Gersdorff was the Ic of H.Gr.Mitte)

Gorlitz, Walter (ed.), *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel*. 1961.

---

<sup>44</sup> **Note:** Frisch served as a private for nine (7) years in the Wehrmacht. He was drafted in **1938** at age **19** from his native Vienna. He also spent two years in American captivity – discharged in **1947**. Most probably due to political “complications,” he never rose above rank of private. An artillery soldier, he fought in Poland, France, Russia, Sicily and Italy. In Russia until early **Dec 41** he served in **AR 109 (mot.)**, a nondivisional, non-organic unit usually assigned as a “fire brigade” to an army or a corps (*Heeresartillerie*). His unit was most frequently outfitted with **s. Kanone 18 (10 cm)**. His artillery regiment was actually only a battalion in size, w/ ca. **800** men (p 11). His battery fought w/ the **4. Armeekorps**, **4. PzGr** – at Yelnya, Smolensk and before Moscow. Of Yelnya he writes: “The Russians were beating the shit out of us.” (p 32). Appears he also served w/ **2. PzGr** (“we frequently ran into Guderian”) (p 73). He also states that the fighting around Smolensk in **Jul – Aug 41** was “the heaviest and deadliest I saw during the war” (i.e., around Yelnya). Frisch writes of the Stalinorgel: “This was the most shocking and terrifying thing I ever encountered.” (see, p 82) He also avers that his men were “terrified of the **T-34**.” The text also includes an excellent section on *impact of Russian winter* on weapons, vehicles and equipment. (see, pp 84-88)

- Gorlitz, W., *Paulus and Stalingrad*. 1963.
- Gorlitz, W., *Strategie der Defensive: Model*. 1982 (3. Auflage).
- Grazioli, E. & Hofmann, G., *Weisst Du noch, Kamerad? Die Geschichte einer Inf.-Kp. im Osten*. (1952?)
- Grimm, Robert. *Und niemand sagt warum. Ein Kradmelder erzahlt, wie er den 2. Weltkrieg ueberlebt*. 2003. (**58. ID / Hr.Gr.Nord**) (courtesy of author)
- Grossjohann, Georg, *Five Years, Four Fronts: The War Years of Georg Grossjohann, Major, German Army (retired)*. 1999.
- Grupe, Friedrich, *Jahrgang 1916. Die Fahne war mehr als der Tod*. 1989. (**8. ID**)<sup>45</sup>
- Guderian, Gen. Heinz, *Panzer Leader*. 1952 (first published).
- Guderian, Gen. H., *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten*. 1951.
- Guderian, Gen. H., *Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential*. 1937.
- Guenther, Helmut, *Heisse Motoren, kalte Fuesse: Kradschuetzen der Waffen-SS vor Moskau*. 2003. (SS “Das Reich”)
- Guenther, Helmut, *Hot Motors Cold Feet—A Memoir of Service with the Motorcycle Btl. Of the SS Division “Das Reich.”* 2004.
- Haape, Heinrich (w/ Dennis Henshaw), *Moscow Tram Stop—A Doctor’s Experiences with the German Spearhead in Russia*. 1957.
- Haape, Heinrich, *Endstation Moskau: 1941-1942*. 1998. (Battalionarzt with the **18. IR/ 6. ID**)
- Haape, Heinrich, *Tagebuch* (and other private personal papers) (courtesy of sons Johannes & Heinz).
- Haering, Bernard, *Embattled Witness—Memories of a Time of War*. 1976.
- Hart, Russell, *Guderian. Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?* 2006.
- Hartmann, Christian, *Halder—Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942*. 1991.

---

<sup>45</sup> According to Herr Scheuer, this is perhaps the best book he has ever read addressing the NS-Zeit.

Heinemann, Werner, *Pflicht u. Schuldigkeit: Betrachtungen eines Frontoffiziers im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. 2010. (Btn.Kdr., **IR 67/23. ID**)<sup>46</sup>

Heinlein, Walter, *Walter Heinlein: Von Fahnenjunker zum Abteilungsfuehrer*. With Ingo Moebius. 2007.

---

<sup>46</sup> **Note:** I received a letter about this creatively and intelligently organized memoir from W. Heinemann's daughter, Dr. Birgit Heinemann (**28.2.10**). Her father fought in WWI (Russian and France, earning **EK I & II**), served in the interwar Reichswehr, left the military in **1934** (following "Hausarrest" due to his anti-Nazi sentiments), in **Feb 40** again drafted into the military. In **1940** in France was Kp.-Chef and later Btl.-Kdr. in **IR 67 / 23. ID**. **1940/41:** promotion to Major, Btn.-Kdr. **III./67**, later the last Rgt.-Kdr. of **IR 67** (which was disbanded due to heavy losses in winter **41/42**). Later served as Obst.Lt. and Oberst in **302. ID (1942/43)**. Wounded (blinded) on **16.9.43**. By early **Dec 41**, his regiment had arrived at Lupanowo ca. **35 km N/NW** of Moscow. Key points: a) **5.12.41:** Discusses attack on Lupanowo – due to extreme cold, artillery and comm.-equipment fails: Art.-Lt. meldet an H., "ich kann weder durch Draht noch durch Funk das Feuer leiten, alle Nachrichtenmittel versagen! Auch die Batterie kann nicht feuern, ihre Richtvorrichtungen u. Zuenderstellungen versagen!" Writes H.: "Bis zu vielleicht **15** oder **20** Grad Kaelte mochten unsere Elemente, Oele u. Fette, fluessig bleiben; bei Kaeltegraden dieses sibirischen Ausmasses aber froren auch sie ein." (156-59); b) H. insists that greatest concern for functioning of tanks, vehicles, weapons and equipment was "das Fehlen an geeigneten Oelen u. Fetten fuer diese hohen Kaeltegraden. . ." (160); c) **Apr 42:** Terrific anecdote about the astounding reliability of the crude Red Army wpns in the arctic Russian climate – weather is beginning to thaw and a group of his men find a Soviet MG in the snow w/ a magazine still in place; a soldier accidentally engages the trigger mechanism and the weapon – which had been lying there since the Soviet retreat in **Oct 41** – still shoots perfectly! (162-63); d) **Oct 41:** great anecdote involving H.'s battalion in Kessleschlacht von Wjasma: H.'s batallion was „Vorhut-Btl.“ Approaching Putkowo (SW of Wjasma). Suddenly stunned by large number of tanks – **50-60** in all – in unrecognizable brown-yellow paints schemes; assume they are Russian and prepare for combat, fully expecting to be destroyed. After tension-filled minutes, they finally discover that the tanks are indeed German, and had earlier been earmarked for North Africa (can only be **5. PD**) (221-24); e) **22.6.41:** very detailed and intense anecdote (**11 pp.**) about first day of „Barbarossa;“ at one point, as H. making his way thru enemy barbed wire obstacle at head of his staff, he looks back and, with a grave demeanor, tells his adjutant: "Denkt immer an diese Minute! Es ist der Anfang vom Ende!" Account of "X-Tag" continues w/ the Ereignisse von Sklody – Here H. Btl. is ordered – for no useful purpose – to attack a line of Red Army bunkers. The line of some **22** highly-modern bunkers proves to be virtually impregnable; cannot be taken; many casualties result. H. decides to suspend attack and dig in. His superiors demand – repeatedly! – that he continue the assault, take the bunkers; H. refuses, repeatedly! See text for remainder of this account, and courage of H. to stand up to his superiors. (257); f) "Der 'sechste Sinn' des alten Soldaten" – several anecdotes about how H. trusted his intuition – instead of conventional tactical principles – and actually saved lives (267, ff.); g) "Aufopferung" – under this title, account of an action in the "Desna-Stellung" on **26.9.41** which illustrates – in my mind – why the Wehrmacht was as successful as it was: the incredible skill, sacrifice and courage of its Offz. and Uffz. This anecdote concerns the commander of the **9./III/IR 67** and his stunning act of courage. (273, ff); h) **5.12.41:** a much-more detailed account of attack on Lupanowo (see, "a" above); author writes: "Erfrierungen tun ja bekanntlich nicht weh, ihre Folgen stellen sich erst allmaechlich, in ihrer ganzen Schwere erst nach mehreren Tagen heraus." (282, ff); i) **3.-25.12.41:** Series of six (**6**) graphic FPB (very useful) (293, ff); j) insightful discussion of decisive role of "Fuehrer" (Offz. / Uffz.) in saving H.Gr.Mitte during winter **41/42** (supporting my own thesis of why German front held); example of terrible losses suffered by Offz. during **Jan/Feb 42** (W.H. points out that, during crisis of winter, Offz. had to lead directly from the front – somewhat in violation of military regulations – resulting to higher losses) (299-309); k) by early spring **42** – when division transferred to the West to be reconstituted (as a panzer division, I believe) – the three regiments of **23. ID** each "boasted" an average of some **200** men! (305); l) **Mar 42:** Partisanenkaempfe – Graphic and illustrative anecdote concerning capture of a "Partisanenlager" in the fir & birch forests outside Wjasma (Waelder am Osemaja-Abschnitt); Nahkaempfe, schaurig Mann gegen Mann, "wahrhaftig [habe ich] das Weisse im Auge des Mannes da drueben gesehen." (312-17)

Hermann, Alfred, *Der Russlandfeldzug 1941*. Unpublished diary of member of *Nahaufklaerungsstaffel* (Hr.Gr.Mitte). (Courtesy of M. Miethe.)

Hertenstein, Rolf, “*The Experiences of a World War II German Panzer Commander*,” Oral History No. 2314 (Cal State U, Fullerton), interview by Robert Mulcahy, 24 Feb 92. (13. PD/Hr.Gr.Sued)

Heusinger, Adolf, *Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalstunden der deutschen Armee 1923 – 1945*. 1950.

Heusinger, Adolf, *Adolf Heusinger. Ein dt. Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert*. Publication of the Bundeswehr. Schriftenreihe Innere Fuehrung (Beiheft 3/87). 1987 (gift of E.M. Rhein)

Hoehne, et al., *The General was a Spy: The Truth about General Gehlen...* 1971

Hoffmann, Peter, *Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1904-1944*. 1992/95.

Hoth, Hermann, *Panzer-Operationen: Die Panzergruppe 3 u. der operative Gedanke der dt. Fuehrung Sommer 1941*. 1956. (Wehrmacht im Kampf series)

Jodl, Luise, *Jenseits des Endes: Leben und Sterben des Generaloberst Alfred Jodl*. 1976.

Kannicht, Joachim (ed.), *Alte Kameraden. Berichte ueber Kampf, Begegnungen, Opfer, Gefangenschaft, Danach*. 2006

Kesselring, Albert, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring*. 1953.

Kesselring, A., *Soldat bis zum letzten Tag*. 1953.

Kieweg, Uffz., „*Russlandtagebuch 1941*.“ (45. ID) In: *Linzer Turm* (Mitteilungsblatt des Frontkaempferbundes der 45. ID Linz u. Wels / versch. Ausgaben) (Courtesy of C. Hartmann)<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> **Note:** Uffz. Kieweg war Geschuetzfuehrer eines Inf.-Geschuetzes bei der **13. Kp.** des **IR 130** in der **45. ID**. Anfang **1942** kam er, an Fleckfieber erkrankt, in ein Heimatlazarett. Aus seinem Tagebuch hab' ich folgende Punkte entnommen: a) **22.6.41:** Eigene Artillerie schießt in unsere Reihen. Viele Ausfaelle; b) **30.6.41:** Die Kaempfe um die Festung Brest-Litowsk sind abgeschlossen. Die Verluste unserer Div. in der ersten Woche sind enorm; sie betragen fast **500** Gefallene u. ueber **1000** Verwundete; c) **27.8.:** den Dnieper ueberschritten. Richtung Gomel; d) **28.8.:** Gomel passiert – es ist dort alles verwuestet; e) **4.9.:** Waldkaempfe. Wir erreichen die Hoehe vor Kariukowka. Hier liegen uns gegenueber russische Scharfschuetzen, die jeden einzelnen von uns abknallen; wir sind wegen der grossen Ausfaelle alle ganz fertig; f) **8.9.:** Weitermarsch mit der Kompanie. Zum ersten mal erleben wir, dass unsere Vormarschstrasse von russ. Fliegern bombardiert wird; g) **22.9.:** Wir schliessen den Einkesselungsring um Kiew an seiner oestlichen Stellung (**Note:** **45. ID** involved in a week of bitter fighting in the Kiev encirclement; elements of division overrun, fighting is absolutely desperate, division losses „enorm.”); h) **30.9.-15.10.:** Abmarsch von Jagotin; Tag ueber Tag lange Gewaltmaersche bis Rylsk; i) **26.10:** Abmarsch von Rylsk; die Russen haben sich nach Kursk zurueckgezogen; j) **11.-21:** Nochmals lange Maersche bis zur Ausgangsstellung zur

Killian, Hans, *Im Schatten der Siege. Als beratender Armeechirurg an der Ostfront*. 1964 (Neuausgabe 2000). (Artz beim 16. AOK)

Knappe, Siegfried, *Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949*. 1992.

Knoblauch, Karl, *Zwischen Metz u. Moskau*. (4. (F)/14). 2008?

Knoke, Heinz, *I flew for the Fuehrer*. (First published in English in 1953. Knoke was a **Bf 109** pilot w/ **JG 52** in Russia.<sup>48</sup>)

Kollatz, K., *Josef Schreiber—Der erste Eichenlaubstraeger der 78. Sturmdivision*, n.d. (*Der Landser*)

Krehl, Eberhard, *Erinnerungen* (self-published; courtesy of author) (**Stab Ari.-Kdr. 121 der Pz.Tr.**)

Kreuter, Georg C., “*Kriegstagebuch vom 28. Maerz 1941 bis zum 17. Dezember 1943*,” (unpublished diary; courtesy of K. Schumann)<sup>49</sup> (**SR 101 / 18. PD**)

Krueger, Arthur, *Stalingrad: Das Ende des Danziger Infanterieregiments*. (Unpublished memoir, courtesy of author.)<sup>50</sup>

Kuhnert, Max, *Will We See Tomorrow? A German Cavalryman at War 1939-42*. 1993.

Kummer, Obstlt. Kurt, *Kriegstagebuch* (courtesy of C. Nehring) (**4./AR 88 (mot.) /18. PD**)

---

geplanten Winteroffensive; k) **28.11.: 20 km** Marsch. Wir werden wieder bombardiert. Ein Spaehtrupp stellt fest, dass alle Ortschaften vor uns von den Russen niedergebrannt wurden. Den Fluss Tym ueberschritten.

<sup>48</sup> **Note:** At beginning of Russian campaign, Lt. Knoke assigned to **JG 52** at Suwalki. He only takes part in first **10** days of “Barbarossa,” then is transferred to a unit in the West. Key points include: a) detailed account of his training, which was thorough yet also exceedingly dangerous (“there have been one or two fatal accidents every week for the past six weeks in our Course alone” (p 28)); b) chilling anecdote concerning his first flight in a **Bf 109 (12 Oct 40)**; c) he notes in **Feb 40** that, because ground covered w/ deep snow, their training acft have been *equipped w/ skis* (Russians did this in winter **41/42**, but did the GAF?); d) based w/ his squadron in Ostend, Knoke flew his first combat mission on **24 May 41** (38); e) **22.6.41:** Knoke and his comrades are enthusiastic over Hitler’s decision to attack Russia (44); he flies six bombing and strafing missions (his **Bf 109** outfitted w/ bomb rack carrying **100** small 5-lb fragmentation bombs) on this first day, flying as low as **6** feet off the ground; roads appear to be clogged everywhere w/ Russian armies, convincing Knoke of *preventive nature of German attack on Russia* (44-48); f) evinces little respect for VVS airman, or for their equipment (49); g) **2.7.41:** Knoke is transferred to **JG 1** in the West (North Sea islands) (49); h) author ends the war with **33** confirmed aerial victories, garnering the Knight’s Cross to Iron Cross on **27 Apr 45**; all told, he registered nearly **2000** flights, of which more than **400** were operational sorties “in the face of the enemy.”

<sup>49</sup> **Note:** As a child Klaus Schumann and his family lived in same house with G. Kreuter, his sons, and other soldiers. He was given diary by one of Kreuter’s sons (**Mar 07**).

<sup>50</sup> Although Krueger’s memoir doesn’t address “Battle of Moscow,” still contains some useful, interesting observations. He served in **60. ID (mot.)**.

Lang, Major a.D. Friedrich, *Aufzeichnungen aus der Sturzkampffliegerei. Die Erlebnisse des Schwervertraegers ueber seine Zeit als Stuka-Pilot.* Neu bearbeitet von Christian Heine, 3. Auflage, Mai 2002.

Langer, Franz-Josef, *Bilder / Briefe / Tagebuch* (translation of book from Russian with his *Feldpostbriefe*, artwork, etc.) (Courtesy of his son, Wolfgang Langer) **(6. ID)**

Lierow, Dr. Hans, *personal diary* (Jun 41 – Jan 42). (courtesy of his son, Dr. Konrad Lierow-Mueller.) **(IR 37 / 6. ID)**

Lochner, Louis P. (ed. & trans.), *The Goebbels Diaries 1942 – 1943.* 1948.

Loeffler, Juergen, *Walther v. Brauchitsch (1881-1948). Eine politische Biographie.* 2001.

Loewer, Willi, *Laeusejagd und Rohrkrepiierer.* (Memoirs; published in 2006; edited by Dr Peter Tauber; courtesy of author) **(AR 129 / 129. ID)**

Lossberg, Bernhard v., *Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab: Bericht eines Generalstabsoffizier.* 1949.

Luck, Hans v., *Panzer Commander: Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck.* 1989.

Luther, Craig & Taylor, Hugh Page (ed.), *For Germany: The Otto Skorzeny Memoirs.* 2005.

Macksey,<sup>51</sup> Kenneth, *Guderian: Panzer General.* 1992.

Macksey, Kenneth, *Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War.* 2000 (Greenhill reprint, copywrite 1978).

Manstein, Erich v., *Lost Victories.* 1982.

Manteuffel, Hasso v., *Panzerkampf im Zweiten Weltkrieg.* (Franz Kurowski (Hrsg.)). 2005.

Martin, Helmut, *Weit war der Weg. An der Rollbahn 1941-1945.* 2002. **(Pz.Jg.Abt. 14 (mot.) / 14. ID (mot.))**

Mathias, Karl-Heinz, *Paul Hausser Generaloberst der Waffen-SS: Ich diene. Ein Lebens- und Zeitbild.* 2002.

Meier-Welcker, Hans, *Aufzeichnungen eines Generalstabsoffiziers. 1939-42.* 1982.

---

<sup>51</sup> **Note:** According to Dermot Bradley, this book contains many errors. See, Bradley's *Guderian*, p 7. Says same thing about Keegan's biography of Guderian (1973)..

- Mellenthin, F.W. v., *Panzer Battles*. 1956.
- Meyer, Georg, *Adolf Heusinger*. 2001. (excellent biography)
- Meyer, Kurt (“Panzermeyer”), *Grenadiere*. 1956.
- Miethe, Marianne, *Memoiren* (3 Bd.). Unpublished manuscript. 2009. (Courtesy of the author)
- Model, H.G. & Bradley, D. (ed.), *Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model (1891-1945). Dokumentation eines Soldatenlebens*. 1991.
- Moebius, Ingo, *Ueber Moskau ins Kurland. Ritterkreuztraeger Georg Bleher erzaehlt*. 2008. **(35. ID)** (book signed by Bleher)
- Moeller, Johannes, *Gratwanderung am Rande des Geschehens, 1937-1945*. **(14. / IR 167 / 86. ID)** (Courtesy of Ernst Meinecke / Bielefeld, Jun 05)
- Muehleisen, Horst (ed.), *Helmuth Stieff Briefe—Deutscher Widerstand 1939-1945*. 1991. (Stieff was Ia in AOK 4)
- Nebe, Erich, *Erinnerungen*. 2004. (Unpublished Memoirs. Courtesy of his son, Karl-Friedrich Nebe) **(IR 37 / 6. ID)**
- Nehring, Walther K.,<sup>52</sup> *Die Geschichte der dt. Panzerwaffe 1916-1945*. (Reprint ca. 2002)
- Nehring, Walther K.,<sup>53</sup> *Militaerische Persoenlichkeiten: Walther K. Nehring*, n.d. (*Der Landser*)
- Newton, Steven H., *Hitler's Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model – Hitler's Favorite Commander*. 2006.
- Pabst, Helmut, *The Outermost Frontier. A German Soldier in the Russian Campaign*. 1957. **(Art. NCO w/ Army Gp Ctr)**<sup>54</sup>
- Pagel, Horst, *From the Other Side. A Collection of Personal WW II Stories*. 1997. (unpublished narrative courtesy of author)

---

<sup>52</sup> According to D. Bradley (*Guderian*), Nehring's book is the best one about the German *Panzertruppe* (at least as of 1986, when Bradley's book published)

<sup>53</sup> Note: This is a detailed biography of Nehring in issue 597 of *Der Landser*.

<sup>54</sup> Note: According to book description, this diary covers Pabst's experiences as an artilleryman on Russian front from **Jul 41** to **Sep 43**; he was promoted to Sergeant in **Feb 42** and to Lieutenant in **Mar 43**. He was killed in **Sep 43**.



Pante, Dr Helmuth,<sup>55</sup> *Meine Kriegserlebnisse* (unpublished memoir written in 2006 and courtesy of author)

Paul, Wolfgang, *Panzer-General Walter K. Nehring. Eine Biographie.* 1984.

Perau, Josef, *Priester im Herre Hitlers.* 1962.<sup>56</sup>

Pflanz, Oberstlt. Hans-Jochen, *Der Weg eines dt. Generalstabsoffiziers im Zweiten Weltkrieg.* 1998 (Ia of **258 ID**)

---

<sup>55</sup> Dr Pante was veterinarian w/ the *Veterinaer-Untersuchungsstelle 509.*

<sup>56</sup> **Note:** Perau was a catholic Priest. According to map, he reached the central front at Juchnow in mid-**Nov 41**. This is a fascinating account; clear that Perau was no fan of the Nazi regime. Discusses the deep ambivalence he and other “Geistlichen” felt about serving Hitler’s regime (see, pp 26, 37). Of particular note is following: a) inducted into Wehrmacht in **Mai 40**: “Ich war zur Sanitaetstruppe einberufen, wie es im Konkordat fuer die Priester vorgesehen ist;“ „gelten doch die Sanis bei den andern Truppenteilen als Soldaten 2. Klasse;“ (pp 7-8); b) discusses training as medical orderly (10, ff.); c) P.: “Der Kommiss ist eine Maschine. Leicht kann einer zwischen die Raeder geraten;” (20); d) **24.6.41**: Brief des Feldbischofs der Wehrmacht mit dem Bescheid, dass ich vom **7.-16.7.** an einem Kursus fuer Kriegspfarreranwaerter in Berlin teilnehmen soll. . . Wenn die Moeglichkeit einer unmittelbaren priesterlichen Taetigkeit sich bietet, will ich sie gern ergreifen; (25); e) **8.7.41**: Berlin – Auf den Berliner Plaetzen stehen riesige Russlandkarten. Taeglich wird die Kordel, welche die Front bezeichnet, ein Stueck weiter nach Osten geschoben (27); f) **Jul 41**: Zusammen mit . . . wurde ich nach Krakau zur **Kriegslazarettabteilung 521** versetzt (from **Jul-Nov 41**, Perau is serving in Poland – Generalgouvernement? – at different military hospitals; he comforts the wounded, performs mass, etc.) (28, ff); g) **21.8.41**: Aus Salzburg erhalte ich die Predigten von Bischof Clemens August zugeschickt . . . Diese Stimme entlastet unser aller Gewissen (32); h) P. is serving with a protestant pastor who he, P., describes as a “Deutscher Christ” (that is, the protestant pastor is a Nazi sympathizer); P.: Manchmal beschleicht mich Sorge, er koenne mich anzeigen. . . Gefaehrliche Debatten entwickeln sich immer auf unseren langen Autofahrten (32); i) **7.11.41**: Heute kam Marschbefehl nach Juchnow, wohin die Abteilung (**Krg.Laz.Abt 521**, I assume) schon vorgerueckt ist. . . Es wird hart werden, aber ich freue mich doch auf das Neue. . . Ich will das Erlebnis des Krieges. . . Anekdote: Meine Wirten (P. was housed in the dwelling of a well-educated Polish family in Lublin) gab mir zum Abschied eine Medaille der Madonna von Czenstochau. Sie hat trotz des grossen Leides, das die Deutschen ihr antaten, Mitleid mit uns u. fuerchtet fuer uns. „Oh, die Deutschen kennen Russland nicht. *Sie haben ja nicht einmal einen Pelzmantel!*“ (38); j) P. describes his journey deep into Russia in a Lazarettzug; graphic description of his journey via Brest-Litowsk - Minsk – Borissow (ueber die Bersina) – Smolensk – Roslawl – Juchnow (19.11.41); appears he is still assigned to **Krg.Laz.Abt. 521** (41); k) Juchnow: Die Kirche des Ortes ist seit 20 Jahren schon Getreidemagazin (42); l) **9.12.41**: P.: “Die Arbeit in den Lazaretten nimmt mich immer mehr in Anspruch. Viele Stunden des Tages bin ich ueber die Lager der Schwerverwundeten u. Sterbenden gebeugt, um ihnen Christus zu bringen . . . Die Verwundungen u. noch mehr ihre Folgen sind grauenhaft (**Note**: What follows is a *graphically chilling anecdote* about types of wounds suffered by the men and their consequences, pp 43-44); m) **25.-26.12.41**: Moving anecdotes about P.’s experiences at Christmas **1941** (46-48); see also M. Jones’ treatment of this material in: The Retreat. Hitler’s First Defeat; n) **28.12.41**: Anekdote about a wounded Lt. overcome w/ joy when he encounters P.: “Solch religioese Erschuetterung mag bedingt sein durch nervoesen Zusammenbruch. Aber wer will urteilen, dies Gottfinden sei nicht echt? (47-48); o) **15.1.42**: evacuation of Juchnow and withdrawal to Roslawl (50); p) **30.1.42**: Wie froh ist schon manch einer, der viele Jahre der Kirche fern war u. in Russland den Glauben wiederfand. . . Ich erlebe viel priestlicher Freude. (51-52); **19.2.42**: Horrific anecdote about burial of thousands of Russian prisoners-of-war: Neben dem Friedhof . . . werden in einem riesigen, immer laenger werdenden Massengrab die Toten des russ. Gefangenenlagers begraben. Taeglich kippen L.K.-Wagen mehrere hundert Leichen hinein Im ganzen seien es schon **19.000** sagte mir der Posten (for more details see, p 53)

Prueller, Wilhelm, *Diary of a German Soldier*. 1963. (Prueller in 9 PD)

Raus, Erhard, *Panzer Operations. The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945*. Compiled and trans. By S.H. Newton. 2003.

Reese, Willy Peter, *Mir selber seltsam fremd. Die Unmenschlichkeit des Krieges. Russland 1941-44*. 2003. (95. ID / Pz AOK 2)

Reese, Willy Peter, *A Stranger to Myself. The Inhumanity of War: Russia, 1941-44*. 2005.

Rehfeldt, Dr Hans H., *Mit dem Eliteverband des Heeres "Grossdeutschland" tief in den Weiten Russlands*. 2008.

Reuth, Ralf Georg (ed.), *Tagebuecher in fuenf Baenden: 1924-1945*. 1992. (J. Goebbels diaries)

Richter, Georg, *persoenliches Tagebuch* (excerpts from) (AR 74 / 2. PD) (Courtesy of E. Weingarten)

Risse, Siegfried, "Das IR 101 u. der 2. Weltkrieg" (portion of unpublished manuscript; courtesy of Klaus Schumann) (18. PD)

Roberts, Geoffrey, *Stalin's Wars. From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*. 2006.

Roell, Hans J., *Oblt. Albert Blaich: Als Panzerkommandant in Ost u. West*. 2009. (3. PD)<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> **Note:** Blaich fought w/ 3. PD. He was wounded on 6 Sep 41 and did not see action again until the fall of 1942. Ritterkreuztraeger (24.7.41). He also fought in Spanish Civil War. Key points include following: a) compelling account of final days/hours before beginning of "Barbarossa" (41/42); b) 23.6.41: on this day, Model's 3. PD – w/ Blaich's Abteilung often "an der Spitze" – drove 150 km deep into the Soviet front, destroying and capturing large numbers of tanks, guns and equipment (45-48, 69-72); c) account of Feldwebel Blaich's combat actions during opening days of campaign clearly demonstrates the *overwhelming tactical superiority* of the German tank crews at this time; d) 25.6.41: lebhaft feindl. Flieger-taetigkeit; discussion of Soviet tactics on ground, while becoming evident that Soviet resistance is noticeably stiffening (73); e) clear from this account that Gen. Model pushed his men to the limits of their endurance; f) 29.6.41: Bobruisk on the Beresina captured (77); g) VVS often active against 3. PD in opening days of campaign (eg., p 78); h) 3.7.41: Battle for Rogatschew begins, the first difficult battle for the division in Russia (78, ff.); i) 4.-7.7.41: difficult and costly fighting to cross the Dnieper near Rogatschew; Blaich's 3 tanks help form bridgehead by crossing underwater (Tauchpanzer!); one German tank coy utterly destroyed in the fighting at this time (81, ff.); j) 13.7.41: On this day, entire 3. PD crosses the "Dnjepr-Abschnitt" behind the 4. PD; advance continues; (85) k) late Jul 41: 3. PD on the Ssosh-Abschnitt; exposed daily to attack by Soviet bombers (87); l) 1.8.41: Obfw. Blaich personally awarded his Ritterkreuz by Gen.-Lt. Model! (87-88); m) 1.8.41: 3. PD supports attack toward Roslawl; its PzRgt 6 now has 103 tanks (88); 10.8.41: n) Kessel von Miloslavitsche (suedwestl. von Roslawl); 20,000 Soviet POWs; (88); o) Aug 41: late in month, 3. PD – along w/ most of Guderian's PzGr 2 – begins thrust south towards Kiev thru most difficult terrain (88, ff.); p) 4.9.41: Gefechtsstaerke der 3. PD jetzt unter 50%; die drei Pz.-Abtl. hatten sogar nur noch Kp.-Staerke. Zum diesem Zeitpunkt lag der Bestand des PzRgt 6 bei 37 Panzer, darunter 6 Pz IV. (95)

- Rokossovsky, K., *A Soldier's Duty*. 1970 (first printing).
- Rudel, Hans Ulrich, *Stuka Pilot*. 1958 (first American edition).
- Sajer, Guy, *The Forgotten Soldier*. 1990 edition.
- Scheurig, Bodo, *Henning von Tresckow. Ein Preusse gegen Hitler*. 1987.
- Schlabrendorff, Fabian v., *Offiziere gegen Hitler*. 1959.
- Schmidt, Dr Paul, *Hitler's Interpreter*. 1951.
- Schmidt, Ulf, *Karl Brandt. The Nazi Doctor*. 2007.
- Schmitterloew, Hptm. Bertram v., *Tagebuch Auszuege (Jul-Okt 42) (AR 14/14. ID (mot.))* (courtesy of Guenter Werner)
- Schneiderbauer, Armin, *Adventures in my Youth: A German Soldier on the Eastern Front: 1941-45*. 2003 (English edition).
- Schroeder, Christa, *Er war mein Chef: Aus dem Nachlass der Sekretaerin von Adolf Hitler*. 1985.
- Schueddekopf, Carl, *Erzaehlungen aus dem Schweigen. Deutsche Soldaten ueber den Zweiten Weltkrieg*. (book gift from Erich Miethe)
- Schulze, Guenter, *General der Panzertruppe a.D. Walther K. Nehring. Der persoenliche Ordonnanzoffizier berichtet von der Vormarschzeit in Russland 1941-42*. (unpublished manuscript)
- Skorzeny, Otto, *Otto Skorzeny: My Commando Operations*. 1975.
- Spahr, William J., *Zhukov. The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain*. 1993.
- Speer, Albert, *Inside the Third Reich*. 1970.
- Speer, Albert, *Erinnerungen*. 1969.
- Sperker, Karl Heinrich, *Generaloberst Erhard Raus: Ein Truppenfuehrer im Ostfeldzug*. 1988.
- Stahlberg, Alexander, *Bounden Duty. The Memoirs of a German Officer 1932-45*. 1990.
- Stein, Marcel, *Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model: Legende und Wirklichkeit*. 2001.

- Strienitz, Fritz, *Memoiren* (excerpts from unpublished manuscript) (**Fallsch.MG.Batl.**)
- Sweeting, C.G., *Hitler's Personal Pilot: The Life and Times of Hans Baur*. 2000.
- Taylor, Fred (ed. & trans.), *The Goebbels Diaries 1939 – 1945*. 1982.
- Tsouras, Peter, G. (ed.), *Panzers on the Eastern Front. General Erhard Raus and His Panzer Divisions in Russia 1941-1945*. 2002.
- Ueberschaer, Gerd R., *Generaloberst Franz Halder: Generalstabschef, Gegner und Gefangener Hitlers*. 1991.
- Vassiltchikov, Marie, *Berlin Diaries. 1940-1945*. 1987.
- Verton, Hendrik C., *Im Feuer der Ostfront: Ein niederlaendischer Freiwilliger an dt. Seite im europ. Schicksalskampf*. 2003.
- Verton, Hendrik C., *In the Fire of the Eastern Front: The Experiences of a Dutch Waffen-SS Volunteer on the Eastern Front 1941-45*. 2007.
- Vogt, Martin (Hg.), *Herbst 1941 im "Fuehrerhauptquartier." Berichte Werner Koepkens an seinen Minister Alfred Rosenberg*. Koblenz, 2002.
- Wagner, Erwin. *Tage wie Jahre. Vom Westwall bis Moskau, 1939-1949*. 1990 (Eigenverlag) & 1997. (**AR / 263. ID**)
- Walde, Karl J., *Guderian*. 1976.<sup>58</sup>
- Warlimont, Walter, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters: 1939-1945*. 1964.
- Weingarten, Emmerich, *Memoiren* (excerpts) (**SR 304 / 2. PD**) (Courtesy of author)
- Weller, Hpt.Fdw., *Tagebuch* (unpublished; excerpts from; courtesy of Konrad Distler) (**IR 480 / 260. ID**)<sup>59</sup>
- Weller, Horst, *1678 Tage bei der 87. Infanterie-Division*. 2002.
- Werth, Alexander, *Moscow War Diary*. 1942.
- Wijers, Hans (ed.), *Sturmgeschuetz-Abt./Bde. 210: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen von ehem. Angehoerigen*. 1997 (self-published).

---

<sup>58</sup> According to Dermot Bradley (as of 1986), this is the best biography of Guderian.

<sup>59</sup> Transcriptions prepared by M. Miethe.

Wijers, Hans (ed.), “...als Panzerfahrer 7000 Kilometer im Sturmgeschuetz...” *Kriegererlebnisse von Uffz. H. Engel, Ritterkreuztraeger in der Sturmgeschuetz-Bde 660 / 259*. 1997 (self-published).

Wijers, Hans (ed.), *Einsatz der Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 276 in Ost- und Westpreussen 1944/45: Nach Tagebuchaufzeichnungen von Alfred Regeniter*. (AR / 255. ID) 2003 (self-published).

Will, Otto, *Mit der 5. Panzer-Division an der Ostfront 1941-1945*. (1995; revised 2005) (self-published, Feb 06; courtesy of author)<sup>60</sup>

Will, Otto, *Tagebuch eines Ostfront-Kaempfers. Mit der 5. PD im Einsatz 1941-45*. 2010. (Courtesy of author).<sup>61</sup>

Woche, Klaus-R., *Zwischen Pflicht und Gewissen. Generaloberst Rudolf Schmidt 1886 – 1957*. 2002.

Yerger, Mark, *SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Weidinger: Knight's Cross w/ Oakleaves and Swords, SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt 4 Der Fuehrer*. 2000.

#### VI. Feldpostbriefe (published collections / misc. unpublished):<sup>62</sup>

“*Menschen im Krieg, Bejahung – und Widerstand*,” (Auszuege aus der Sammlung v. Feldpostbriefen im Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz), in: *Jahrbuch fur westdt. Landesgeschichte*. 1987.

*Ich will raus aus diesem Wahnsinn: Deutsche Briefe von der Ostfront, 1941-45 aus sowjet. Archiven*. Peter Hammer Verlag. 1991. (editor?)

*Das Echolot—Barbarossa '41: Ein kollektives Tagebuch*. Albrecht Knaus Verlag. 2001. (editor?)

*True to Type*:<sup>63</sup> *A Selection from Letters and Diaries of German Soldiers and Civilians collected on the Soviet-German Front*. Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, London, etc., n.d.

Baehr, Walter & Hans, *Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten 1939-45*. 1952.

Buchbender, O., et al., *Das Andere Gesicht des Krieges: Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939-1945*. 1982.

---

<sup>60</sup> **Note:** Also have earlier, unpublished version of his memoirs.

<sup>61</sup> **Note:** After decades of trying, Otto finally got his book published by *Pour le Merite!*

<sup>62</sup> **Note:** Unpublished *Feldpostbriefe* gleaned from archival collections are listed above in Section II, under the appropriate archive. Some of unpublished letters listed here were provided to me directly from German veterans.

<sup>63</sup> This is collection of letters and diaries that had fallen into the hands of the Red Army. Unclear whether they are accurate or contrived; from cursory look, they appear to be the latter (at least in part).

Diewerge, Wolfgang, *Deutsche Soldaten Sehen Die Sowjet-Union: Feldpostbriefe aus dem Osten*. 1941.

Dollinger, Hans (ed.), *Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? Was der Mensch im Zweiten Weltkrieg erleiden muss – dokumentiert in Tagebuecher u. Briefen*. 1983.

Duesel, Dr Hans H. (Hg.), *Gefallen! . . . und umsonst – Erlebnisberichte deutscher Soldaten im Russlandkrieg 1941-45*. 1993.

Geiger, Jeffrey E., *German Prisoners of War at Camp Cooke, CA*. 1996.

Groth, San.Feldw. (**IR 256 / 112. ID**) (Courtesy of comrade Btn.Arzt Eberhard Willich)

Hammer, Ingrid, *et al., Sehr selten habe ich geweint: Briefe und Tagebuecher aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von Menschen aus Berlin*. 1992.

“Hans-Otto“ (**268. ID**) (Courtesy of K. Distler)<sup>64</sup>

Huerter, Johannes, *Ein dt. General an der Ostfront: Die Briefe u. Tagebuecher des Gotthard Heinrici 1941/42*. 2001. (Heinrici was cdr of AK)

Humburg, Martin, *Das Gesicht des Krieges: Feldpostbriefe von Wehrmachtssoldaten aus der Sowjetunion 1941 – 1944*. 1998.

Latzel, Klaus, *Deutsche Soldaten – Nationalsozialistischer Krieg? Kriegserlebnis – Kriegserfahrung. 1939-1945*. 1998.

Kegel, Wolfgang (ed.), *Unteroffizier Alfred Hoffmann: “Vermisst in Witebsk.” Soldatenbreife aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg...*” (self-published) (Hoffmann with **197. ID**) 2001.

Kegel, W. (ed.), *Leutnant Gerhard Jung: Gefallen fuer Grossdeutschland. (Feldpostbriefe collection)* (self-published).

Meyer-Timpe, Ulrike (ed.), *Traeume recht suess von mir*. 2004.<sup>65</sup>

Moltke, Helmut James von., *Letters to Freya 1939-1945*. Edited and translated by Beate Ruhm v. Oppen. 1990.

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), *Kampf Gegen Die Sowjets: Berichte u. Bilder vom Beginn des Ostfeldzuges bis zum Fruehjahr 1942*. 1943.

---

<sup>64</sup> These *Feldpostbriefe* are very detailed, from 21.6.41-22.3.42. “Hans-Otto” is most likely a hyphenated first name.

<sup>65</sup> Includes *Feldpostbriefe* from “Willi,” Soldat with the 10. / Pz.Rgt. 21 / Pz AOK 2)

Richardson, H.F. (ed.), *Sieg Heil: War Letters of Tank Gunner Karl Fuchs 1937-1941*. 1987. (Fuchs w/ **25. PzRgt / 7. PD**)

Richardson, H.F. (ed.), *Your Loyal and Loving Son. The Letters of Tank Gunner Karl Fuchs, 1937-41*. 2003 (updated edition)

Schaefer-Kehnert, Dr Walter, *Kriegstagebuch in Feldpostbriefen: 1940-45*. (unpublished manuscript courtesy of Dr Schaefer) (Dr Schaefer w/ **Pz.AR 119 / 11. PD**)

Scheuer, Guenter (ed.), *Briefe aus Russland: Feldpostbriefe des Gef. A. Scheuer 1941-1942*. ca. 2000. (A. Scheuer w/ **197. ID**)

Scheuer, Guenter (ed.), *Briefe aus Russland: 1941-1942*. (self-published by G. Scheuer) Jun 00.

Scheuer, Alois (deceased), *Briefe aus Russland 1941-1942*. CD (75 Minuten). Kleine Buehne der Volkshochschule St. Ingbert. Lesung im Kulturhaus St. Ingbert am Sonntag, 25 Nov 01.<sup>66</sup>

Showalter, Dennis, *et al.*, *Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History*. 1989.

Stockhoff, Heinrich, *Feldpostbriefe* (courtesy of author) (**IR 37 / 6. ID**)

Stuehlmeier, Heinrich, *Feldpostbrief* (courtesy of author)<sup>67</sup> (**IR 37 / 6. ID**)

Vierkorn, K.G., *Feldpostbriefe-Sammlung* (unpublished; courtesy of Herrn Vierkorn). (Vierkorn with **AR 59 / 23. ID**)

Willems, Paul, *Feldpostbriefe 41/42* (**FPN: 26797 B**) (courtesy of his friend and comrade, Heinrich Stockhoff (**6. ID**)<sup>68</sup>

Wittek, Erhard (ed.), *Die Soldatische Tat: Berichte von Mitkaempfern des Heeres (Der Kampf im Osten 41/42)*. 1943.

Wurster, Gottlieb, *Feldpostbriefe* (unpublished) (courtesy of his Neffe, Gerhard Renz) (**35. ID**)

## VII. *German Veterans (Contributions from “Russlandkaempfer”):*

---

<sup>66</sup> This CD contains a dramatic reading of some of Alois Scheuer’s letters from Russia in 41/42. Courtesy of Guenter Scheuer.

<sup>67</sup> Note: Stuehlmeier letters received from his comrade, H. Stockhoff, who personally recopied all of the letters for me (Jun 05). MS Word file of letters created for me by Marianne Miethe (Jun 06).

<sup>68</sup> I believe these *Feldpostbriefe* are unpublished.

**Adler,<sup>69</sup> Rudolf (11. IR / 14. ID (mot.)** – *Brief; Bericht* (“*Winterschlacht von Rshew: Januar bis Februar 1942*”); *Fragebogen; Fragestellungen*; “*Geschichte des 11. (Saechs.) Inf.-Rgts;*” *Kurzegefasste Geschichte des 11. Inf.Rgts (Vortrag von Dr Wilhelm Rust Sep 98)*; *Feldpostbrief; Propaganda (Flugblaetter)*; „*Landser*“ *publications*

**Andres, Kurt W. (20. PD)** – *Erlebnisbericht* (“*Die Schlacht um Moskau 1941/42*”); also compilation of *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen* from veterans of 20. PD

**Baese, Otto (110. ID)** – *Fragebogen, Tagebuch, Sonderfragen*<sup>70</sup>

**Baetcher, Hansgeorg (K.Gr. 100)** – *Fragebogen* (prepared by Hans Gaenshirt on behalf of Herr Baetcher, who flew He-111s)

**Barkhoff, Guenther (26. ID)**<sup>71</sup> – *Fragebogen / Fotos / Memoiren* (“*Ostfront*”)

**Bauer, Ludwig (3. PD)** – *Fragestellungen*

**Beimdieke, Karl (SR 304 / 2. PD)** – *Fragebogen*

**Belke, Friedrich-August (“Fritz”) (6. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Memoiren* (“*Infanterist*”)

**Bergelt, Walter (56. ID)** – *Fragestellungen u. “Eigenbericht”*

**Beyrich, Dr Martin (AR 14/14. ID (mot.))** – *Tagebuchauszuege* (Jul-Aug 41) (courtesy of Guenter Werner)

**Bock, Guenther (Beob.Abt. 35)** – *Fragebogen / Fotos / KTB III. AR 213 / etc.*

**Boeselager, Philipp Freiherr v. (86. ID / O.O. beim GFM v. Kluge)** – *Fragebogen / Broschure (Widerstand in Hr.Gr.Mitte) / Private Paper (assessment of GFM v. Kluge) / Broschure (Henning v. Tresckow)*

**Borsdorff, Heinz (K.G. z.b.V. 800)** – *Fragebogen u. “Sonderbericht ‘C’*” (Borsdorff served in Ju-52 transport wing)

**Bose, Georg (schw. Heeres-Art.-Abt. 58)**<sup>72</sup> – *Fragebogen*

**Boucein, Heinrich (IR 427 / 129. ID)** – *Telefongespraech* (2, 19 Apr 06)

**Braun, Hans Erich (2. PD)** – *Fragebogen*

**Bremer, Walter H. (95. ID)** – *Memoiren* (self-published)

**Bruenger, Helmut (86. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Kriegserleben (detailed memoir) / Fotos*

**Bub, Emil (Flak Abt. 303)** – *persoenliches Tagebuch* (courtesy of R. Gehrman)

**Bunke, Dr Erich (Pz.Jg.Abt. 31)** – *Fragebogen / Memoir*

**Craemer, Uffz. Otto (IR 37/6. ID)** – *persoenliches Tagebuch* (courtesy of H. Stockhoff)

**Dehmel, Gen.-Lt. (Kdr. 292. ID)** – *Tagebuch* (courtesy of R. Moebius)

**Dicke, Dr Werner (26. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Fragestellungen / Erinnerungen / Bilder / Sonderfragen*

**Dihlmann, Erich (Nach.Abt. 35 / 35. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Kompaniegeschichte (prepared by author) / Geschichte der 3./Inf.Rgt.109 / correspondence (emails, etc.)*

**Dill, Haupt. Hans Joachim (SR 304 / 2. PD)** – *persoenliches Tagebuch* (courtesy of E. Weingarten)

**Dismer, Hans-Joachim (AR 6 / 6. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Buch (personal Memoir)*

**Dowe, Wilhelm (Pz.Jg.Abt. 186 / 86. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Fragestellungen / Kriegserlebnisse (Auszuege)*

<sup>69</sup> Verstorben (**Mar 09**). Nach Brief vom Walter Vollmer.

<sup>70</sup> His son, Wolfgang Baese, and comrade Horst Paul both helped me secure O. Baese’s support of project.

<sup>71</sup> Contact courtesy of Dr Werner Dicke.

<sup>72</sup> Bose was not involved in fighting on central front; wrote book about **Stug.-Bde. 177**. I met him in **Oct 08** at Bad Wimpfen. He is Ritterkreuztraeger.



**Drews, Martin (110. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte*  
**Effing, Heinz (26. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen*  
**Folger, Paul (252. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisbericht*  
**Franze, Herbert (263. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Memoiren / Fragestellungen*  
**Fritze, Prof.Dr.(med.) Eugen (6. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen*  
**Fuehrer, Fritz (6. ID)**<sup>73</sup> – *persoenliches Tagebuch* (courtesy of H. Stockhoff)  
**Garn, Arnulf v. (252. ID)**<sup>74</sup> – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte*  
**Gaenshirt, Hans (K.Gr. 100)** – *Letter / Baetcher Fragebogen* (prepared on B.'s behalf)  
**Gassmann, Aloys (106. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Geschichte Inf.Rgt. 241*  
**Grimm, Robert (58. ID / Hr.Gr.Nord)** – *Fragestellungen / Fragebogen / Memoiren*  
**Groth, San. Feldw. (112. ID)** – *Feldpostbriefe*<sup>75</sup>  
**Gutenkunst, Alfred (35. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen; Geschichte der 11./Inf.Rgt.109*  
**Haape, Heinrich (18 IR/6. ID)** – *Tagebuch, Gefechts- u. Zeitungsberichte, dienstliche Unterlagen, Auszeichnungen, etc.*<sup>76</sup>  
**Hahn, Johannes (129. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Bericht*  
**Hahn, Jochen (AR 292/292. ID)** – *Feldpostbriefe an seine Frau* (courtesy of R. Moebius)  
**“Hans-Otto“ (268. ID)** – *Feldpostbriefe* (courtesy of K. Distler)  
**Heinemann, Werner (IR 67/23. ID)**<sup>77</sup> – *Memorien* (published), *Fragebogen, Feldpostbriefe* (Mar-Oct 41)  
**Heinlein, Walter (2. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Artikel / Erlebnisbericht / Memoiren*  
**Hempel, Kurt (258. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Erlebnisbericht / Memoiren (Auszuege)*  
**Hermann, Alfred (H-Nahaufklaerungsstaffel)** – *Tagebuch (Russlandfeldzug 1941)*<sup>78</sup>  
**Hoffmann, Uffz. Alfred (197. ID)** – *„Vermisst in Witebsk“* (courtesy of W. Kegel)  
**Hohmeier, Herbert (6. ID)** – *Interview in Rzhev* (May 05)  
**Hoyer, Ludwig (95. ID)** – *23 Fotos* (courtesy of his son)  
**Jakubowski, Ofw. (292. ID)** – *Tagebuch* (courtesy of R. Moebius)  
**Klein, Rudolf (252. ID)** – *Fragebogen*  
**Krehl, Eberhard (Stab Ari.-Kdr. 121 der Pz.Tr.)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Erinnerungen*  
**Kreuter, Georg (SR 101 / 18. PD)** – *“Kriegstagebuch”* (courtesy of K. Schumann)  
**Krombholz Erwin (3.(H)/21(Pz))** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte / Urkunden / Chronik der Aufklaerungsstaffel 3.(H)/21(Pz), usw.*  
**Kruedenscheidt, Ernst (IR 18 / 6. ID)**<sup>79</sup> – *Fragebogen*  
**Krueger, Arthur (60. ID (mot.))** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisbericht / Memoiren*<sup>80</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Passed away, Mar 06.

<sup>74</sup> Passed away in 2004.

<sup>75</sup> Courtesy of Dr. E. Willich.

<sup>76</sup> Passed away ca. 1994. His papers courtesy of sons Johannes & Heinz (Dec 07).

<sup>77</sup> Heinemann passed away in 1983. He was a battalion commander in IR 67 during battle of Moscow; became regimental commander in IR 67 in Jan 42. Fragebogen and Feldpostbriefe courtesy of his daughter, Dr. Birgit Heinemann (Aug 10).

<sup>78</sup> Courtesy of M. Miethe (Jun 06)

<sup>79</sup> Passed away 03 Dec 05.

<sup>80</sup> This unit belonged to Hr.Gr.Sued. Saw action at Stalingrad. Contact courtesy of M. Miethe (Jun 06).

**Kummer, Kurt (AR 88 (mot) / 18. PD)** – *Fragebogen; Tagebuchauszuege*  
**Kunz, Wilhelm (87. ID)** – *Fragebogen, Fragestellungen, Buecher*  
**Leppelmann, Wilhelm (6. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisbericht*  
**Langer, Franz-Josef (6. ID)**<sup>81</sup> – *Feldpostbriefe / Kuenstwerke / usw.* (courtesy of his son, Wolfgang Langer)  
**Lierow, Dr. Hans (6. ID)** – *personal diary* (courtesy of his son, Dr. K. Lierow-Mueller)  
**Loewer, Willi (AR 129 / 129. ID)**—*Fragebogen / Memoiren / Artikeln*  
**Loheide, Hermann (95. ID)** – *Nachlass (Wehrpass, Karten, etc.)* (Courtesy of Karl H. Hoyer)  
**Mayer, Karl Hans (30. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisbericht*  
**Meinecke, Ernst (86. ID)** – *Berichte / Erlebnisberichte / Karten / J. Moeller Buch / etc.*  
**Meyer, August (106. ID)**<sup>82</sup> – *Fragebogen / Fragestellungen / Rgts-Geschichten*  
**Miethe, Erich (Ju 52 pilot)**<sup>83</sup> – *Memoiren; misc. Documents*  
**Mobius, Rudolf (292. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte / Erinnerungen / photos, etc.*  
**Moennich, Horst (FlakRgt 12)** – *Telephone Interview (w/ P. Steinkamp)*  
**Mueller-Wolfram, Gerd (Flak Abt. 71)** – *Telephone Interview (w/ P. Steinkamp)*  
**Nebe, Erich (IR 37 / 6. ID)**<sup>84</sup> – *Erinnerungen* (memoirs)  
**Nehring, Christoph (son of Pz.Gen. Walther K. Nehring / 18. PD)** – *Intvw in Essen* (Jun 05) / books & articles / Assessments of his father (by former subordinates)  
**Niermann, Hans Wilh. (6. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Tagebuch / Feldpostbriefe*  
**Pagel, Horst (German soldier)** – *Unpublished stories*  
**Pante, Dr Helmuth (Veterinaer-Untersuchungsstelle 509)** – *Kriegserlebnisse*  
**Regeniter, Alfred (255. ID)** – *personal diary excerpts*  
**Rhein, Ernst-Martin (IR 18 / 6. ID)** – *Fragebogen / book (his history of IR 18) / personal intvw (Dec 06).*  
**Richter, Georg (AR 74 / 2 PD)** – *persoenliches Tagebuch* (courtesy of E. Weingarten)  
**Richter, Dr. Will (268. ID)** – *Gefechtsberichte* (courtesy of K. Distler)  
**Ringenberg, Obstlt. (IR 240 / 106. ID)**<sup>85</sup> – *Erlebnisbericht* (courtesy of W. Vollmer)  
**Risse, Siegfried (IR 101 / 18. PD)** – *Manuscript (Regimentsgeschichte)*<sup>86</sup>  
**Schaefer-Kehnert, Dr W. (11. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Special Questionnaire / BBC interview / Feldpostbriefe, etc..*  
**Scharffetter, Friedrich-Karl (Flak)** – *Brief, Book excerpts.*  
**Schickner, Wilhelm (2. PD)** – *Erlebnisbericht* (courtesy of E. Weingarten)  
**Schillke, Hans (8. PD / Hr.Gr. Nord)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen*  
**Schmidt, Albert (14. ID (mot.))** – *Erlebnisbericht* (Sommer 1944)<sup>87</sup>  
**Schmiterloew, Bertram v. (IR 14 / 14. ID (mot.))** – *Tagebuchauszuege*<sup>88</sup>  
**Schoening, Dietrich (AR 6 / 6. ID)** – *Brief discussion w/ in Rshew* (May 05)  
**Schroeter, Helmut (56. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Berichte*

<sup>81</sup> Passed away in early 1980s.

<sup>82</sup> Passed away Jan 06. (Notified by W. Vollmer.)

<sup>83</sup> Passed away late 2009. Had flown his first **Ju 52** missions into Stalingrad in **Jan 43**.

<sup>84</sup> Passed away 13 Jan 05. Memoirs courtesy of his son, Karl-Friedrich Nebe.

<sup>85</sup> Passed away in 1968.

<sup>86</sup> Courtesy of Klaus Schumann.

<sup>87</sup> Passed away Oct 06. Report courtesy of Klaus Schumann.

<sup>88</sup> Tagebuch courtesy of Guenter Werner.

**Schulze, Guenter (O.O. beim Kdr / 18. PD)**<sup>89</sup> – *Brief / Telephone Intvw (w/ F. Roemer) / Memoiren (Vormarschzeit in Russland 41/42)*

**Schulze, Helmut (56. ID)** – *Fragebogen*

**Soff, Heinz (56. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Brief*

**Sohn, Hermann (35. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Tagebuch / Farbkarten / Fotos, etc.*

**Stelly, Werner (SS-Kav.-Brig.)** – *Fragebogen, etc.*

**Stockhoff, Heinrich (6. ID)**<sup>90</sup> – *Fragebogen / Fragestellungen / /FPB / FPB (of deceased Kamerad P.W.) / Kampfberichte / misc.*

**Stoves, Rolf O.G. (1. PD)** – *Fragebogen, etc.*

**Strienitz, Fritz (Fsch.M.G.Batl.7)**<sup>91</sup> – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Memoiren (excerpts) / unit history (excerpts) / misc.*

**Stuehlmeier, Heinrich (IR 37 / 6. ID)** – *Intvw in Rzhew (May 05) / Feldpostbriefe / Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Erlebnisbericht (Weihnachten 1941)*

**Tilinski, M. (292. ID)** – *Erlebnisbericht (courtesy of R. Moebius)*

**Trotsch, Otto (5. PD)** – *Fragestellungen*

**Vierkorn, K.G. (AR 59 / 23. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Feldpostbriefe / Erlebnisberichte, etc.*

**Vollmer, Walter (AR 107 / 106. ID)** – *Brief / Fragebogen / Erlebnisbericht / Einheitsgeschichte; Geschichte des I.R. 77 (26. ID); Kuratorium Rzhew (Personalliste)*

**Vornholt, Erich (IR 58/6. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte / Rhein Buch (Auszuege)*

**Voss, Dr. Hellmuth (Pi.Btn. 6 / 6. ID)** – *Geschichte des Pi.Btns 6 im Russlandfeldzug (courtesy of Wolfgang Langer)*

**Wagemann, Eberhard (23. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Rgt. History*

**Wardin, Eberhard (9./537 HNR)**<sup>92</sup> – *Erlebnisberichte / Briefe / Sonderfragen*

**Weingartner, Emmerich (SR 304 / 2. PD)** – *Fragebogen; Sonderfragen; Memoiren (excerpts); referrals (to other vets); material from other vets.*

**Weller, Hpt.Fdw. (IR 480 / 260. ID)** – *Tagebuch (excerpts from; courtesy of K. Distler)*

**Werner, Guenter (AR 251 / 251. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Tagebuchauszuege (of Hptm Schmitterloew & Dr Martin Beyrich) / Kurzgeschichte IR 53(mot.)(14. ID.(mot.))*

**Werner, Wolfgang (252. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Erlebnisberichte / Dokumenten*

**Wessler, Wilhelm (IR 58 / 6. ID)** – *Tagebuch Auszuege / Erlebnisberichte*

**Wexel, Heinz (IR 82 / 31. ID)**<sup>93</sup> – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Fotos*

**Will, Otto (5. PD)** – *Fragebogen / Fotos / Memoiren des Russlandfeldzuges / Sonderfragen / FPB / Buch (Memoiren) / Maps*

**Willich, Eberhard (112. ID)** – *Fragebogen / Sonderfragen / Erfahrungsbericht / Artikeln / FPB of San.Feldw.Groth*

**Wothe, Willy (3. PD)**<sup>94</sup> – *Bericht (“Vormarsch ueber Orel nach Tula—Oct – Dez 41)*

**Wurster, Gottlieb (35. ID)** – *Fragebogen (prepared by Neffe, G. Renz); Feldpostbriefe*

**Ziegner,**<sup>95</sup> **Wilhelm (7. PD)** – *Erzaehlungen / Feldpostbriefe (excerpts from) / Fragebogen (prepared by his son)*

<sup>89</sup> Passed away 02 Apr 06. (Notified by C. Nehring)

<sup>90</sup> Passed away Apr 09.

<sup>91</sup> Contact courtesy of W. Vollmer & U. Seyfarth. Fritz passed away on **13 Sep 10 (geb. 3.8.21).**

<sup>92</sup> Passed away 15 Nov. 05.

<sup>93</sup> Contact courtesy of Christoph Nehring.

<sup>94</sup> Herr Wothe joined 6./Pz.Gren.Btl II/3. PD in Sep 42—i.e., didn't participate directly in Schlacht um Moskau. He interviewed many former members of 3.PD for his *Bericht*.

<sup>95</sup> Material provided by son, H. Ziegner.

Zirk, Georg(e) (KG 55 & 4) – *Fragestellungen* (via email correspondence)

VIII. *Barbarossa (General Accounts / Photographic Studies)*:

Aaken, Wolf van, *Hexenkessel Ostfront. Von Smolensk nach Breslau*. 1964.

Anderson, Duncan, *et al.*, *Die Ostfront 1941-1945. Barbarossa, Stalingrad und Berlin*. German edition (2002)

Bartov, Omer, *The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*. Second edition (2001)<sup>96</sup>

Boog, Horst, *et al.*, *Germany and the Second World War. Vol IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union*. (German official history of WWII)

Boog, H., *et al.*, *Das Deutsche Reich u. der Zweite Weltkrieg. Vol. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*. (same as above)

Carell, Paul, *Hitler Moves East, 1941 – 1943*. 1964.

Carell, P., *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der Marsch nach Russland*. 1963.

Carell, P., *Operation Barbarossa in Photographs*. 1991.

Clark, Alan, *Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945*. 1965.

*Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Vols. 2-4. Akademie-Verlag. Berlin. 1982-84. (Brief excerpts from courtesy of Fritz Strienitz)<sup>97</sup>

Erickson, John, *The Road to Stalingrad. Stalin's War with Germany: Volume One*. 1975.

Erickson, J., *The Road to Berlin. Stalin's War with Germany: Volume Two*. 1983.

Erickson, John & Ljubica, *The Eastern Front in Photographs: 1941-1945*. 2001.

Fleischer, Wolfgang, *Unternehmen Barbarossa, 1941*. 1998. (Bildband)

Forum "Unternehmen Barbarossa," at: <http://hco.hagen.de/barbarossa>. Redaktion: Wigbert Benz. (Auf dem Server des Historischen Centrums Hagen)

---

<sup>96</sup> Bartov's books includes accounts of the 12. ID, Gross Deutschland, and 18. PD—the latter perhaps because the records for this division are nearly complete. Note: View Bartov's data on troop strength with suspicion. According to Christoph Rass, Bartov is not careful in his use of different types of strength reports, *Verfligungsstaerke*, *Gefechtsstaerke*, etc.

<sup>97</sup> Note: This is an East German *official* (?) history.

Fowler, Will, *Eastern Front: The Unpublished Photographs: 1941-1945*. 2001.

Friedrich, Joerg, *Das Gesetz des Krieges. Das dt. Heer in Russland 1941-45. Der Prozess gegen das OKW*, 1995.<sup>98</sup>

Frieser, K.-H., et. al., *Die Ostfront 1943/44. Der Krieg im Osten u. an den Nebenfronten*. DRZW / Bd. 8. 2007.

Fugate, Bryan, et al., *Thunder on the Dnieper: Zhukov – Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg*. 1997.

Glantz, David (ed.), *The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22 Jun – Aug 41*. 1993.

Glantz, D. (et al.), *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. 1995.

Glantz, D., *Barbarossa: Hitler’s Invasion of Russia, 1941*. 2001.

Glantz, D., *Before Stalingrad. Barbarossa—Hitler’s Invasion of Russia 1941*. 2003. (Note: this is paperback version of above book)

Glantz, D., “*What If?*” *The German Eastern Front in 1941 Revisited*. 2006.

Glantz, D. & House J.M., *To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942*. 2009.

---

<sup>98</sup> **Note:** Juergen (Foerster) told me not to waste my time w/ this book. That said, I did read 20 pp. and found following: a) **8 Jul 41:** folgte der Stab der **4. Armee** unter GFM v. Kluge zum Uebergang [ueber die Beresina] bei Borissow. “Hier fanden wir die Spuren Napoleons,” schreibt Stabschef Blumentritt. “Einige Kilometer noerdl. von Borissow war es, wo die Grande Armee im Winter **1812** den vereisten Fluss ueberqueren musste u. so entsetzliche Verluste erlitt. *Wenn das Wasser klar ist, kann man noch die Reste der Pfeiler sehen*, welche die franz. Ingenieure ins Flussbett getrieben haben, um die Bruecken zu stuetzen.” (452); b) GFM v. Kluge fuehrte die Denkwuerdigkeiten des Grossstallmeisters Coulaincourt, des Adjutanten des Kaisers, stets mit sich. “*Es war seine Bibel*.” (452-53); c) Sommer **'41:** V. Bock’s avancierte H.Gr.Mitte zeigte eine offene suedl. Flankenseite. Napoleons Flanken waren auch das bevorzugte Objekt Kutusows gewesen. Das entscheidende Debakel des Spaetsommers **1812** hatte Clausewitz aber in der Versorgungslage gesehen. (456); d) Kiew – Wjasma/Bryansk: Innerhalb von sechs [**6**] Wochen hatte die Sowjetunion **1.3** Millionen Mann, **2100** Panzer u. **9100** Geschuetze verloren. (459); e) in Kiew waren beim Einzug der **6. Armee** durch Funkwellen Abertausende verborgener Minen gezuendet worden. (459); f) **Nov 41:** GFM v. Bock fuehlte sich abwechselnd an die Marne erinnert, wo der Sieg am letzten Batl. hing, u. an Verdun, wo die Hohenzollernarmee sinnlos verblutete. (464); g) **Dez 41:** Die Gruende des Erfolges gleichen denen des Misserfolges; das Vabanquespiel, das uebersteigerte Zutrauen zur eigenen Kraft, die Verachtung des Gegners u. vor allem der *Zauber, den man der **Ultrahaerte** beimass*. Das war das Mal des Ersten Weltkrieges, in dem man sich hatte erweichen lassen. (464); h) Haltebefehl: Trotz erdrueckender Ueberlegenheit Schukows zerschellte die Angriffskraft der sowj. Offensive an der Magie des Hitlerischen Haltebefehls. . . Hitler hatte am dt. Soldaten wiederum ein *psychologisches Wunder* vollbracht. (466).

Glantz, D., *Barbarossa Derailed – The Battle for Smolensk 10 July – 10 September 1941, Vol. I: The German Advance, the Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July – 24 August 1941*. 2010.

Hartmann, Christian, *Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Krieg im Osten, 1941-1945*. 2011.

Hoyt, Edwin P., *Stalin's War. Tragedy and Triumph, 1941-1945*. 2003.<sup>99</sup>

Keegan, John, *Barbarossa: Invasion of Russia, 1941*. 1970.

Kershaw, Robert J., *War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941/42*. 2000.

Kirchubel, Robert, *Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3): Army Group Center (Campaign)*, Osprey Publishing. 2008.

Kirchubel, Robert, *Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Front*. 2009.

Lucas, James, *War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia, 1941-1945*. 1979.

Mawdsley, Evan, *Thunder in the East*. (Unpublished manuscript / copies of portions addressing Battle of Moscow)

---

<sup>99</sup> **Note:** This is a short, popular history (and, frankly, sort of “Mickey Mouse”), yet it has solid endorsements from Glantz, Ziemke, etc! It also states clearly – citing Ernst Topitsch – that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany (“but in **1939** was not yet prepared to do so. It would be another three years before he could strike.”) Perforce, book supports position that “Barbarossa” was preventive – at least in the long term. Key points: a) German shortages of raw materials (list) (6); b) opines that only about a month before Hitler’s attack did Stalin finally accept truth that there would be war w/ Germany; yet even then he said it might come in a year, not in a month (8); c) Russia suffers from lack of an auto industry; only **800,00** motor vehicles (14); d) evening of **21.-22.6.41** – Lt.Gen. Kutznesov (C-in-C **3. Army**) reports Germans had removed barbed wire barriers along border; roar of engines can be heard in forest; trainloads of pontoon equipment, sectional bridges and ammo arriving, etc. (25); e) **22.6.41**: Luftwaffe destroys trains, gasoline and grain warehouses burning on outskirts of Belostok; fuel dumps set on fire; Germans use *incendiary bullets* to destroy railroad cars filled w/ fuel, etc. (28-29); f) states that the STAVKA was an “exact copy from the days of Nicholas II” (35); g) Stalin’s “disappearance” – his great hero was Ivan the Terrible (one work in his personal library that was “much thumbed” was Tolstoy’s play “Ivan the Terrible” (40); h) **22.6.41** – Stalin’s behavior (“he was so nervous he drank only one cup of tea all day.”) (50, ff.); i) **29.6.41**: Stalin turns up twice at the defense commissariat and subjects everyone there to abuse; his face is gray and he has huge bags under his eyes (54); j) **10.7.41**: Stalin was in charge from this day till end of war; he “meddled shamelessly” w/ his military cdrs (58); k) start of **Aug 41**: Shaposhnikov summoned to Stalin’s dacha at midnight and gave Stalin an account of situation on all fronts; Stalin concludes Red Army capable of stopping Germans (66-67); l) **7.7.41**: Guderian reaches the Dnieper; decides to disobey orders and cross; on **10-11 Jul 41** he crosses, losing only **8 men**; by **29 Jul 41**, he is only **300** miles from Moscow (71); m) **Oct 41**: Stalin suggests Beria find way to negotiate another Brest-Litovsk (like one signed by Lenin in **Mar 18**) (75); n) **Oct 41**: Germans advance another **150** miles toward Moscow (80); **Oct-Nov 41**: brief account of fighting (72, ff.); o) **15.11.-5.12.41**: In **20** days, in second German offensive, Wehrmacht had lost **155,000** men, **800** tanks, **300** guns and **1500** acft (90); p) the Red Army’s serious handicap in winter **41/42** was a shortage of transportation; there were only **8000** trucks available on the Moscow front, a totally inadequate number. (96)

Megargee, Geoffrey P., *War of Annihilation. Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941*. 2006.

Mitcham, Samuel, *Men of Barbarossa: Commanders of the German Invasion of Russia*. 2009.<sup>100</sup>

Mueller, Rolf-Dieter, *et al.*, *Hitler's War in the East: A Critical Assessment*. 2002.

Philippi, Alfred, *et al.*, *Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrußland: 1941 bis 1945. Ein operativer Ueberblick*. 1962.<sup>101</sup>

Rees, Laurence, *War on the Century. When Hitler Fought Stalin*. 1999. (Contains some excellent eye-witness accounts.)

---

<sup>100</sup> **Note:** This book includes dozen of useful biographies of key German commanders in “Barbarossa;” also includes short synopsis of the campaign of 1941.

<sup>101</sup> In his book, *Hitlers Heerfuhrer* (2006), J. Huerter mentions Philippi / Heim book (“Feldzug”) as example of the “noble” view of the Wehrmacht and its role in *Barbarossa* so sedulously fostered by Gen Halder and the generals after the war (see, FMS studies): “Die mil. Selbstdarstellung des Ostkrieges wurde vor allem von Philippi/Heim...verbreitet u. beeinflusste auch die angelsaechsische Literatur, vgl. *Etwa Seaton...*“ (Huerter, pp 281-82) That said, Philippi / Heim book has much to offer, including following: a) good overview of “Aufmarsch” for “Barbarossa: **17,000** total trains (**Jan-Jun 41**), **126** total divisions (+ **19** in reserve), etc. (52-53); b) good account of “Kesselschlacht bei Kiew:” makes clear that **OKH** initially hoped it would not have to commit elements of H.Gr.Mitte (**2. Armee** + **PzGr 2**) beyond the Desna River; however, its commitment south of the Desna became imperative after Soviet SW Front stopped its withdrawal and began to accumulate massive forces in Kiev area (76-79); c) as possible alternative to the Kiev operation authors aver that, by late **Aug 41** at the latest, it would have been necessary to “liberate” H.Gr.Sued from Hitler’s “exzentrischen Konzeption mit den Zielrichtungen Krim u. Donezbecken . . . u. statt dessen ihren Schwerpunkt in allgemeiner Richtung Kursk anzusetzen, um so den Stoss auf Moskau im Sueden zu begleiten u. abzudecken. . . Nicht weniger folgerichtig waere [diese Alternative] auch nach der gewonnenen Schlacht gewesen. . . Was Hitler aber nicht begreifen wollte, war das alte Gesetz, dass man in der entscheidenden Richtung nie stark genug sein kann – anders gesagt, dass ein Feldzug gegen Rußland nicht mit zersplitterten Kraeften gewonnen wird!” (79); d) discussion of Leningrad operation; notes that by early **Sep 41**, the **57. AK (mot.)** was also withdrawn from H.Gr.Mitte (**PzGr 3**) and given to H.G.Nord; the corps captured Demjansk on **8.9.41**; (80); e) vor allem muss der Entzug der beiden mot. Korps der **PzGr 3** aus dem Bereich der H.Gr.Mitte als ein Fehlgriff gedeutet werden, der operativ entscheidend ins Gewicht fiel (81); f) **11.9.41: OKH** orders the transfer of **5 Pz.-Div.**, **2 ID (mot.)** u. **8. Air Corps** from Nord to Mitte by **25.9.41** (81); g) overview of status of H.Gr.Mitte – available forces, logistics, etc. – on eve of “Taifun” (82-83); h) discussion of preparations (deployments, operational strategy, etc.) for “Taifun;” notes that H.Gr.Sued contributed **2 PD**, **2 ID (mot.)** and **5 ID** to the operation; (84-86); i) brief but useful summary of “*Schlacht von Wjasma*” and “*Brjansk*;” former ended on **14.10.41**, the latter on **20.10.41** (86); j) discussion of the “*Schlammperiode*;” good overview of myriad problems faced by troops, vehicles and weapons of H.Gr.Mitte;” **OKW** order of **14.10.41** re: encirclement of Moscow illustrates just how the Schwerpunkt of the operation was severely diluted by excentric nature of operations (90-93); k) **30.11.41:** Status of H.Gr.Mitte (line reached) (91-92); l) die Wende des Feldzuges (authors support position of **OKH**, H.Gr.Mitte, etc., that the decision in the eastern campaign was to be sought at Moscow); brief account of second phase of “Taifun,” beginning on **15.11.41**. This second phase could not start until mid-**Nov 41** due to requirement to: a) replenish stocks of munitions, fuel, etc.; b) close up the divisions which had become strung-out during the muddy season; c) bring up the artillery & heavy wpns which had become bogged down, etc. (94-99).

Salewski, Michael, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, Bd. I: 1935-41. 1970.<sup>102</sup>

Stahel, David, *And the World held its Breath. The German Strategic Crisis in the Summer of 1941 and the Failure of Operation Barbarossa.*” Doctoral dissertation (2008).  
Courtesy of author.

Seaton, Albert, *The Russo-German War: 1941-45*. 1971.

Seidler, Hans, *Images of War. Operation Barbarossa*. (Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives) 2010.

Stolfi, R.H.S., *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted*. 1992.

Tsouras, Peter G. (ed.), *Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front*. 1995.

Ueberschaer, Gerd R., et al., *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der dt. Ueberfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941*. 1984.

Winchester, Charles, *Ostfront: Hitler's War on Russia, 1941-45*. 2000.

#### **IX. *Battle of Moscow (Sep 41 – Apr 42):***

Braithwaite, Rodric, *Moscow 1941. A City and its People at War*. 2006.

Forczyk, Robert, *Moscow 1941. Hitler's First Defeat*. Osprey Publishing. 2006.

Grossman, Horst, *Rshew: Eckpfeiler der Ostfront*. 1962.

Hahn, Dr Oswald (ed.), “Zum 8. Januar 1942: Die Ruecknahme der 4. Panzerarmee aus dem ‘Balkon von Borowsk.’ Das mil. Vermaechtnis von Generaloberst Erich Hoepner.” 1982.

Haupt, Werner, *Assault on Moscow 1941: The Offensive, the Battle, the Setback*. 1996.

Haupt, W., *Sturm auf Moskau 1941: Der Angriff, Die Schlacht, Der Rueckschlag*. 1986.

Haupt, W., *Die Deutschen vor Moskau 1941/42: Bildchronik einer Schlacht*. 1972.

Jacobsen, Dr. Hans-Adolf (et al.), *Entscheidungsschlachten des zweiten Weltkrieges*. 1960.

Jacobsen, Dr. H.A., *1939-1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten*. 1959.

---

<sup>102</sup> **Note:** Didn't really have any category for this book, so simply stuck it here.



Jones, Michael, *The Retreat – Hitler’s First Defeat*. 2009. (Galley proofs; courtesy of Evan Mawdsley)<sup>103</sup>

Jukes, Geoffrey, *The Defense of Moscow*. 1970.

Kondratjew, Oleg. A., *Die Schlacht von Rshev. Ein halbes Jahrhundert Schweigen*. 2001 (expanded edition / original in Russian 1999)

Magenheimer, Heinz, *Moskau 1941. Entscheidungsschlacht im Osten*. 2009.

Muriyev, Dado, *The Rout of “Typhoon,”* 1979. (Note: this is a tendentious Soviet account of battle)<sup>104</sup>

Nagorski, Andrew, *The Greatest Battle. Stalin, Hitler and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow that Changed the Course of World War II*. 2007.

Paul, Wolfgang, *Erfrorener Sieg—Die Schlacht um Moskau 1941/42*. 1975.

Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, *Die Schlacht um Moskau: Die erfrorene Offensive*. 1998.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> **Note:** This book’s weakness is the “paper-thin” narrative of actual operations during first year of “Barbarossa.” However, there are lots of good personal recollections laid out in a rigidly chronological order. Chapter on General Model – addressing his operations as C-in-C of **AOK 9** in **Jan/Feb 42** – is particularly useful.

<sup>104</sup> **Note:** This little booklet written in Marxist-Leninist jargon – w/ usual acts of omission and commission – yet still useful: a) Macro-statistics (e.g., every minute of war for **1418** days Russia lost **9** lives; **587** lives every hour; **14,000** every day, based on total of **20,000,000** dead (more update figure of total losses would be as high as ca. **27,000,000**); b) like most Soviet accounts, Muriyev exaggerates size of German “Ostheer” on **22.6.41**; c) states that Battle of Smolensk and slowing down of the German advance was Red Army’s “first strategic achievement;” d) avers Moscow’s population was to be exterminated in gas chambers; e) Battle of Borodino (**32. RD** holds off German advance for **5** days); f) good details on efforts by Moscow citizens to build city’s defenses; g) German crimes (“scorched earth;” account of destruction of Tolstoy’s estate); h) states **11** railroad lines running in and out of Moscow, **7** of which the Germans had cut by mid-**Oct 41**; i) German “Herbstoffensive” **Nov 41**: fighting at Dubosekovo railway station beyond Volokolamsk (**16.11.41**); j) states Soviet winter **41/42** counteroffensive liberated over **11,000** inhabited localities, including **60** towns and cities.

<sup>105</sup> **Note:** This book provides a strict chronology – day-by-day – of events (often juxtaposed w/ events from **1812**). Does include some useful facts: a) Hitler in Mein Kampf: “Wollte man in Europa Grund u. Boden, dann konnte diese im Grossen u. Ganzen nur auf Kosten Russlands geschehen;” (6); b) ab **22.6.41**: Erst im Einsatzraum stellen die Pz.-Kommandanten zu ihrem Entsetzen fest, dass die Landkarten der UdSSR, die ihnen das OKH ausgehändigt hat, in keiner Weise der Wirklichkeit entsprechen: Fast alle als Strassen eingezeichneten Verbindungen erweisen sich als unbefestigte Sandwege. (76); c) Die Doppelschlacht von Bialystok – Minsk kostet die Sowjets . . . Mehrere sowjetische Kommandeure u. viele ihrer Soldaten verueben Selbstmord. (81); d) am **28.6.41**, dem siebten Tag seiner Operationen, erreichte Napoleon Wilna. Graf Anatole de Montesquiou, ein juengerer Leutnant im Stabe, zaehlte auf dem Weg von Njemen nach Wilna **1240** tote Pferde. (81); e) Anfang **Jul 41**: In Moskau kursieren alle moeglichen Geruechte. Es wird sorgar behauptet, dass Stalin bereits fuer seine Verbrechen abgeurteilt wurde, u. Trotzki unterwegs sei, um die Fuehrung zu uebernehmen. (84); f) **16.7.41**: Am Abend nimmt die **29. ID (mot.) Smolensk** nach **48** Stunden erbitterte Strassenkaempfe. . . Nun hat die **2 PzGr** von Brest-Litowsk nach Smolensk eine Strecke von gut **600** km hinter sich gebracht. . . Sie nimmt die Stadt am **25.** Tage der Operation. Bis hierher erreichten die dt. Truppen im Mittelabschnitt einen Tagesdurchschnitt von **24** km, mehr als das Doppelte

Plievier, Theodor, *Moscow*, 1950. (Roman)

Reinhardt, Klaus, *Moscow—the Turning Point The Failure of Hitler’s Strategy in the Winter of 1941-42*. 1992.

Reinhardt, K., *Die Wende vor Moskau: Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42*. 1972.<sup>106</sup>

Richardson, William (ed.), *The Fatal Decisions*. 1956. (includes chapter on Moscow by G. Blumentritt.)

Seaton, Col. Albert, *The Battle for Moscow*. 1971.

Turney, Alfred W., *Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock’s Campaigns 1941-42*. 1970.

Wagener, Carl, *Moskau 1941: Der Angriff auf die russische Hauptstadt*. 1965.<sup>107</sup>

Ziemke, Earl F., et al., *Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East*. 1988.<sup>108</sup>

“Operation Ssytschewka, Jan. 42: Combat Experiences of Fritz Langanke 2nd SS Pz.-Div. ‘Das Reich, ’...” (at: [www.dasreich.ca/fritz](http://www.dasreich.ca/fritz))

#### X. *Luftwaffe in Barbarossa (Jun 41 – Apr 42):*<sup>109</sup>

---

von Napoleons Grande Armee. (88); g) **Jul 41**: excellent account of the Soviet efforts to defend and camouflage Moscow against air attack (89-90); h) **25.7.41**: Erwaeht der dt. Wehrmachtsbericht erstmals das Auftreten von Partisanen. (91); i) am **18.8.1812**, dem **58**. Operationstag, eroberte Napoleon nach blutigen Kaempfen Smolensk. . . Die Grande Armee hatte bis jetzt Luftlinie **580** km zurueckgelegt, taeglich im Schnitt etwas ueber **10** km. (96); j) Interesting facts re: Napoleon’s Battle of Borodino (100); k) am **11.9.41**: beginnt in der Mandschurei die Verladung der ersten Verbaende der sowj. Fernostarmee in Richtung Moskau. (100); l) **14.9.1812**: am **85**. Operationstage, **920** km Luftlinie von ihrer Ausgangsstellung entfernt u. einer Marschleistung von **11** km taeglich, erreichte die Grande Armee Moskau. (101); m) **24.9.41**: findet in Smolensk im Gef.-Std. der H.Gr.Mitte eine Besprechung uber die Operation gegen Moskau statt. (102); n) Operation “Taifun.” useful details on preparations for the offensive, Soviet counter-preparations. (104-6); o) Verlustziffer des Osttheeres vom **22.6.-30.9.41** (106); p) day-by-day account of Operation “Taifun,” w/ many useful details. (123, ff.); q) *Dichte der sowjet. Verteidigungsfront* (Nr. von Pak, Artillerie, Panzer, usw. per kilometer) (124); r) fatal decisions made by **OKH & AGC** on **7.10.41** for the pursuit (127). See “Piekalkiewicz” folder for more details.

<sup>106</sup> J. Huerter (*Hitlers Heerfuehrer*, 2006) praises Reinhardt’s book as example of beginning reassessment of Wehrmacht and its role in *Barbarossa* (in contrast to misleading image of a “clean” and noble Wehrmacht fostered by Halder and his FMS group (p 282, fn. 10).

<sup>107</sup> **Note**: See my notes (24 pp) gleaned from this old, yet useful work.

<sup>108</sup> According to John Erickson (Apr 92 article in *Journal of Military History*), Ziemke’s book is the “most balanced, the most perceptive, and even the most informative account of the crucial period of the German-Soviet war...This must be accounted the best book so far written on this highly controversial, and politically and militarily complex, period.” Also offers “vivid picture of frontline life.”

<sup>109</sup> Note: Luftwaffe studies (and several misc. studies) gleaned from the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell AFB, AL, are listed separately above (under AFHRA).

*Aircraft of the World*. International Masters Publishers. (Collection of “thumbnail” sketches of German/Russia a/c)

Air Ministry (U.K.), *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: 1933-1945*. 1948.

Kameradschaft ehm. Transportflieger, *Geschichte einer Transportflieger-Gruppe im II. Weltkrieg*. 1989.

“Das Jagdgeschwader 27” (at: <http://www.jg27.de>).

Balke, Ulf, *Kampfgeschwader 100, “Wiking.”* 1981. (He-111s gegen Moskau, etc.)

Bekker, Cajus, *The Luftwaffe War Diaries*. 1967.

Bergstroem, Christer, *et al.*, *Black Cross Red Star: The Air War Over the Eastern Front. Vol. I, Operation Barbarossa 1941*. 2000.

Bergstroem, C., *et al.*, *Black Cross Red Star: The Air War Over the Eastern Front. Vol. II: Resurgence, Jan – Jun 42*. 2001.

Bishop, Chris, *Luftwaffe Squadrons 1939-45. The Essential Aircraft Identification Guide*. 2006.

Boog, Horst, “Higher Command and Leadership in the German Luftwaffe, 1935-1945,” in: *Air Power and Warfare. The Proceedings of the 8<sup>th</sup> Military History Symposium USAF Academy 18-20 October 1978*. Alfred F. Hurley, Col., USAF & Robert C. Ehrhart, Maj., USAF (editors). 1979.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> **Note:** Very useful article laying out “special facets of Luftwaffe command and leadership thinking.” To wit, the five (5) “special traits” of Luftwaffe command thinking: a) Concentration on purely military matters; understanding of outside world and of broad strategic issues increasingly difficult for Luftwaffe general staff officer (example of GFM v. Richthofen – master of field of close air support, yet his personal diary revealed hardly any indication that he attempted to understand the war situation as a whole); b) Overemphasis on tactics and operations (sometimes called “*Ia-Denken*”) at expense of fields of logistics, intelligence, technology, training, transportation, etc.; c) Technology given a “much lower priority” than tactics (progressive devaluation of technology); d) Offensive assumptions shaped Luftwaffe doctrine of air war until nearly the end of the war; e) Final trait was Luftwaffe’s narrow view of its “mission” – although idea of the necessity of strategic air warfare always existed in Luftwaffe doctrine – at least implicitly – the concept of a “cooperative air force” prevailed (i.e., GAF’s ultimate “raison d’être as an aerial instrument to support ground ops) (belated and unsuccessful strategic air campaign against industrial centers and electric power plants of USSR not undertaken till **1944/45**). Points out that Chief-of-Staff Jeschonnek concentrated wholly on tactical/operational side of war. According to Boog, Luftwaffe also “much less integrated into the [OKW] than the Army and Navy.” Logistics was never prestigious in the German Army – the Quartermaster service had a low reputation in the GAF General Staff; chapter on supply and replacement in *Fundamental Field Manual Nr. 16 on the Conduct of the Air War* was **never written** (!). Boog: “Hitler fought and lost the Second World War w/ an *inadequate understanding of logistical considerations*.” Training also neglected; Jeschonnek once said: “First we have to beat Russia, then we can continue training.” Intelligence also accorded a low priority; a comprehensive field manual for intelligence work did not exist. The suffering caused by the Allied strategic air campaign finally made the Luftwaffe comprehend

- Brookes, Andrew, *Air War over Russia*. 2003.<sup>111</sup>
- Brown, Eric, *Wings of the Luftwaffe*. 1977.
- Cooper, Matthew, *The German Air Force 1933-1945*. 1981.
- Crevelde, Martin van, et al., *Air Power and Maneuver Warfare*. 1994.
- Donald, David (ed.), *Warplanes of the Luftwaffe: Combat Aircraft of Hitler's Luftwaffe, 1939-45*. 1994.
- Faber, Harold (ed.), *Luftwaffe—A History*. 1977.
- Galland, Adolf, *The First and the Last: Rise & Fall of the German Fighter Forces*. 1954.
- Gellermann, Guenther W., *Moskau ruft Heeresgruppe Mitte...Was nicht im Wehrmachtbericht stand—Die Einsatze des geheimen Kampfgeschwaders 200 im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. 1988.
- Green, William, *Famous Fighters of the Second World War*, Vols. 1-2, 1965 & 1962, respectively.
- Green, William, *War Planes of the Second World War: Fighters*. Vol. 1. 1960.
- Griehl, Manfred, *Luftwaffe at War: German Bombers over Russia*. 2000.
- Gundelach, Dr Karl, *Kampfgeschwader "General Wever" 4*. 1978. (He-111s gegen Moskau, etc.)
- Hallion, Richard P., *Strike from the Sky. The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945*. 1989.
- Higham, R. & S. Harris, *Why Air Forces Fail. The Anatomy of Defeat*. 2006.

---

strategic air war. Author states that overemphasis on operational and tactical aspects of military ops can be traced to the elder Moltke; General Schlieffen continued the trend of narrowing the theory of war to purely military aspects. Problem of reserves also had been traditionally neglected by German military thinking – Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen did not think much of strategic reserves because they thought that the decisive battles took place at the beginning of a war. This was also the conviction of General Jeschonnek. Finally, Hitler's Fundamental Order Nr. 1 (11 Jan 40) exclusively stifled the development of an adequate mode of higher leadership; not even so much as a handful of Luftwaffe officers were allowed to have a full picture of the overall situation and war effort. Final point: Prevailing doctrine of air-ground cooperation a consequence of German experience in WWI and Spain; Seeckt conceived of the Luftwaffe as an auxiliary instrument for land offensives to enhance power of attacking armies. Interdiction was to him more remunerative than strategic air bombing.

<sup>111</sup> **Note:** This is also a terrific source. See "GAF Notes" for details.

Hozzel, Paul-Werner, “*Conversations with a Stuka Pilot*,” (Conference featuring Hozzel at the National War College, Nov 78).<sup>112</sup>

Irving, David, *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of F.M. Erhard Milch*. 1973.

Kreis, John F., *Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense*. 1988.

Kurowski, Franz, *Balkenkreuz u. Roter Stern: Der Luftkrieg ueber Russland, 1941-44*. 1984.

Muller, Robert, *The German Air War in Russia*. 1992.

Murray, Williamson, *Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-45*. 1983.

Overy, R.J., *The Air War: 1939-45*. 1980.

Prien, J., et al., *Die Jagdfliegerverbände der dt. Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945. Teil 6/I: Unternehmen “Barbarossa” Einsatz im Osten 22.6. bis 5.12.41*. 2003.

Prien, J., et al., *Die Jagdfliegerverbände der dt. Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945. Teil 9/I: Winterkampf im Osten 6.12.1941 bis 30.4.1942*. 2005.

Prien, J., & Stemmer, G., *Jagdgeschwader 3 “Udet” in WWII. 11./JG 3 in Action w/ the Messerschmitt Bf 109*. 2003.

Scutts, Jerry, *Messerschmitt BF 109: The Operational Record*. 1996.

Scutts, Jerry, *Luftwaffe Bomber Units 1939-41*. 1978.

Shores, Christopher, *Luftwaffe Fighter Units in Russia 1941-45*. 1978.

Smith, Peter, C., *Stukas at War*. 1980.

*Stabschronik Aufklärungsstaffel 3.(H)/21(Pz)* (Excerpts from courtesy of Erwin Krombholz).

Stedman, Robert, *Kampfflieger: Bomber Crewman of the Luftwaffe 1939-1945*. Osprey Publishing. 2005.

Van Ishoven, Armand, *Messerschmitt Bf110 at War*. 1985.

Weal, John, *Bf 109 Aces of the Eastern Front*. 2001.

---

<sup>112</sup> Note: I downloaded this document from the *Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)*. Document number: **DTIC AD-A164 063**. Brig Gen Hozzel commanded the famed “*Immelmann*” *Geschwader* (StG 2) outside Moscow in fall of ’41.

Weal, John, *Jagdgeschwader 51. "Moelders."* 2006 (Osprey)

Weal, John, *Jagdgeschwader 52. The Experten.* 2004 (Osprey)

XI. *Primary Materials (misc.):*

Cameron, N. *et al.* (trans.), *Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944.* 2000.

Burdick, Charles, *et al.* (eds.), *The Halder War Diary: 1939-1942.* 1988.

Douglas, Gregory, *Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Mueller.* 1995.

Gerbet, Klaus (ed.), *Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock: The War Diary, 1939-1945.* 1996.

Greiner, Helmuth, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtfuehrung: 1939-45.* 1951.

Halder, Franz, *Hitler as War Lord.* 1950.

Heiber, Helmuth, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militaer. Konferenzen, 1942-45.* 1962.

Heim, Heinrich, *Monologe im Fuehrer Hauptquartier, 1941-1944.* 1980.

Irving, David, *Adolf Hitler: The Medical Diaries. The Private Diaries of Dr Theo Morell.* Ed. by David Irving. 1983<sup>113</sup>

Jacobsen, H.A. (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch Generaloberst Franz Halder.* (Chef OKH) 1963. (several vols.)

Killian, Hans, *Cold and Frost Injuries – Rewarming Damages Biological, Antiological and Clinical Aspects.* 1981.

Mellenthin, F.W. v., *German Generals of World War II.* 1977.

Newton, Steven H., *German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front 1941-1945.* 1994.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>113</sup> Note: Morell's records are missing from **Sep 41 – mid '42.**

<sup>114</sup> Collection of useful FMS studies. Includes: "XXXXI. Pz.Kp. during the Battle of Moscow in 1941 as a component of Pz.Gr. 3," by Hans Roettiger (Corps Chief-of-Staff). Roettiger study includes following: a) Movement of **41. PzK** from Army Group North to Army Group Center in late **Sep 41** had to be accomplished "on foot" (no by rail), thus tracked vehicles suffered large numbers of breakdowns; b) not all elements of corps assembled on **2 Oct 41**, hence effective strength at this time only one to one-and-one-half divisions; c) enemy air activity in early **Oct 41** against corps' spearheads "surpassed everything so far experienced in Russia;" d) ca. **9 Oct 41** corps received orders to continue attack in a NE direction, toward

Picker, Dr Henry, *Hitlers Tischgespraeche im Fuehrerhauptquartier 1941-42*. 1951.

Schramm, Percy E. (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (WfSt) 1940-45. Band I & II: 1. Aug 40 – 31. Dez 41 & 1. Jan 42 – 31. Dez 42*. 1965 & 1982, respectively.

Schramm, P.E., *Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer*. 1962.

Seidler, Franz W. (Hrsg.), *Verbrechen an der Wehrmacht: Kriegsgreuel der Roten Armee 1941/42*. 1997.<sup>115</sup>

## XII. *Secondary Materials (misc.):*

Air Force Pamphlet **48-151**: “*Thermal Injury*.” 2002.

Alexander, Bevin, *How Hitler Could Have Won World War II*. The Fatal Errors that led to Nazi Defeat. 2000.

Armstrong, John A. (ed.), *Soviet Partisans in World War II*. 1964.

Bacque, James, *Other Losses—An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans after World War II*. 1989.<sup>116</sup>

Barnet, Correlli (ed.), *Hitler’s Generals*.

---

Kalinin, which was captured on **13-14 Oct 41** (street cars still operating as spearheads of **1. PD** moved in, evident of how surprised Russians were); e) at this point, advance SE toward Moscow – in cooperation w/ **4. PzGr** – seemed best operational option to the corps, however, it is sent NW toward Torzhok to crush Red Army forces in sector facing **9. Army** northern wing (**18.-22.10.41**); f) *inadequacy of supply situation* is a constant theme of Roettiger’s study; g) defense of Kalinin – **41. PzK** is compelled to defend the city for about a full month, a misuse of armor leading to very serious losses; h) mid-**Nov 41**: Original intent of thrusting beyond Kalinin to the N and NE is abandoned; corps advances south of the Volga Reservoir on Moscow; i) **5.12.41**: Corps spearheads have carried attack to a point little more than **35** km from the Kremlin; j) Corps begins to withdraw following Soviet counteroffensive; hundreds of vehicles break down in temperatures averaging **-35** C., weapons stopped working due to lack of cold-weather lubricants; k) by committing last reserves, able to hold covering position at Klin; reach the Lama sector by mid-**Dec 41**, where corps makes a “lasting stand” (yet eventually have to give up a large part of the Lama position); l) in mid-**Jan 42**, corps withdraws to the “Koenigsberg-Stellung” (its final winter position; m) Roettiger writes that “Russians took advantage of our wrong ‘strongpoint tactics;” n) Roettiger: “Our drive on Moscow would probably have resulted in the desired success, if the *entire* **3. PzGr** – after its forces had disengaged themselves at Vyazma – had *not been committed north of the Volga Reservoir* for an attack in a NE direction, but had rather been employed south of the Reservoir for a thrust in a general eastern direction;” o) very last tank of **6. PD**, named “Anthony the Last,” broke down on **10 Dec 41** near Klin (for comparative tank strength of **3. PzGr** on **16.10** and **1.12.41**, see p 55, f.n. 14).

<sup>115</sup> This source consists primarily of cases drawn from the *Wehrmachtuntersuchungstelle*. Also discusses when & why this agency was established.

<sup>116</sup> **Note:** Bacque’s account is vigorously rebutted in *Eisenhower and the German POWs. Facts against Falsehood*. Ed. by Guenter Bischof & Stephen Ambrose.

Barrett, Michael B. (ed.), *Proceedings of the Citadel Symposium on Hitler and the National Socialist Era*. 1980.

Bartov, Omer, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich*.

Bauer Eddy, *Der Panzerkrieg. Die wichtigsten Panzeroperationen des zweiten Weltkrieges in Europa u. Afrika*. Band I: Vorstoss u. Rueckzug der dt. Panzerverbaende. n.d.

Baxter, Ian, *SS: The Secret Archives. Eastern Front*. 2003.

Benedict, Capt Stacy, "Cold Weather Operations." USAF. 2003.

Beevor, Antony, *The Mystery of Olga Chekhova*. 2004.

Bess, Michael, *Choices under Fire. Moral Dimensions of World War II*. 2006.

Bobbitt, Philip, *The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace and the Course of History*. 2003.

Boot, Max, *War Made New. Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today*. 2006.

Bracher, et al., *Nationalsozialistische Diktatur: 1933-45*. 1983.

Brett-Smith, Richard, *Hitler's Generals*. 1977.

Buchheim, Hans, et al., *Anatomie des SS-Staates*. 2 Vols. 1967.

Bullock, Alan, *Hitler—A Study in Tyranny*. 1962.

Bullock, Alan, *Hitler and Stalin—Parallel Lives*. 1991.

Burdick, Charles, *An American Island in Hitler's Reich. The Bad Nauheim Internment*. 1987.<sup>117</sup>

Burgdorff, Stephan & Wiegrefe, Klaus (ed.), *Der 2. Weltkrieg. Wendepunkt der dt. Geschichte*. 2005.

Burleigh, Michael, *The Third Reich: A New History*. 2000.

Byers, Michael, *War Law. Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict*. 2005.<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>117</sup> Book begins with wonderfully descriptive verbal picture of Berlin in December 1941.



Calvocoressi, Peter, *et al.*, *Total War: Causes and Course of the Second World War*. 1972.

Chandler, David. G., *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. 1966.

Chaney, Otto P. Jr., *Zhukov*. 1971. (also have revised edition of 1996)

Citino, Robert M., *The German Way of War. From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich*. 2005.

Citino, Robert M., *Death of the Wehrmacht. The German Campaigns of 1942*. 2007.

Clasen, Christoph, *Generaloberst Hans-Georg Reinhardt (1887 – 1963)*. 1996.

Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War* (ed. by Anatol Rapoport). 1968.

Cooper, Matthew, *The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans 1941-44*. 1979.

Corson, William R. & Crowley, Robert T., *The New KGB. Engine of Soviet Power*. 1985.<sup>119</sup>

Courtois, Stephane, *et al.*, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes Terror Repression*. 1999.

Creveld, Martin van, *Fighting Power: German Military Performance, 1914-1945*. 1980.

Creveld, Martin van, *The Art of War. War and Military Thought*. 2000.

Creveld, Martin van, *The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq*. 2006.

Cromwell Productions Video, “*Army Group Center*.” 1999.

Cueppers, Martin, *Wegbereiter der Shoah: Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsfuehrer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939 – 1945*. 2005.

Dahm, Volker, *et al.* (Hsg.), *Die toedliche Utopie*. 2008

Deighton, Len, *Blood, Tears and Folly. An Objective Look at World War II*. 1993.

---

<sup>118</sup> This is a very contentious little book; makes some outrageous yet *unsubstantiated charges* concerning “war crimes” committed by U.S. soldiers at Fallujah in 2004. Still, provides a useful overview of the laws of war for a layperson.

<sup>119</sup> Discusses barbaric crimes committed by NKVD on Russian people during war “dressed up” to look like German war crimes. (Note: Be careful addressing this issue. It appears that a Nov 41 decree of Stalin has been *doctored!*)

- Deutscher, Isaac, *Stalin: A Political Biography*. 1949.
- Deutsches Historisches Museum (Berlin) (<http://www.dhm.de/>) (bios of generals; Barbarossa history, etc.)
- De Zayas, Alfred M., *The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945*. 1989.
- Dinerstein, Herbert S., et al., *Communism and the Russian Peasant & Moscow in Crisis*. 1955.
- Domarus, Max, *Hitler—Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945*. 1962.
- Dunn, Walter S. Jr., *Stalin's Keys to Victory—The Rebirth of the Red Army*. 2006.
- Dunn, Walter S. Jr., *Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943*. 1997.
- Dunnigan, James F., *The World War II Bookshelf—Fifty Must-Read Books*. 2004.
- Dupuy, Col. T.N., et al., *Great Battles on the Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945*. 1982.
- Dupuy, Col. T.N., *A Genius for War: The German General Staff, 1807-1945*. 1977.
- Erdmann, Karl Dietrich, Die Zeit der Weltkriege, Band 4, 1. Teilband, „Der Erste Weltkrieg, Die Weimarer Republik,“ Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, 1973 (9. Aufl.).
- Erenberger, Timothy, *Grandfather's Tale. The Tale of a German Sniper*. 2000.<sup>120</sup>
- Ferguson, Niall, *The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*. 2006.
- Fest, Joachim C., *Hitler*. 1973.
- Flower, Desmond & Reeves, James (editors), *The War 1939-45*. 1960.
- Foerster, Juergen, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse*. 2007. (Courtesy of author/GSA conference, Oct 07)
- Foerster, Juergen (Hrsg.), *Stalingrad. Ereignis, Wirkung, Symbol*. 1992.
- Fowler, Will, *Barbarossa—The First Seven Days*. 2004.
- Fowler, Will, *Blitzkrieg 3: Russia 1941/42*. 2003.

---

<sup>120</sup> This is work of fiction. But has chapters on *Barbarossa*, *Taifun*, etc.

- Fritz, Stephen G., *Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II*. 1995.
- Fuller, Maj Gen J.F.C., *A Military History of the Western World*. 1956.
- Gilbert, Martin, *Second World War*. 1989.
- Glantz, David M., *Soviet-German War 1941-45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay*. n.d.
- Goerlitz, Walter, *History of the German General Staff: 1657-1945*. 1953.
- Gorodetsky, Gabriel, *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia*. 1999.
- Grulioiw, Leo, *Moscow* (w/ Time Life Books). 1977.
- Gruchmann, Lothar, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Kriegsfuehrung u. Politik*. 11. Auflage (expanded). 2005.
- Haldane, R.A., *The Hidden War: The exciting behind-the-scenes Story of Counter-intelligence in World War II*. 1978.
- Hanisch, Ernst, *Obersalzberg. The "Eagle's Nest" and Adolf Hitler*. 2009.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell, *The German Generals Talk*. 1948.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell, *Strategy*. 1967.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell, *History of the Second World War*. 1970.
- Hartmann, Christian, et al. (ed.), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer Debatte*. 2005. (Courtesy of Herrn Hartmann & Huerter)
- Hartmann, Christian (Hrsg.), *Von Feldherren und Gefreiten. Zur biographischen Dimension des Zweiten Weltkrieges*. 2008.
- Heaton, Colin, *German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939-45*. 2001.
- Heer, Hannes & Naumann, Klaus, *War of Extermination—The German Military in World War II, 1941-1944*. 2000 (English edition)
- Hesse, Erich, *Der sowjet. Partisanenkrieg: 1941 bis 1944: im Spiegel dt. Kampfanweisungen u. Befehle*. 1969.
- Hildebrand, Klaus, *Grundriss der Geschichte: Das Dritte Reich*. 1979.

Hilger, Andreas, *Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion, 1941-1956. Kriegsgefangenenpolitik, Lageralltag u. Erinnerung.* 2000.

Hill, Charles, *Grand Strategies. Literature, Statecraft, and World Order.* 2010.

Hillgruber, Andreas, *Hitlers Strategie: Politik u. Kriegfuehrung 1940-41.* 1965.

Hillgruber, Andreas, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939-45. Kriegsziele u. Strategie der grossen Maechte.* 1982.

Hillgruber, Andreas, *Deutsche Grossmacht- u. Weltpolitik im 19. u. 20. Jahrhundert.* 1977.

Hillgruber, Andreas, *Die Zerstoerung Europas. Beitraege zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945.* 1988.

Hinterhuber, Hans H., *Wettbewerbsstrategie.*<sup>121</sup> 1990.

Hinze, Rolf, *Das Ostfront-Drama 1944. Rueckzugkaempfe Heeresgruppe Mitte.* 1997 (4. Auflage).

Hoffmann, Joachim, *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-45.* 1996 (3. Auflage).

Hoffmann, Peter, *The History of the German Resistance: 1933-45.* 1977.

Hubatsch, Walther, *Deutschland im Weltkrieg 1914-1918.* 1978 (3. Auflage).

Hughes, Matthew, *et al., Inside Hitler's Germany: Life under the Third Reich.* 2000.

Hughes-Wilson, Col. John, *Military Intelligence Blunders.* 1999.

Huerter, Johannes, *Hitlers Heerfuehrer. Die dt. Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42.* 2006 (book courtesy of author)

Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, *Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933-38.* 1968.

Johnson, Aaron L., *Hitler's Military Headquarters: Organization, Structures...*1999.

Johnson, Paul, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties.* 1991.

Junger, Sebastian, *War.* 2010.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>121</sup> **Note:** Terrific insights into strategic thinking of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, GFM v. Moltke, etc.

<sup>122</sup> **Note:** Terrific account of an American platoon in Afghanistan in **2007-08**, in the Korengal Valley in the Hindu Kush (close to Pakistan). Many parallels to the Russo-German war – to *any* modern conflict, for that matter. Terrific on the psychology of war, the physiology of war, small unit tactics, impact of different types of wpns, etc.

- Irving, David, *Hitler's War*. 1977.
- Kahn, David, *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II*. 1978.
- Kaiser, David, *Politics & War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*. 1990.
- Keegan, John, *The Second World War*. 1989.
- Keegan, John, *The Mask of Command*. 1987.
- Keegan, John, *The Battle for History. Re-Fighting World War II*. 1995.
- Kershaw, Ian, *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis*. 2000.
- Kershaw, Ian, *Fateful Choices. Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941*. 2007.
- Kirchubel, Robert, *Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1): Army Group South*. 2003.
- Klee, E., et al., "Got mit uns:" *Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten 1939-1945*. 1989.
- Knopp, Guido. *Die Wehrmacht. Eine Bilanz*. 2007.
- Knox, Macgregor & Murray, Williamson, *The dynamics of military revolution, 1300-2050*. 2001.
- Krier, Leon (ed.), *Albert Speer. Architecture 1932-1942*. 1985
- Kurowski, Franz, *Die Heeresgruppe Mitte 1942/43*. 1989.
- Kurowski, F., *Infantry Aces: The German Soldier in World War II*. 1994.
- Kurowski, F., *Panzer Aces: The Legendary World War II Battles of Six German Tank Commanders*. 1992.
- Kurowski, F., *Panzer Aces II: Battle Stories of German Tank Commanders of WWII*. 2004.
- Leach, Barry A., *German Strategy Against Russia, 1939-1945*. 1973.<sup>123</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> **Note:** Although this is a very old source, it offers some terrific insights. For example, it lays out the status of the "Ostheer" in **Jul-Aug 41**, w/ much attention paid to logistics. Leach posits that logistical problems in **Aug 41** (lack of supply trains reaching Army Group Center, etc.) would have most likely made an attack toward Moscow in summer of **1941** impossible. Author also argues that an attack toward the Soviet capital at that time would not have brought any better results than it ultimately did in autumn of

Leibovitz, Liel & Miller, Matthew, *Lili Marlene. The Soldiers' Song of World War II*. 2009.

Leonard, Robert, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle*. 1991.

Lewin, Ronald, *Hitler's Mistakes: New Insights Into What Made Hitler Tick*. 1984.

Linz, Susan J. (ed.), *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union*. 1985.

Lucas, James, *Hitler's Enforcers: Leaders of the German War Machine, 1939-1945*. 1996.

Lucas, J., *Hitler's Commanders: German Bravery in the Field, 1939-1945*. 2000.

Lukacs, John, *June 1941. Hitler and Stalin*. 2006.

Luttichau, Charles V.P., *Guerilla and Counterguerilla Warfare in Russia during World War II*. 1963.

Luttichau, C.V.P., *The Road to Moscow: The Campaign in Russia—1941*. (incomplete draft of CMH manuscript)

Luttwak, Edward N., *Strategy—The Logic of War and Peace*. 2001.

Lyons, Eugene, *Modern Moscow*. 1935.

Macksey, Kenneth, *Military Errors of World War II*. 1987.

Macksey, Kenneth, *Why the Germans Lose at War. The Myth of German Military Superiority*. 2006 edition (orig. 1996).

Magenheimer, Heinz, *Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940-1945*. 1997.

Mann, Chris, *SS-Totenkopf: The History of the "Death's Head" Division 1940-1945*. 2001. (Data on German wpns)

Megargee, Geoffrey, *Inside Hitler's High Command*. 2000.

---

1941. In final chapter of his book, Leach offers very useful insights into the many shortcomings of German High Command planning for "Barbarossa," while also elucidating quite well the status and mentality of the High Command. Among other things, he emphasizes how the unexpectedly easy victory in the West in 1940 resulted in a dangerous hubris, creating a sense of invincibility and that anything was possible for the German soldier; result was a boundless optimism which translated into sloppy planning for Operation "Barbarossa." (See my 11 pp of notes!)

Messenger, Charles, *The Second World War in Europe*. Smithsonian History of Warfare. 1999 (Paperback edition, 2001).

Messenger, Charles, *The Blitzkrieg Story*. 1976.

Merriman, John, *A History of Modern Europe. From the Renaissance to the Present*. 2004 (second edition).

Miles, Clement A., *Christmas Customs and Traditions*. 1912 (original publication date) 1976 (reprint).<sup>124</sup>

Mitcham, Samuel W., Jr., *Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles*. 1988.

Mitcham, S.W., Jr., *et al.*, *Hitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht*. 1992.

Montefiore, Simon Sebag, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*. 2004.

Moorhouse, Roger, *Berlin at War*. 2010

Mosier, John, *Deathride. Hitler and Stalin: The Eastern Front, 1941-45*. 2010.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup> **Note:** Interesting historical material on German Christmas traditions.

<sup>125</sup> **Note:** This is a rather odd book. Author is a tad too sure of himself on too many of his assessments (and in his dismissal of others in his guild). Among other things, he insists that Hitler's invasion of Russia was a preventive attack, although he provides scant evidence for this (82). Useful points include following: a) One very particular cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the Second World War (3); b) suggests that Hitler came *much closer to an outright victory* than is often supposed (5); c) the Soviet Union was "Oz w/ numbers" – i.e., Soviet statistics on virtually *any topic* – production figures, war losses, etc. – are to be treated w/ utmost suspicion (7); d) states that the *Stalinist version* of the war has "proven to be remarkably durable, despite its improbability;" (10); e) states that Soviets "murdered and mistreated [POWs] on a larger scale [than the Germans];" avers that as few as **10%** of German POWs survived the Soviet prison camps, and that this is the figure used by the MGFA; (13, 17); f) casualty exchange rate over course of war was **3.5:1** in Germans favor, and the Wehrmacht continued to win this exchange rate right up to end of the war; (17-19); g) in "what if" chapter of book, author laments inability of the Luftwaffe to develop a strategic bomber (the "Ural bomber"), which might have exercised a huge impact on outcome of war; this theme runs like a "rote Faden" thru the narrative (eg., pp 132-33); h) Wehrmacht entered WWII w/ obsolete tanks and AT guns (31); i) "what if" chapter also deals w/ impact Tukhahevsky might have made on Red Army; says that T. authorized the use of chemical weapons by **Jun 21** to squash a revolt; notes that Soviet "deep battle" doctrine developed by Triandafilov, but promoted by T. (48-51); j) the **T-34/76** was designed to carry **80** rounds of **76.2-mm** ammunition, but Kulik's opposition to the main tank gun dramatically limited the number of shells produced; when the war began, the amount available for each tank was between **6-12** rounds (64); k) author stresses the lack of a logistics infrastructure prior to **Jun 41**; Soviets lacked spare parts, repair facilities w/ specialized equipment, vehicles capable of towing tanks, etc.; in **1941** the huge Soviet tank part of **22-24,000** vehicles was largely immobile: **44%** of the tanks required rebuilding and **29%** replacement of a major component such as an engine or transmission (66-67); l) by end of **1940**, in Germany the basic tools of warfare a modern army needed – tanks, planes, guns – were either obsolete or had been found not suitable; by **1941**, the *Luftwaffe* needed a whole new set of airplanes (69); m) Soviet invasion of Bessarabia & Bukovina began on **28.6.40**; these moves threatened Rumanian oilfields and Hitler's response was to order Army to *begin work on plan for a Soviet invasion* (81); n) avers that Hitler's foreign policy and military decisions [**1940-41**] were "astonishingly correct;" (83); o) Red

Army had no coherent defensive doctrine [on eve of “Barbarossa”] (102); p) Stalin’s military ideas were “firmly rooted in the past;” he was still fighting the previous war, as if it was a repeat of **1914** (104-05); q) states that in **Jun 41**, the Red Army was not using radios but was “totally committed to telephones,” chain of command “firmly anchored on telephone lines” [not telegraph?] (106-07); r) Soviets suffered serious tank losses in opening weeks of campaign due to basic maintenance problems and lack of mechanics and spare parts (113); s) discussion of “overwhelming advantage” provided by the German assault guns (134-35); t) author insists – oddly – that the German “fighting machine [was] hardly scratched” by mid-**Sep 41** (138); u) makes good point that by late summer ’**41**, the German army groups in Russia were essentially fighting “three different campaigns . . . in parallel;” (142); v) another key theme: Hitler’s decision-making during “Barbarossa” was largely sound; author repeatedly defends Hitler’s strategic decisions (eg., Hitler’s decision to seal off Leningrad, 144); w) author appears to make several mistakes re: German unit designations (i.e., “8<sup>th</sup> Air Corps” called “8<sup>th</sup> Air Army;” Schmidt’s corps called **23. PzKp**, etc.) (147, 153); x) states *erroneously* that German **2. Army** and **PzGr 2** were to attack (at start of “Taifun”) from the vicinity of Smolensk; also states that these armies were not “technically” under command of GFM v. Bock! (153); y) says that “Typhoon” was “scheduled to begin on **15 Nov 41!** (!) (163). Stopped reading – book much too uneven in its analysis.

<sup>126</sup> **Note:** This book is alternately provocative and annoying. Author is a tireless self-promoter (as one recent reviewer of another of his books averred); in fact, it appears that most of the existing history of the German Army 1914-45 was simply based on myth and legend, until he, Mosier, came along to see it all straight! In any cases, following points of interest: a) Author attributes superiority of the Wehrmacht to its “institutional memory: the Germans had mastered many of the problems of modern warfare, and they preserved the essentials of what they had learned as they integrated the technologies that emerged in the next decades. Their advantage in combat was thus not a function of equipment or even training: it was conceptual, and the two key concepts were speed and integration (244); b) the German Army was never mechanized to the extent its major opponents were; but its commanders were generally quicker to move than their adversaries, whether on offense or defense. Their speed, immensely aided by the decentralization of command, meant that the Germans generally *moved inside the decision cycle of their opponents* (i.e., Boyd’s “OODA loop” concept) (245); c) author devotes “good deal of space” to explaining the inadequacies of German armament – while there were interesting innovations and inventions, by and large the margin of technical superiority was non-existent (247); d) author makes case that Hitler, far from irrational, was a shrewd strategist; in author’s view, Hitler’s failure to really understand the impact of the USA on the war was “the only serious mistake [he] made on the grand strategic level;” (5, 251); e) conversely, he utterly condemns Stalin’s war leadership; insists that, w/o massive Anglo-American aid, Russia would have lost the war in **1943** (250); f) casualty exchange rates: this is one measure of efficacy in combat stressed by author, who points out that the ratio of losses was significantly in Germany’s favor in both WWI and WWII. In his book Myth of the Great War, Mosier asserts that the ratio of dead was **3:1** on the Western Front alone in favor of Germany during **1941/18**; author also quotes corroborative evidence of Niall Ferguson (The Pity of War) (3, 258); g) Mosier avers (w/o citing a source) that exchange rate on Eastern front from **1941/45** was ca. **6:1** in Wehrmacht’s favor, and fully **11:1** in **1941!** (181); h) nothing irrational about Hitler’s decision to attack USSR, “nor did it lead inevitably to Germany’s defeat;” (6); i) German tanks: Mosier calls them “Paper Tigers” (chapter heading); states Germany entered WWII w/ “underpowered, overweight vehicles that were completely unsuitable for combat;” at one point, he states their tanks were “wretched;” writes later that “among the many failures of German tank design was a woefully insufficient tread life;” (see, pp 90-107, 164); j) **May 40**: At this time, “German army was the least mechanized of all the major combatants, and the situation never improved;” (104); k) German transport fleet: Makes good point that the **Ju 52** fleet also suffered devastating losses in **May 40** (airborne landings in Holland), not only at Crete in **May 41** (137); l) **Crete (May 41)**: author indicates the German intelligence was a “failure at every level;” (159); m) **Jun 41**: One fact that helps explain the initial Soviet disaster (after start of “Barbarossa”) is the *disposition of Soviet forces* – whether for an offensive or a defense in depth, Red Army units were well in front of the prepared defensive positions; moving the Soviet divisions so far forward was a major factor in the astronomical losses; (173); n) Quote: “Although the



Mueller, Rolf-Dieter, *Der letzte deutsche Krieg 1939-45*. 2005.

Mueller, Rolf-Dieter & Volkmann, Hans-Erich (Hrsg.), *Die Wehrmacht. Mythos u. Realitaet*. 1999.

Munoz, Antonio J. & Romanko, Dr. Oleg V., *Hitler's White Russians: Collaboration, Extermination and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Byelorussia, 1941-1944*. 2003.

Murphy, David E., *What Stalin Knew. The Enigma of Barbarossa*. 2005.

Murray, Williamson, & Millet, Allan R., *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. 2000. The Belknap Press & Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA & London, England.

Musial, Bogdan, Kampfplatz Deutschland. Stalins Kriegsplaene gegen den Westen. 2008.

Naumann, Andreas, *Freispruch fuer die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Unternehmen Barbarossa erneut auf dem Pruefstand*. 2004.

Nehring, Hubertus W.,<sup>127</sup> *90 JAHRE – Fast ein Jahrhundert. Walther K. Nehring. 15.8.1892 – 15.8.1982*. 1982.

Neitzel, Soenke, *Abgehoert. Deutsche Generaale in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942-45*. 2005.

---

Soviet military had modern weapons, there's no indication that anyone understood how to use them;" (174); o) avers that in first months of attack, "the invading German forces swept over Belorussia and the Baltic states like a wave rolling up onto a beach;" (**Note:** Here, author promotes what in my view is an enduring myth – that opening weeks of "Barbarossa" were a "cake walk" for the Germans; nothing could be further from the truth!); p) Mosier does make good point that the Soviet strategy in summer **1941** of counterattacking at every opportunity was misunderstood by the Germans: "These attacks, all appearances to the contrary, were part of a deliberate Soviet strategy . . . [but they] were so ineffective [and so terribly costly!] that the Germans failed to notice the pattern;" (176, 184); q) assessing German failure in Russia in **1941**, Mosier notes that the "basic structural problem" was that the "production of war materials after **Sep 39** had continued at the same leisurely pace as before;" (183); r) asserts that Operation "Blau" **1942** was a "worse defeat for the Red Army than the opening blows of Barbarossa," and that **Jul 42** was the "nadir of Soviet fortunes;" (190-91); s) Lend-Lease: British and American aid to Russia was "not simply supplementary; it was the "root cause of the Red Army's success;" (see, pp 202-03 for figures on Allied material aid to Russia); t) Great Patriotic War marked "the beginning of the collapse both of Communism and of Russia as a great power;" she never recovered from war (203). **Crux:** Wehrmacht's superiority in combat was not a function of better equipment (author attempts to show that, in most cases, German materiel was inferior to that of her adversaries). Nor were the victories of **1939-41** the result of some radically new concept of warfare (i.e., so-called "Blitzkrieg," which Mosier says "hardly existed"); rather, the superiority of the Wehrmacht on the battlefield "derives almost exclusively from intangibles such as *leadership, doctrine, and institutional memory*." (3-4)

<sup>127</sup> This listing is a *Festschrift* of sorts prepared by General Nehring's family, Kameraden and friends.

Oertle, Vincenz, "Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurueckkehren..." *Schweizer Freiwillige an dt. Seite 1939-45*. 1997.

Oltmann, Reinhard, *Sturm auf Moskau: Der Russlandkrieg 1941 in Farbe*. 2002.

Osprey Publishing, *The Second World War. A World in Flames*. (Foreward by Sir Max Hastings). 2004.

Padfield, Peter, *Himmler: A Full-Scale Biography of one of Hitler's most Ruthless Executioners*. 1990.

Pandolf, Kent B. & Burr, Robert, E., *Medical Aspects of Harsh Environments*. Vol. I. Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 2001.

Paret, Peter (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. 1986.

Payne, Robert, *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler*. 1973.

Pohlman, Hartwig, *Wolchow: 900 Tage Kampf um Leningrad 1941-1944*. 1962.

Prinzing, Dr Friedrich, *Epidemics Resulting from Wars*. 1916. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Putney, Diane T. (ed.), *Ultra and the Army Air Forces in World War II*. 1987.

Radzinsky, Edvard, *Stalin: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives*. 1996.

Read, Anthony, *The Devil's Disciples—Hitler's Inner Circle*. 2003.

Read, Anthony, et al., *The Fall of Berlin*. 1992.

Redelis, Valdis, *Partisanenkrieg: Entstehung u. Bekaempfung der Partisanen...im Mittelabschnitt der Ostfront 1941 bis 1943*. 1958. (Wehrmacht im Kampf / Band 17)

Richie, Alexandra, *Faust's Metropolis: A History of Berlin*. 1998.

Reuth, Ralf G., *Goebbels—Eine Biographie*. 1990.

Reuth, Ralf G., *Goebbels*. 1993 (English trans.).

Reuth, Ralf G., *Hitler. Eine politische Biographie*. 2003/2005.

Rhodes, Richard, *Masters of Death: The SS Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust*. 2002.

- Roberts, Geoffrey, *Stalin's Wars, From World War to Cold War, 1939-45*. 2006.
- Rohwer, J., et al., *Kriegswende Dezember 1941: Referate u. Diskussionsbeitraege des internationalen historischen Symposiums in Stuttgart v. 17. bis 19. September 1981*. 1984.
- Rohwer, Juergen & Jaeckel, Eberhard, *Die Funkaufklaerung und ihre Rolle im 2. Weltkrieg*. 1979.
- Ropp, Theodore, *War in the Modern World*. 1959.
- Schneider, Wolfgang (Hg.), *Alltag unter Hitler*. 2000.
- Schneider-Janessen, Karlheinz, *Artz im Krieg. Wie deutsche und russische Aertze den zweiten Weltkrieg erlebten*. 1993.
- Schreiber, Gerhard, *Kurze Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges*. 2005.
- Schroeder, Hans Joachim, *Die gestohlenen Jahren*. 1992.
- Seaton, Albert, *Stalin as Military Commander*. 1976.
- Service, Robert, *Stalin—A Biography*. 2005.
- Seymour, June, *In the Moscow Manner*. 1935.
- Shay, Jonathan, *Achilles in Vietnam. Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. 1994.
- Shay, Jonathan, *Odysseus in America. Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming*. 2002.<sup>128</sup>
- Shephard, Ben, *A War of Nerves – Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century*. 2003.
- Shirer, William L., *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. 1960.
- Short, Neil, *The Fuehrer's Headquarters. Hitler's command bunkers 1939-45*. 2010.
- Smelser, Ronald & Davies, Edward J. II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front. The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture*. 2008.

---

<sup>128</sup> Includes highly original discussion of U.S. vs. German replacement and rotation policies, leadership and training policies, importance of unit cohesion, etc.

Smith, Bradley F., *Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941 – 1945*. 1996.

Steiger, Rudolf, *Armour Tactics in the Second World War. Panzer Army Campaigns of 1939-41 in German War Diaries*. 1991.

Stephan, Robert W., *Stalin's Secret War. Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945*. 2004.<sup>129</sup>

Stolfi, R.H.S., *German Panzers on the Offensive. Russian Front / North Africa 1941-1942*. 2003.

Stolfi, R.H.S., *Hitler. Beyond Evil and Tyranny*. 2011.

Stone, David, *Fighting for the Fatherland. The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day*. 2006.

Strawson, John, *Hitler as a Military Commander*. 1971.

Suworow, Viktor, *Stalins Verhinderter Erstschlag: Hitler erstickt die Weltrevolution*. 2000.

Sweeting, C.G., *Hitler's Squadron: The Fuehrer's Personal Aircraft and Transport Unit, 1933-1945*. 2001.

Thadden, Adolf v., *Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg*. 1996.

Toland, John, *Adolf Hitler*. 1976.

Tooze, Adam, *The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*. 2006.

Travers, P.L., *Moscow Excursion*. ca. 1934.

Ulam, Adam B., *Stalin: The Man and His Era*. 1973.

Ulam, A.B., *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73*. 1974.

Ueberschaer, Gerd R. (ed.), *Hitler's militaerische Elite: Von Kriegsbeginn bis zum Weltkriegsende*. 1998.

---

<sup>129</sup> Excellent, up-to-date work with detailed background on the organization and mission of Soviet and German intelligence and counterintelligence orgs. Definitions of key terms, such as *agent*, *double-agent*, *counterintelligence*, etc. Points out key reasons for catastrophic failure of German intelligence operations in the East.

Volkogonov, Dmitri, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. (ed. and trans. by Harold Shukman) 1988/1991.<sup>130</sup>

Wallach, Jehuda L., *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation. The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars*. 1986.

Weber, Thomas, *Hitler's First War*. 2010.

Weeks, Albert L., *Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1945*. 2002.

Weintraub, Stanley, *Silent Night. The Story of the World War I Christmas Truce*. 2002.<sup>131</sup>

Wette, Wolfram, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*. 2002 / 2006.

Wegner, Bernd (ed.), *Zwei Wege nach Moskau*. 1991.

Wegner, Bernd (ed.), *From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939-1941*. Berghahn Books, Providence, RI; Oxford, UK. 1997 (Note: translation of *Zwei Wege...*)

Weinberg, Gerhard L., *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. 1994.

Wette, Wolfram (ed.), *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes: Eine Militaergeschichte von unten*. 1992.

Winchester, Charles D., *Hitler's War on Russia*. Osprey. 2007.

Wright, Jonathan, *Germany and the Origins of the Second World War*. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, N.Y. 2007.

Yahil, Leni, *The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945*. 1990.

Zamoyski, Adam, *Moscow 1812. Napoleon's Fatal March*. 2004.

Z.d.F. Broadcast, "*Entscheidungsschlacht Moskau 1941*." 2002 Video.

---

<sup>130</sup> According to Geoffrey Roberts, Volkogonov was "one of the sternest critics of Stalin's war leadership [with] his 'glasnost' biography." His biography of Stalin "was widely regarded as the first serious and genuinely critical treatment of the Soviet dictator published in the USSR." Since the publication of his book, "opinion among Russian military historians has swung back in Stalin's favor." (G. Roberts, **Stalin's War**, p 12)

<sup>131</sup> **Note:** This book offers some unique insights into the vital importance of Christmas – and *Weihnachtsbaeume!* – to the German soldier (and culture as a whole). Thousands of Christmas trees were stocked in the depots, then transported to the front, the Germans planting them atop their parapets. Many terrific anecdotes and quotes.

### XIII. *Logistics:*

Creveld, Martin van, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. 1977.

Donat, Gerhard, *Der Munitionsverbrauch im Zweiten Weltkrieg im operativen u. taktischen Rahmen*. 1992.

Kreidler, Eugen, *Die Eisenbahnen im Machtbereich der Achsenmaechte...*1975.

Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, *Die deutsche Reichsbahn im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. 1979.

Pottgiesser, Hans, *Die Deutsche Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug 1939-1944*. 1960. (Wehrmacht im Kampf / Band 26)

Rohde, Horst, *Das dt. Wehrmachtstransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. 1971.

Schueler, Klaus A. F., *Logistik im Russlandfeldzug: Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung u. Durchfuehrung des dt. Angriffes auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskow im Winter 41/42*. 1987.<sup>132</sup>

Thomas, Georg, *Geschichte der dt. Wehr- u. Ruestungswirtschaft (1918 – 1943/45)*. 1966.

Vecamer, Arvo. L., “*Deutsche Reichsbahn – The German State Railway in WWII*.” At: [www.feldgrau.com](http://www.feldgrau.com)

Wagner, Elisabeth (ed.), *Der Generalquartiermeister: Briefe u. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen...Eduard Wagner*. 1963.

### XIV. *Weapons, Equipment & Organization (German / Soviet):*

Aero Publishers, Inc., *The German Panzers from Mark I to Mark V “Panther.”* 1966.

Barker, Lt Col A.J., *Stuka JU-87*. 1983.

Battistelli, Pier Paolo, *Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941-43*. 2008.

Bean, Tim, *et al.*, *Russian Tanks of World War II*. 2002

Beinhauer, Eugen (ed.), *Artillerie im Osten*. 1944.<sup>133</sup>

Breyette, Thomas W., *et al.*, *Tank Killers: History of the Tank Destruction Badge*. 2000.

---

<sup>132</sup> Schueler’s book also contains much information of general interest to the campaign.

<sup>133</sup> Tremendous photographs in this book, published in Germany late in the war.

- Buchner, Alex, *The German Infantry Handbook, 1939-1945*. 1991.
- Cooper, Matthew, *The German Army 1933-1945*. 1978.
- Davies, W.J.K., *Panzer Regiments: Equipment and Organization*. 1978.
- DiNardo, R.L., *Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II*. 1991.
- DiNardo, R.L., *Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII*. 1997.
- Emde, Joachim, *Die Nebelwerfer: Entwicklung u. Einsatz der Werfertruppe im Zweiten Weltkrieg*.
- Emde, Joachim, "Die deutsche 'Nebelwerfer'—zur Geschichte einer jungen Waffengattung." In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1977.
- Engelmann, Joachim, *German Light Field Artillery: 1935-1945*. 1995.
- Engelmann, Joachim, *German Heavy Field Artillery: 1934-1945*. 1995.
- Feldgrau web site: <http://www.feldgrau.com> (German armor production statistics)
- Fleischer, Wolfgang, *An Illustrated Guide to German Panzers: 1935-1945*. 2002.
- Fleischer, Wolfgang, *German Light and Heavy Infantry Artillery: 1914-1945*. 1995.
- Fleischer, Wolfgang, *German Trench Mortars and Infantry Mortars: 1941-1945*. 1996.
- Foedrowitz, Michael, *Stalin Organs: Russian Rocket Launchers*. 1994.
- Foedrowitz, M., *Soviet Field Artillery in World War II*. 1996.
- Forty, George, *WWII German Infantryman at War*. 2002. (Includes photos of Heinrich Stockhoff.)
- Freter, Hermann, "Fla nach vorn." 1971. (detailed history of Heeresflak units)
- Geocities web site "Achtung Panzer": <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/3620> (specs on German armor)
- German Infantry Weapons*, Special Series, No. 14 MIS 461, prepared by Military Intelligence Service, U.S. War Dept. 25 May 1943.
- Glantz, David, *Red Army Weapons and Equipment 1941-1945*. 2004.

- Green, Michael, *et al.*, *German Tanks of World War II in Color*. 2000.
- Hart, S., *et al.*, *The German Soldier in World War II*. 2000.
- Haupt, Werner, *Die deutschen Infanterie-Divisionen*. Doerfler Zeitgeschichte reprint. No date of publication.
- Heitmann, Keith, *et al.*, “Introduction to World War II German Weapons.” At web site: <http://www.feldgrau.com>.
- Hofer, Werner, “Erfahrungen der Heeres-Pz.Jaeger-Abt. 561 mit der 5 cm Pak u. 7,5 cm Pak 41.” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1974.
- Hogg, Ian V., *Twentieth Century Artillery: 300 of the World’s Greatest Artillery Pieces*. 2000.
- Hogg, Ian V., *The Greenhill Armored Fighting Vehicles Data Book*.
- Hughes, Dr. M. & Mann, Dr. C., *Fighting Techniques of a Panzergrenadier. 1941-1945. Training, Techniques, and Weapons*. 2000.
- Jentz, Thomas L., *Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation of Germany’s Tank Force, 1933-1942*. 1996.
- Lewis, Sam J., *Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy, 1918-1941*. 1985.
- Mason, Chris, *Personnel Effects of the German Soldier in World War II*. 2006.<sup>134</sup>
- McCarthy, Peter, *et al.*, *Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Tank Divisions*. 2002.
- Miller, David, *The Great Book of TANKS*. 2003.
- Necker, Wilhelm, *The German Army of To-Day, 1943*. (Reprint, 1973).<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> Includes great photo of a “Hindenburg trench candle” (p 105).

<sup>135</sup> **Note:** This is a terrific source. Original published in **1943**, so text does contain some inaccuracies. One interesting point is how much information on weapons, tactics, etc., our intelligence folks gleaned from “open source” materials: official German military publications, newspapers, radio, speeches, propaganda materials, etc. Book contains highly detailed data (most appears to be reasonably accurate) on branches of the Wehrmacht, unit organization, weapons, tactics, etc. For example: a) types of ammunition used and penetrating power of (27-28) b) difference between I.MG & s.MG (former only shoots for seconds at a time, latter capable of *Dauerfeuer*, etc.) (30); c) types of fuses and projectiles used by the artillery (46-47); d) reconnaissance battalion (its fire power is “so great that this detachment can hold its ground against quite considerable enemy forces till reinforcements arrive” (55-56) e) many missions of German “*Pioniere*” (enginnering) troops (59, ff); f) Signal units (types of equipment used; telephone “scramblers;” different ranges of light & heavy field cable (telephones); wireless (telegraph), etc.; g) panzer and motorized units (“w/ its high mobility and heavy armament, [the motorized rifle batl.] has strong striking power and is especially used for covering exposed flanks of advancing tank . . . forces;” (107); h) Assault gun batl. – it is



Perrett, Bryan, *Knights of the Black Cross: Hitler's Panzerwaffe and its Leaders*. 1986.

Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, *Die 8,8 Flak im Erdkampf-Einsatz*. 1999 (2. Auflage).

Rosado, Jorge & Bishop, Chris, *Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions 1939-45. The Essential Tank Identification Guide*. 2005.

Scheibert, Horst, *et al.*, *Die dt. Panzertruppe, 1939-1945: Eine Dokumentation in Bildern*. 1966.

Scheibert, H., *et al.*, *Panzer in Russland: Die dt. gepanzerten Verbaende im Russland-Feldzug, 1941-44*. 1971.

Scheibert, H., *Russian Battle Tank T-34*. 1992.

Schneider, Wolfgang, *Panzer Tactics. German Small-Unit Armor Tactics in World War II*. 2005.

Seaton, Albert, *The German Army 1933-45*. 1982.<sup>136</sup>

Showalter, Dennis, *Hitler's Panzers. The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare*. 2009.<sup>137</sup>

---

a tactical weapon, whereas the tanks . . . are organized in operational units (117); i) role and organization of the "Advanced Detachment" (*Vorausabteilung*) (119-20); j) M.G. batls.: they are HQ troops, mostly attached to armies; fully motorized; chief purpose is defensive (122-23); k) German tactics – basic principles (i.e., combined arms); "*infantry training* is the *basis* of the training of every kind of service" (169, ff); l) theoretical unit frontages (175-76); m) rank badges of the Army (198), etc.

<sup>136</sup> **Note:** While this is an older source (1982) it contains some useful information addressing German High Command planning for "Barbarossa;" dysfunctional nature of German command structure (eg., division of battlespace into **OKW** and **OKH** theaters of war); German force structure, equipment and shortages on eve of "Barbarossa;" consequences of Hitler's takeover of Army in **Dec 41**; and, efforts of Replacement Army, etc., to plug manpower shortages in the East, beginning in **Oct 41**. Seaton notes that, on eve of Russo-German War, Germany only had some **80,000** men formed into reinforcement march battalions and some **350,000** men in Fromm's *Ersatzheer* as the "only immediate source of reinforcements" for the impending campaign. These were used up by late summer '41. Photocopies of two chapters from Seaton's book can be found in my "Ground Forces, German" file. (172)

<sup>137</sup> **Note:** a) Stresses impact of **1940** campaign in West on German thinking, i.e., outbreak of hubris! (131); b) details restructuring of German panzer and motorized units between the fall of France and outbreak of "Barbarossa (tank production reached low of **120** in **Sep 40**; to equip mot. forces, trucks purchased from Switzerland and requisitioned from North Africa (134-43.); c) discusses huge challenges of possible Middle East offensive (eg., survivability of German and Italian trucks in mountains of Syria and deserts of Iraq) (157); d) avers that von Crevel'd's "careful calculations have long since discredited the long-standing argument that the Balkan operation delayed Barbarossa by a significant amount of time" (158); e) notes that in **1940** Guderian's corps frontages rarely exceeded **15** miles; in Russia the norm for his group would be **80** and more (160); f) discusses quality of Soviet tanks, Soviet armored doctrine, etc. (161-62); g) Soviet counteroffensives in summer '41: recent archival evidence shows that, far from collapsing in disorganized panic, from start of Barbarossa the Red Army conducted a "spectrum of counterattacks in a coherent attempt to implement pre-war plans for an active defense ending in a decisive counteroffensive" (162-63); h) Germans found themselves in a "**360-degree war**" (i.e., attacked from all sides) (163); i) pockets formed

Thomas, Nigel, *et al.*, *The German Army 1939-1945 (3): Eastern Front 1941-45*. 1999. (Men-at-Arms Series / Osprey)

Tornau, Obstlt., Gottfried, “*Die Sturmartillerie.*” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1965.

Trewhitt, Philip, *Armored Fighting Vehicles: 300 of the world's greatest military Vehicles*. 1999.

Walter, John, *Guns of the Third Reich*. 2004.

Westwood, David, *German Infantryman (2): Eastern Front 1941-43*. Osprey. 2003.

Williamson, Gordon, *World War II German Police Units*. Osprey Publishing. 2006.

Winchester, Jim, *Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles of WWII*. 2004.

Wray, Maj Timothy A., *Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front during World War II*, US Army CGSC, 1986.<sup>138</sup>

#### XV. *Journal Articles:*

*Alte Kameraden*: Numerous articles by German soldiers from 1984 – 86 issues, as well as earlier and later issues of journal.

Assmann, Vice Admiral Kurt, „*The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War,*” In: *Foreign Affairs*, Jan 50.

Bartov, Omer, “*A View from Below. Survival, Cohesion and Brutality on the Eastern Front,*” in: *From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939-1941*. Bernd Wegner (ed.).

Berlin, Isaiah, “*The Hedgehog and the Fox. Essay on Tolstoy's View of History.*” 1953.

Blumentritt, Guenther, “*Die Ueberwindung der Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42, dargestellt an der 4. Armee.*” In: *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*. 1954.

---

by Wehrmacht in summer '41 “in many places no more than a line on a [HQ] map” (i.e., porous!) (167); j) tactical/operational superiority of the panzers over their opponents “was never greater than in the first half of **Jul 41** (170-71); k) discussion of Operation “Typhoon” begins on p 182; stresses operational errors, eg., sending **3. PzGr** NE toward Kalinin vice using it for a direct assault on Moscow); l) role of German battle groups as “force multiplier” in winter battles. (199)

<sup>138</sup> **Note:** This is an excellent study. Of particular interest are the following: a) Defense by Army Group Center, **Jul-Sep 41** (including losses suffered by several German divisions); b) Winter '41/42 – Strongpoint Defense: Origins/Conduct; c) Discussion of weaknesses and problems faced by Russians at beginning of their **Dec 41** counteroffensive.

Bozek, Maj. Gregory J., “*The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-40. Getting the Doctrine Right.*” U.S. Army CGSC, n.d.

Brand, Obstlt. Freiherr v., “*Streifzug durch die deutsche Militaer- u. Kriegsgeschichte XII. Der II. Weltkrieg,*“ In: *Die Bundeswehr*. 1967. Nr. 10-12. (Courtesy of J. Foerster)

Buck, Gerhard, “*Generaloberst Alfred Jodl.*” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1970.

Campbell, D’Ann, “*Women in Combat: The World War Two Experience.*” In: *Journal of Military History*. Apr 93.

Carell, Paul (a.k.a. Schmidt), “*Schlacht im Niemandsland,*“ in: *Kristall*, Nr. 15, 1962. (Courtesy of C. Nehring)<sup>139</sup>

Chew, Allen F., „*Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies.*” Combat Studies Institute. U.S. Army CGSC. Dec 81.

Corum, James S., “*The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.*” In: *Journal of Military History*. Jan 95.

Crevelde, Martin van, “*Die deutsche Wehrmacht: eine militaerische Beurteilung,*“ in: *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos u. Realitaet*. R.-D. Mueller & H.-E. Volkmann (Hrsg.), 1999.<sup>140</sup>

De Beaulieu, Walter Chales, “*Sturm bis vor Moskaus Tore: Der Einsatz der Panzergruppe 4.*” In: *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*. 1956.

Deist, Wilhelm, “*Some Aspects of German Mobilization under the National Socialist Regime.*” In: *The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century*. (Proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium. USAF Academy. 1982.)

*Der Deutsche Fallschirmjaeger*, 1/92, 2/92, 3/92, 4/92, 5/92. (Excerpts from courtesy of F. Strienitz / **Fallsch.MG.Batl.**)

*Deutscher Soldatenkalendar (SDK) / Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch (SDJ) 1958 - 2002*. Many dozens of articles addressing fighting around Moscow, weaponry, officer bios, etc.<sup>141</sup>

Erickson, John, “*Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?*” In: *History Today*. Jul 01.

---

<sup>139</sup> **Note:** Article does not provide attribution to any author, but clear from looking at Carell’s Hitler Moves East, that he composed the article.

<sup>140</sup> **Note:** Excellent insights into strengths and weaknesses of the Wehrmacht. See my notes, rather arbitrarily placed in folder, “German Army: Unit Organization.”

<sup>141</sup> **Note:** Some of these articles cross-referenced in this section.

Erickson, John, “*New Thinking about the Eastern Front in World War II.*” In: *Journal of Military History.* Apr 92.

Foer, Joshua, “*Remember This,*” in: *National Geographic,* Nov 07.

Foerster, Juergen, “*Ludendorff and Hitler in Perspective: The Battle for the German Soldier’s Mind, 1917-1944.*” In: *War in History.* 2003. 10 (3).

Foerster, Juergen, *et al.*, “*Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa.*” In: *War in History.* 2004.

Foerster, Juergen, ‘*Ich bin der erste Soldat des Reiches.*’ *Hitler als Kriegs- und Feldherr.* (Courtesy of author / Feb 07)<sup>142</sup>

Foerster, Juergen, „*Wehrmacht, Krieg u. Holocaust,*“ in: *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos u. Realitaet.* R.-D. Mueller & H.-E. Volkmann (Hrsg.), 1999.<sup>143</sup>

Frieser, Karl-Heinz, „*Die deutschen Blitzkriege: Operativer Triumph – strategische Tragoedie,*“ in: *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos u. Realitaet.* R.-D. Mueller & H.-E. Volkmann (Hrsg.), 1999.<sup>144</sup>

Glantz, David M., “*The Ghosts of Demiansk: In Memory of the Soldiers of the Soviet 1st Airborne Corps.*” In: *Journal of Military History.* Oct 92.

Glantz, David M., “*Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942-December 1943: A Reappraisal.*” In: *Journal of Military History.* Jan 96.

---

<sup>142</sup> Copy of article—a longer version w/ more analysis than his published article—emailed to me by Juergen on 2 Mar 07.

<sup>143</sup> **Note:** Juergen’s article makes strong case for what we all know now to be true – the Wehrmacht’s deep complicity in NS crimes. He sees a sharp line of continuity in ideological thinking of the military establishment and NS-Party going back to WWI; as well as the genesis of an anti-Jewish tradition in the German military during WWI (eg., the so-called “*Judenzaehlung*” of 1916). This anti-Semitism was made more acute by the Russian revolution of 1917 and its impact on Germany in years that followed, resulting in conflation of Jew w/ Bolshevism. Article illustrates how anti-Jewish measures took hold in Reichswehr / Wehrmacht from 1933 on, and the strong support given to Hitler’s ever-more aggressive racist policies. As Juergen shows, the German military (high command, field commanders, rank-and-file) overwhelmingly supported ideological/racial objectives of Hitler’s Third Reich; for this, he cites many examples. Hitler’s generals also largely accepted Hitler’s concept of “Barbarossa” as a race war (eg., guidelines of GFM v. Brauchitsch). Other key points in article: a) Gerichtsbareiterlass of 13.5.41 = eine *praeventive Amnestie fuer Verbrechen von Soldaten gegenueber Sowjetbuerger in u. ohne Uniform* (953); b) auch 1942 schien Abschreckung durch gnadenlose Bestrafung immer noch die erfolgsversprechende Methode zu sein [re: Befriedungspolitik im Osten], den zunehmenden Widerstand zu brechen, trotz negativer Erfahrung (959). Article located in „War Crimes“ folder.

<sup>144</sup> **Note:** This insightful article offers a complete reassessment of Hitler’s so-called “Blitzkrieg Strategie.” As author avers: “Der ‘Blitzkrieg’ war von seiner Entstehung her kein politisch-strategisches, sondern ein militaerisch-taktisches Phaenomen. Diese Idee entwickelte sich voellig unabhængig von Hitlers Eroberungsplaenen.“ Also: „Unter dem Einfluss der Schlieffen-Schule entstand naemlich die Illusion, strategische Aufgaben *rein operativ loesen zu koennen.*“ (182-83) This article can be found in my „France 1940“ file.

Gosztony, Peter, “Moskau in der Krise 1941.” In: *Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift*. Bd. 5, Heft 2 & 3. 1967.

Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz, “Der Vorstoss auf Tula 1941,” In: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaer Zeitschrift*. Okt 49 & Nov 49.

Hamann, Christoph, “Im Osten – Anfang 1942.” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1998.

Hartmann, Christian, “*Verbrecherischer Krieg – verbrecherische Wehrmacht? Ueberlegungen zur Struktur des deutschen Ostheeres 1941 - 1944.*” In: VfZ 1/2004

Haupt, Werner, “Die Wende im Winterkrieg 41/42 vor 20 Jahren (Eckpfeiler der Hr.Gr.Mitte).” In: *Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung*. 1962.

Hessenthal, Horst v., “Das Deutsche Kreuz: Zu seiner Stiftung vor 30 Jahren.” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1971.

Hildebrand, Klaus, “Hitlers ‘Programm’ und seine Realisierung 1939-1942,” In: *Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte—Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*. Manfred Funke (ed.). 1978.

Hillgruber, Andreas, “Die ‘Endloesung’ und das dt. Ostimperium als Kernstueck des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus.” In: *Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte—Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*. Manfred Funke (ed.). 1978.

Hillgruber, Andreas, “Die Bedeutung der Schlacht von Smolensk in der zweiten Julihaelfte 1941 fuer den Ausgang des Ostkrieges,” In: *Die Zerstoerung Europas. Beitrage zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945*. 1988.

Hillgruber, Andreas, „Das Russland-Bild der fuehrenden deutschen Militaers vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion,“ in: *Die Zerstoerung Europas. Beitrage zur Weltkriegsepoche 1941 bis 1945.*“ 1988.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> **Note:** Excellent study addressing the planning for Operation “Barbarossa” and the perspectives of the German military vis-à-vis Russia on eve of the attack. Crux: Dominant view: “die Vorstellung vom toenernen Koloss . . . eindeutig dominierte.” (268). Other key points: a) Doppelgesicht des Russland-Bildes (aus dem 19. Jahrhundert) – einerseits die Auffassung, dass das Russische Reich ein „toenernen Koloss“ war . . . andererseits die alptraumartige Vorstellung von einem ungeheuren Wachstum Russlands, das bei seinem „Drang nach Westen“ alles ueberrollen werde. . . (256); b) „Hyperoptimismus“ vom GFM v. Brauchitsch . . . meinte er am 30.4.41, dass der Feldzug gegen die SU nach “voraussichtlich heftigen Grenzschlachten” mit einer Dauer “bis zu vier [4] Wochen“ im wesentlich beendet sein u. es sich danach nur noch um Saeuberungsaktionen . . . handeln werde (258); c) die Hauptursache fuer solchen leichtfertigen Optimismus ist . . . in dem *Primat des operativen Denkens* im preussisch-deutschen Generalstab (seit Moltke u. Schlieffen) zu suchen (258); d) detailed discussion of the Marcks Plan (**Aug 40**) (259-60); e) Studie vom Obst.Lt. d.G. von Lossberg in OKW (260); f) „Betrachtungen ueber Russland“ die der Chef des Stabes der SKL, Admiral Fricke, am 28.7.40, unterzeichnete (262); g) diesbezugliche Auffassungen

Hillgruber, Andreas, “Die weltpolitischen Entscheidungen vom 22. Juni bis 11. Dezember 1941.” In: *Nationalsozialistischer Diktatur*. By K.D. Bracher, et al.

Hosiner, Hans, „Die Hoelle am Ozuga-Fluss. Winter 1942 – Die Schlacht im Sueden von Rshew. Der Kampf einer Pak-Einheit,“ in: Der Landser (courtesy of R. Adler).

Huerter, Johannes, “‘Es Herrschen Sitten u. Gebraeuche...’ Das erste Jahr des dt.-sowjet. Krieges In Dokumenten des Generals Gotthard Heinrici.” In: *Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte (VfZ)*. 2000.

Jordan, Jonathan, “Panzers at the Gates of Moscow,” In: *WWII History*. Sep 09.

Kipp, Jacob W., “Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military History and Airland Battle.” (FMS Office. Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1989)

Kirchubel, Robert, „Operation Barbarossa and the American Controversy over Aid to the Soviet Union,“ Unpublished paper courtesy of author, Jul 08.

Knoch, Peter, “Feldpost – eine unentdeckte historische Quellengattung.“ (*Geschichtsdidaktik*. 1986)

Latzel, Klaus, „Feldpostbriefe: Ueberlegungen zur Aussagekraft einer Quelle,“ in: *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer Debatte*. Hartmann, Christian, et al. (ed.), 2005.<sup>146</sup>

---

vom Militaerattache in Moskau, General Koestring (der zu Recht als Russland-Experte unter den dt. Militaers gelte) (263-64); h) wie wenig konkret insgesamt die Unterlagen waren, auf die sich die dt. militaerische Planung stuetzen konnte, zeigte in besonders krasser Weise das „Handbuch“ ueber die „Kriegswehrmacht der UdSSR,“ das die Abteilung FHO am **1 Jan 41** herausgab; hier wurde zugegeben, dass man ueber die sowj. Kriegsgliederung faktisch nichts wusste (264-65); i) Auffassungen auf der Ebene der H.Gr.- u. Armeefuehrungen (here, brief discussions of the views of GFM v. Leeb, GFM v. Bock, GFM v. Rundstedt, Guderian, v. Kluge, Blumentritt, usw. (265-67); j) Auffassungen vom General Thomas des Wi.-Rue.-Amt im OKW: Zur Entwicklung eines realistischen Russland-Bildes fehlten Thomas die Informationen.“ (267); k) die Erwartung, dass die dt. Kriegsmaschine die SU in kurzer Zeit ueberrollen werde, war indessen nicht nur in der dt. militaerischen Fuehrung weitestgehend *Opinio communis*, sondern sie wurde auch von britischen u. amerikanischen Militaers u. Politikern geteilt (here brief discussion of Anglo-American assessments of outcome of possible Russo-German war. (268); l) **Fazit:** Der schnelle Triumph ueber Frankreich, die erfolgreichen „Blitzfeldzuege“ insgesamt, zuletzt noch in dem schwierigen Gelaende in Suedosteuropa, hatten jenes **hybride Ueberlegenheitsbewusstsein** hervorgerufen, das insbesondere fuer den Generalstab des Heeres das russ. Problem nur noch zu einer Frage des richtigen Operationsansatzes werden liess. Die Klischees von der schwerfaelligen, schematisch denkenden u. handelnden, verantwortungsscheuen Roten Armee, die in Polen u. Finnland alles andere als militaerisch ueberzeugende Leistungen vollbracht hatte trugen . . . wesentlich zu der Erwartung bei, dass die dt. *technische u. fuehrungsmaessige Ueberlegenheit* den raschen durchschlagenden Erfolg herbeifuehren werde. . . (268)

<sup>146</sup> **Note:** Excellent article w/ following key points: a) estimate is of some **30-40 billion** FPB sent during WWII, about ¼ of which (i.e., **7.5 to 10 billion**) were sent by the soldiers at the front themselves; b) if one takes the figure of **17.4 million** total soldiers in the Wehrmacht between **1939-45**, then one arrives at an

Leonard, Raymond W., “*Studying the Kremlin’s Secret Soldiers: A Historiographical Essay on the GRU, 1918-1945.*” In: *Journal of Military History*. Jul 92.

Loganathan, Maj., “*Failure of Logistics in ‘Operation Barbarossa’ and its Relevance Today.*” In: *Pointer*. Apr – Jun 98.

Marchicus, “*Irrlichter des Erfolges.*“ In: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift*. Feb/Mar 49.<sup>147</sup>

Mawdsley, Evan, “*Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Offensive War Plans in 1940-41.*” In: *International Review*. Dec 03.

Mawdsley, Evan, “*Stalin: Victors Are Not Judged.*” (draft article / Feb 05) (courtesy of author)

Michaels, Dan, “*Marshal Zhukov: A Career Built on Corpses,*” Castle Hill Publishers, <http://www.vho.org>, TR 3/2004.

Mueller, Klaus-Juergen, “*The Brutalization of Warfare, Nazi Crimes and the Wehrmacht,* in: *Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies.* John Erickson & David Dilks (eds.), 1994.

Mulligan, Timothy P., “*Reckoning the Costs of People’s War: The German Experience in the Central USSR.*” In: *Russian History/Histoire Russe*, 9, Pt. 1 (1982), pp. 27-48.

Murray, Dr Williamson, “*Attrition and the Luftwaffe.*” In: *Air University Review*. Mar-Apr 83.

---

average of ca. **430** to **570** letters sent by each soldier; (171); c) of this massive amount, but a tiny, tiny fraction – “weit ueber hunderttausend “ – in archives and private collections which are available to researchers; d) Frage der inneren u. aeusseren Zensur: “Wir muessen immer davon ausgehen, dass das, was in den Briefen ausgesprochen wird, vor einem Hintergrund des Schweigens steht, der uns unbekannt bleibt;” (173); e) “die Briefe eines einzelnen Soldaten ueber seinen Kriegseinsatz koennen eine wertvolle Ergaenzung fuer die aktenmaessige Ueberlieferung seines Truppenverbandes sein, u. fuer die Entwicklung von Forschungsfragen u. zur Thesenbildung taugen selbst geringe Bestaende allemaal;“ f) „ist doch . . . festzuhalten, dass quantifizierende Generalisierungen auf der Basis von Feldpostbriefen nicht moeglich sind; sich mit der mangelnden statistischen Verallgemeinerbarkeit abzufinden, faellt insofern leicht, als FPB aeusserst ergiebige Quellen fuer Fragestellungen sind, die sich um die Art u. Weise der Erfahrung des Krieges drehen, also fuer die so genannte qualitative Forschung. . .“ (175); g) „Die bisherigen Untersuchungen ueber FPB kommen einhellig zu dem Befund, dass Kriegsverbrechen in dieser Quelle nur selten konkret benannt oder gar genauer beschrieben werden u. noch weniger die Beteiligung daran.“ (175)<sup>147</sup> **Note:** Guderian mentions that *his* articles in same journal (Okt/Nov 49, see above), were meant to supplement “Marchicus.” This piece contains interesting interpretations of the *Orsha conference* (Nov 41); dilemma faced by German General Staff (ObKdH) in Nov 41 before Moscow; relations between Hitler and his generals, etc. “Marchicus” is certainly a pseudonym—most likely for a high-ranking German officer who was “in the know.”

Naimark, Norman M., “*War and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945.*” In: *Contemporary European History*, 16, 2 (2007).

Nehring, Walther K., “*Die 18. Panzerdivision 1941.*” In: *Deutscher Soldatenkalender*. 1961.

Nehring, Walther K., “*Die Befreiung von Ssuchinitschi durch die 18. PD im Januar 1942.*” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1967.

Nehring, Walther K., “*Heinz Guderian. Ein grosser General u. westpreussischer Landsmann.*” In: *Westpreussen-Jahrbuch, Band 23, Muenster, 1973.* (Courtesy of Christoph Nehring)

Optiz, Alfred, “*Die Stimmung in der Truppe am Vorabend des Ueberfalls auf die Sowjetunion.*” In: *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes*.

Paus, P., „*Kampfziel: Moskau. 1941 – Vorstoss der HG Mitte zur sowjetischen Hauptstadt,*“ In: *Der Landser* (courtesy of R. Adler)

Portugall, Kurt, “*Die Kavallerie der Waffen-SS.*” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch*. 1978. (SS-Kav.-Bde. in Winterschlacht von Rzhev)

Proctor, Robert N., „*Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial. The anti-tobacco campaign of the Nazis . . .*,” In: *BMJ*, 1996.

Puckett, Michael E., “*Strategic Energy Lessons. A Historical Perspective Applied to America’s Oil Source Issues.*” In: *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 2009.

Ratley, Maj Lonnie O. III, “*A Lesson in History: The Luftwaffe and Barbarossa.*” In: *Air University Review*. Mar-Apr 83.

Raus E., Generaloberst a.D., “*Das Ringen um Moskau,*“ in: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift*, Heft 12, Dec 52.

Record, Jeffrey, „*Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s.*” Aug 05 (Strategic Studies Institute).

Reinhardt, Klaus, “*Moscow 1941: The Turning Point,*” in: *Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies*. Erickson, John & Dilks, David (eds.), 1994.

Reinhardt, Klaus, “*Das Scheitern des deutschen Blitzkriegskonzepts vor Moskau,*” in: *Kriegswende Dezember 1941. Referate u. Diskussionsbeitraege des internationalen historischen Symposiums in Stuttgart vom 17. bis 19. Sep. 81, J. Rohwer u. E. Jaeckel (herausg.)*, 1984.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> **Note:** Interesting comments include the following: a) According to K. Reinhardt, at time of the Orscha conference, Hoepner recommended that the German troops be pulled back to the German border! (206);



Richter, Timm C., “Die Wehrmacht u. der Partisanenkrieg in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion,” in: *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos u. Realitaet.* R.-D. Mueller & H.-E. Volkmann (Hrsg.), 1999.<sup>149</sup>

Rosenwald, Walter, “Das 21. (Bayerische) Inf. Rgt. u. das Inf. / Gren. Rgt. 21.” (17. ID) In: Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch. 1993.

*Russian Studies in History* (Fall, 1997), “Was the USSR Planning to Attack Germany in 1941?” (Collection of articles.)

*Russian Studies in History* (Winter, 1997-98), “At the Threshold of War: The Soviet High Command in 1941.” (Collection of articles.)

Schmider, Klaus, “German Military Tradition and the Expert Opinion on Werner Moelders. . .” In: *Global War Studies* 7 (1) 2010.

---

b) ca **5 Dec 41**: Gen.Obst. Reinhardt, **PzGr 3**, schaeztzte den Gefechtswert seiner acht [8] Divisionen auf nur noch 7 Kompanien u. Guderian meldete ueber den Zustand seiner **2. PzArmee**: “Wir haben einfach vielfach nur noch bewaffnete Trosse, die nun langsam zuruecktrudeln.” (207); c) German losses: Die Ausfaelle des Ostheeres beliefen sich am Ende **Jan 42** auf **920.000** Mann, davon **29.000** Offiziere. Allein im Bereich der H.Gr.Mitte fehlten zu diesem Zeitpunkt etwa **400.000** Mann. Eine Studie des **OKW** stellte zum gleichen Zeitpunkt fest, dass eine “volle Auffuellung der Verluste des Winters nicht mehr moeglich ist.” Auch die Verluste an Material u. Ausruestungsgegenstaende waren nicht mehr auszugleichen. . . Ende **Dez 41** betrug die Verluste an Panzern u. Stugs **3.730**; Ende **Jan 42** **4.240**. Diese Ausfaelle waren bei einer monatlich durchschnittlichen Panzerproduktion von nur rund **250** Panzern kurzfristig nicht mehr zu ersetzen. . . Darueber hinaus war die Beweglichkeit des Heeres durch den hohen Ausfall an Kfz eingeschaenkt worden. Von den rund **500.000** Kfz bei Feldzugbeginn waren Ende **Nov 41** **100.000** ausgefallen, weitere **250.000** mussten repariert werden. Dazu kamen die enormen Pferdeverluste, die sich Ende **Jan 42** auf **210.000** beliefen. . . Die Flugzeugverluste der Luftwaffe hatte Ende **Jan 42** die Gesamthoehe von **6.900** Flugzeugen erreicht. Mitte **Jan 42** meldete die Luftwaffe, dass sie ihre Verluste im Osten nicht mehr decken konnte. (207-08).

<sup>149</sup> **Note**: Excellent article on German approach to anti-Partisan warfare. Stresses several points, among them: a) total lack of preparation for partisan warfare (had no expectation of need to confront a major partisan movement); b) war w/ Russia clearly conceived by Hitler and High Command as a race war; c) close cooperation planned between SS and OKW/OKH for administration of rear areas; d) critical role of “Krieggerichtsbarkeiterlass” for German approach to anti-partisan warfare (see GFM v. Bock’s negative response to this directive, p 840); e) catastrophic shortfall in personnel (police, military, etc.) to administer rear areas (eg., **9. Army**, which at beginning of campaign had only **300** troops earmarked for rear-area “Streifendienste” over **10,000** sq. km!); author avers that this personnel shortfall explains in part German decision to respond to any “partisan” activity w/ absolute brutality (Abschreckungseffekt); this shortfall soon led to recruitment of local, indigenous elements to support SS/Police and Wehrmacht anti-partisan operations; f) nature of German tactics and operations (i.e., mechanized units pushing like thin fingers deep into Soviet battlespace, leaving rear areas – forests, swamps, etc. – crawling w/ unmolested Soviet troops and stragglers) left rear areas insecure (see reference, Halder KTB, **1.7.41**, p 849); g) inability to completely clean out “Kesseln” favored formation of partisan nuclei, for eg., in Wjasma – Bryansk area; h) by start of **1942**, there was still no central agency tasked w/ rear area security, rather, a “hodgopog” of different authorities were responsible (“Kompetenzenwirrarr”) (849-52); in **1942**, Germans, aware that war would be a protracted one, began – in part at least – to rethink their brutal occupation policies; others continued to demand “das harte Vorgehen,” among them, Halder, who even recommended the use of poison gas if necessary (853, see his KTB, **13.5.42**). This useful article can be found in my “War Crimes” folder.

Schweppenburg, General Leo Freiherr von, “Guderian. *Portrait of a German Soldier.*” An Cosantoir. November 1964.

Seidler, Prof Dr Franz W., *Hilfstruppen: Von russischen Hiwis zu den Ostlegionen.*“ In: DMZ. Nr 37 (Jan-Feb 04).

Showalter, Dennis E., „*Barbarossa. Adolf Hitler hoped to destroy Russia with a single blow.*” In: *Great Battles* (a Primedia Publication), 2005.

Soutor, Kevin, “*To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Effect on American Defense Doctrine, 1948-1954.*” In: *Journal of Military History.* Oct 93.

Stoeckelle, Gustav, “*Das Unternehmen ‘Taifun’ (Schluss).*” In: *Oesterreich. Militaer. Zeitschrift.* Bd. 5, Heft 2. 1967.

Stolfi, R.H.S., “*Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign. (Jun – Dec 41).*” In: *Journal of Modern History.* Mar 82.

Stolfi, R.H.S., “*Chance in History: The Russian Winter of 1941-42.*” In: *History.* Jun 80.

Stolfi, R.H.S., “*German 10. Panzer Division’s Eastern Front Offensive near Vyazma during World War II.*” In: *World War II Magazine.* Sep 97.

Tedor, Richard., “*Unternehmen Barbarossa: Die Generaale vereitelten die Strategie.*” In: *Soldat im Volk.* 2003.

Tedor, R., “*Hitler’s Generals Ruin the Russian Campaign Strategy.*” In: *The Barnes Review.* Mar-Apr 03.

Thomas, David, “*Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-1945.*” In: *Journal of Contemporary History.* 1987.

Tieke, Wilhelm, “*Die deutsche 4. Armee vor Moskau.*” In: *Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch.* 1971.

Ulrich, Andreas, “*Hitler’s Drugged Soldiers,*” in: *Spiegel Online,* 6 May 05.

Vigor, P.H., “*Soviet Planning Successes in the Great Patriotic War: The Results of Correct Formulae?*” In: *Military Planning in the Twentieth Century (Proceedings of the Eleventh Military History Symposium. USAF Academy. 1984.)*

Vogel, Detlef, “*Der Kriegsalltag im Spiegel von Feldpostbriefen (1939-1945).*” In: *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes.*

Wegner, Bernd, “*The Road to Defeat: The German Campaign in Russia 1941-43.*” In: *The Journal of Strategic Studies*. Mar 90.

Weinberg, Gerhard L., “*Some Thoughts on World War II.*” In: *Journal of Military History*. Oct 92.

Weinberg, Gerhard L., “*World War II Scholarship, Now and in the Future.*” In: *Journal of Military History*. Apr 97.

Ziemke, Earl F., “*Franz Halder at Orsha: The German General Staff Seeks a Consensus.*” In: *Military Affairs*. Dec 75.

**XVI. *Soviet Side / Source Materials (misc.):***<sup>150</sup>

Axell, Albert, *Russia's Heroes: 1941-1945*. 2001.

Barber, John, “*The Moscow Crisis of October 1941.*” In: *Soviet History, 1917-53. Essays in Honor of R.W. Davies*. Julian Cooper, et al. (ed.). 1995.

*Battles Hitler Lost. And the Soviet Marshalls who Won them*. 1986.

Bellamy, Chris, *Absolute War. Soviet Russia in the Second World War*. 2007.

Besymenski, Lew, *Die Schlacht um Moskau 1941*. 1981.

Beevor, A. & Vinogradova, L., *A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army, 1941-45*. 2005.

Bialer, Seweryn (ed.), *Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II*. 1969.<sup>151</sup>

*Bitva pod Moskvoi: khronika, fakty, liudi. (Battle of Moscow: Chronicles, Facts, and People)*. V.Z. Zhilin (ed.). Vol 1.

*Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi Armii Chast' 1: liun' – dekabr' 1941 god (Combat Composition of the Soviet Army Part I: Jun – Dec 41.)*<sup>152</sup>

Boyd, Alexander, *The Soviet Air Force Since 1918*. 1977.

---

<sup>150</sup> Note: In Rzhew (May 05) I picked up a half-dozen Russian-language books on WWII and fighting in the Rzhew area. All in Cyrillic.

<sup>151</sup> “Bumped” into at the *Blue Dragon* used book store in Ashland, OR, Jul 07.

<sup>152</sup> This source provides an Order of Battle for Soviet Army for each month. Purchased from *East View Publications* on recommendation from Col Glantz.

- Broekmeyer, Marius, *Stalin, the Russians and Their War*. 1999.<sup>153</sup>
- Colvin, John, *Zhukov. The Conqueror of Berlin*. 2004.
- Conner, Albert Z., et al., *Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War*. 1985.
- Drabkin, A. & Sheremet, O., *T-34 in Action. Soviet Tank Troops in WWII*. 2006.
- Drabkin, Artem, *Red Air Force at War: Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow*. 2007.
- Dunn, Walter S., *Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930-45*. 1994.
- Erickson, John, *The Soviet High Command. A Military-Political History 1918-1941*. 1962.
- Freeze, Gregory L. (ed.), *Russia—A History*. 1997.
- Grenkevich, Leonid D., *The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-44*. 1999.
- Glantz, David M., *Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War II*. 1998.
- Glantz, David M., *Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943*. 2005.
- Glantz, D.M., *The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II*. 1990.
- Glantz, D.M., *The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union. A History*. 1992.
- Gorbachevsky, Boris, *Through the Maelstrom. A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front*. 2008.
- Grenkevich, Leonid, *The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944*. 1999 (edited w/ forward by D. Glantz)
- Guttman, Jon, "Artyon Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich's MiG-3 was a less-than-great start to a great line of fighters." In: *Aviation History*. Mar 04.
- Hardesty, v., *Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945*. 1982.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>153</sup> This book, which offers excellent insights in many areas, is based entirely on sources published in Russian between 1985 and June 1999. This period "consciously chosen" by author because it only became possible in 1985 to publish views on the war "which were subjected decreasingly—and finally not at all—to censorship.

<sup>154</sup> **Note:** This useful study appears to rely heavily on work by Kozhevnikov (cited above). Author avers that "air supremacy achieved [by GAF] in **Jun-Jul 41** quickly dissipated, as the strains of a **2000**-mile front took their toll." (p 72) Book includes following: a) good introduction to Soviet combat acft, bomber and fighter tactics ("VVS operational tactics were to cautious and inflexible.") ( 26); b) discussion of

*History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Vol II: Jun 41 – Nov 42. 1961.*

Hoyt, Edwin P., *Stalin's War: Tragedy and Triumph 1941-45. 2003.*

*Journal of Military Thought* (several articles on Russian side of war. 2001)

Kilmarx, Robert A., *A History of Soviet Air Power. 1962.*

Kohl, Paul, *Ich wundere mich, das ich noch Lebe—Sowjetische Augenzeugen berichten. 1990. (eyewitnesses in area of Hr.Gr.Mitte)*

Kozhevnikov, M.N., *The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-45. 1977.*<sup>155</sup>

---

phenomenon of “ramming” technique (*taran*) (27 ff); c) “acute sense of inferiority” of Soviet aircrews vis-à-vis GAF (61); d) night bombing by **Po-2s (U-2)** biplanes; called “Naehmaschine” by the Germans (65); e) differing German/Soviet perceptions of efficacy of Soviet aviation (65); f) VVS in Battle of Moscow; facing critical shortages of day bomber and ground-attack acft, etc. (64 ff.); g) Soviet sources candidly record “serious shortcomings” of VVS, particularly in coordinating air/ground actions (68); h) outlines problems created by freezing weather for GAF operations (70-71); i) **15.11.-5.12.41:** VVS, says Soviet sources, flew **15,840** sorties [in Moscow sector?] vs. **3500** GAF sorties; also claim Luftwaffe lost **1400** acft in Moscow sector during this time (clearly an exaggeration!) (71); j) **Dec 41:** Excellent outline of results of Soviet counteroffensive; states VVS deployed **1376** acft (**859** operational) in western sector alone at start of **Dec 41** (74 ff); k) **Jan-Mar 42:** VVS flew by its own account total of **49,000** sorties against H.Gr.Mitte; German accounts, however, suggest a *much lower level* of combat activity by VVS in early months of **1942.** (78-79); l) **Demyansk pocket:** excellent overview (80 ff); m) discussion of major VVS reforms by Gen. A.A. Novikov after he became VVS Cdr in **Apr 42;** new structure for long-range aviation, creation of air armies, etc. (83 ff). CRUX: Despite its heroism and achievements, “the role of the VVS at Moscow had been *peripheral* in deciding the outcome;” “failure of the VVS to systematically apply air power on the retreating *Wehrmacht* at Moscow stood out as a *major tactical error* in the minds of German observers.” (88-89)

<sup>155</sup> **Note:** Author was member of the VVS command and staff during WWII. Document translated and published under “auspices of [USAF].” In my view, this account belies commonly-held belief that the VVS simply disappeared for months following its destruction during first days of German invasion. Soviet Air Force hastily reorganized based on experience gained in first six months of Russo-German War. Key was centralization. Aviation assigned to army and front cdrs no longer distributed among the combined arms cdrs and employed in uncoordinated fashion. At unit level, greater emphasis on flexibility. Air regiments made less unwieldy, etc. New concepts validated in skies over Moscow and at Stalingrad. Branches of Soviet aviation included: long-range, frontal, army, air defense fighter aviation (p 20). Text also includes: a) Excellent discussion of frantic efforts to build up the VVS prior to German attack (formation of **106** new air rgmts began in **1941,** only **19** formed by beginning of war, including **13** long-range bomber rgmts; **164** new airfields built between **8 Apr – 15 Jul 41**); b) technical specifications and production figures for VVS given in several tables; c) theory & doctrine behind employment of VVS (“aviation is linked strategically and tactically to the ground forces;” key role played by air supremacy, etc.) (25 ff.); d) destruction of VVS in opening days of war (33 ff.); **23.6.-10.7.41:** Long-Range Bomber Aviation flew **2112** combat sorties against enemy tank/mot. columns; on the whole, however, “actions of Soviet aviation against enemy troops did not have a noticeable influence” on course of events – VVS efforts often dispersed, planes not massed adequately, weapons and tactics not appropriate, etc. (39); e) VVS attempts first massed strikes on GAF airfields (41); f) in first **18** days of war, Soviet aviation flew **45,000** combat sorties (numbers exaggerated?); g) at end of **Jul 41,** in **22** days of battle on Leningrad’s distance approaches, **16,567** combined sorties flown (44); h) **29 Aug – 3 Sep 41:** day/night air operations

Larionov, V., et al., *World War II: Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army*. 1984.

Litvin, Nikolai, *800 Days on the Eastern Front. A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II*. 2007.

Loza, Dmitriy, *Attack of the Airacobras: Soviet Aces, American P-39s, and the Air War against Germany*. 2002.

Merridale, Catherine, *Ivan's War. Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945*. 2006.

Obryn'ba, Nikolai I., *Red Partisan. The Memoirs of a Soviet Resistance Fighter on the Eastern Front*. 2006.

Orenstein, Harold S. (trans.), *Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience. Vol. I: The Initial Period of the War 1941*. 1991.<sup>156</sup>

Orenstein, H.S. (trans.), *Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience. Vol. II: The Winter Campaign 1941-42*. 1991.<sup>157</sup>

---

against Guderian's **2. PzGr** in vicinity of Pochep – Starodub – Shostka and to halt its advance on Bryansk; over **4000** sorties flown (47); i) Smolensk operation (**Jul-Aug 41**): VVS flew about **20,000** sorties (48-49); j) VVS air raids on Berlin (**10** raids during **Aug-Sep 41**); also bomber strikes on key Axis industrial facilities (Koenigsberg, Danzig, Helsinki, Warsaw, Ploesti, etc.) (50); k) By **30.9.41**, VVS has flown ca. **60,000** combat sorties in Leningrad sector (51); l) Soviet aviation in Battle of Moscow (52 ff.); m) **11.-18.10.41**: massed VVS strikes on GAF airfields along entire eastern front (55); n) **30.9.-31.10.41**: VVS flies **26,000** combat sorties in defense of central sector (57); o) **Nov 41**: Another wave of VVS attacks on GAF airfields (59); **Oct-Nov 41**: During entire period of defense of Moscow, Soviet Air Force flew **51,300** combat sorties; by beginning of **Dec 41**, VVS had “attained firm operational air supremacy in the Moscow sector.” (60); **Dec 41**: Soviet counteroffensive (VVS strength about **1200** combat acft) (60 ff); **Dec 41-Jan 42**: In first **33** days of counteroffensive, Soviets fly ca. **16,000** combat sorties. (62)

<sup>156</sup> **Note**: This is a terrific series. This volume includes: a) introduction by David M. Glantz (discussion of Soviet military theory/doctrine, etc.); b) brief review of tactical use of anti-tank assets, including Soviet use of *fields of Molotov cocktails*; c) role of small-arms fire in taking down German acft; d) excellent study of *German field defenses* (based mainly on separate pockets of resistance – strong points, centers of resistance – equipped for all-round defense and located w/ mutual fire support; importance of populated areas; engineering preparations of field defenses; etc.).

<sup>157</sup> **Note**: This volume includes: a) introduction by D.M. Glantz (points out, *inter alia*, Soviet recognition that *logistics* was an Achilles heel for her forces; b) operational/tactical lessons of Winter Campaign 41/42 (i.e., shortcomings in troop control; insufficient co-operation between and w/in armies; improper use of air power, ski units, etc.); c) features of offensive actions in winter (Germans unable to create a continuous and tight defense; Germans had many automatic weapons, etc.); d) combat use of ski troops (basic missions of, etc.); e) combat use of large cavalry formations (cavalry has high operational and tactical mobility; cavalry should be directed against operationally important targets on the enemy flanks, in his rear, and on his lines of communication; f) key examples of cavalry actions in winter 41/42 (Belov's **1<sup>st</sup> Gds Cav Corps**; destruction of German **34. AK**; rout of German **78. ID** by Gen Dovator's **2d Gds Cav Corps**; use of large cavalry units in German rear); Red Army, including cavalry, *significantly inferior to Germans in supply of mortars (esp. heavy mortars), sub-machine guns, and AT defense means*, giving Germans “tremendous superiority over ours w/ respect to fire (p 83));” g) use of non-toxic smoke by Soviet ground forces for camouflage.

Orenstein, H.S. (trans.), *Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience. Vol. III: Military Operations 1941 and 1942.* 1993.<sup>158</sup>

Overy, Richard, *Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow.* 1997.

Overy, R., *Russia's War—A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-45.* 1997.

Parrish, Michael (ed.), *Battle for Moscow: The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study.* 1989.<sup>159</sup>

Petrov, Vladimir, *June 22, 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion.* 1968.

---

<sup>158</sup> **Note:** This volume includes: a) introduction by D.M. Glantz (addresses “historically obscure, but operationally significant case studies of deep ops in German rear by Belov’s **1<sup>st</sup> Gds Cav Corps** and Soviet **4. Airborne Corps**; former spearheaded advance of Western Front’s left wing during defeat of Guderian’s **2. Pz Army** near Tula and Kaluga, and then penetrated deep into the German rear area during the Viaz’ma operation of **Jan-Feb 42**; **4. AB Corps** was dropped into German rear in **Jan-Feb 42** to assist Group Belov); b) very good overview from second phase of German “Taifun” offensive (from **15.11.41**) thru Soviet winter counteroffensive; lots of key dates/events noted; average daily rate of movement of Soviet *Western Front* forces from **6.-25.12.41** ranged from about **4-15** km/day; study says virtually *nothing about Soviet failures at Rzhev!*; c) detailed case study of actions of General Belov’s cavalry group (fails in several attempts to capture Viaz’ma by enveloping it from the west in **Jan-Feb 42**; study notes that Belov’s forces were “technically poorly outfitted” for their mission; Belov’s 7+ divisions actually very modest in size – **28,000** personnel as of **20.1.42**); d) detailed case study of operations of Soviet **4. Air-Assault Corps** during **Jan-Mar 42** (corps tiny in size, composed of only **2484** personnel as of early **Mar 42**; also lightly outfitted w/ wpns (**37-**, **50-** and **80mm** mortars but no artillery; later it had a few **45mm** cannon.))

<sup>159</sup> **Note:** This is an extremely valuable study, prepared by Soviet General Staff in **1942**. Study was not intended for mass consumption, and thus is not distorted by propaganda and imbalance. Book contains many insightful points, among them: a) As editor noted, “Soviet histories like to claim that it was defensive battles in Belorussia in **Aug-Sep 41** that brought to a halt the Wehrmacht’s first attempts to capture Moscow, when in reality it was *Hitler’s decision* to concentrate on the Ukraine during this period that saved Moscow.” (viii); b) one of the major reasons for “incomplete results” of winter campaign of **41/42** was the “major shortcomings in troop leadership,” including insufficient cooperation among fronts, armies, divisions, etc. (1); c) study repeatedly emphasized importance of roads for both offensive and defensive operations; d) despite problems posed by cold and weather, mobile formations were capable of carrying out independent operational missions (6); e) notes that in winter combat the Red Army had a “substantial advantage” over the Germans (7-8); f) the main battles took place for the defense and seizure of populated places (10); g) stresses importance of using *incendiary rounds and bombs* in connection w/ combat for populated places (12); h) points out success of Soviet night attacks and that Germans “rarely held off night attacks” (13); i) *ski troops* mentioned on virtually every page (!), their importance was clearly paramount (for missions of ski battalions see, pp 31, 41); j) report admits that Germans were well led during this phase of the war (18, 24); k) a snow cover of over **30cm** slows down movement of foot soldiers and rapidly exhausts their strength, if deeper than **75cm** it will prohibit the movement of tanks except along roads (23); l) study admits *superiority of German weapons*: the Germans had *automatic weapons*, while the Red Army infantry still relied on rifles (25); m) in discussing Soviet offensive tactics, it seems that Hitler’s decision to hold on to fortified areas – the so-called “island” defense – was basically correct (25); n) having limited personnel, Germans were not able to set up a *solid and continuous defensive line*; as a rule, their defense consisted of strong points jointed together in centers of resistance (26); o) study states that Germans used draconian measures – including chaining soldiers to their MGs! – to shore up resistance (27); deep snow cover cuts down effectiveness of tanks markedly (30); p) **T-34** tank could negotiate a snow depth of **.70-.80** meters (33); q) Red Army artillery did not acquit itself well during Battle of Moscow (43 ff.); r) density of Soviet artillery in **Feb-Mar 42** ranged from **3.1** to **29** artillery pieces/km (see, p 48); s) “precise methods of target designation and correction were used rarely in divisional artillery” (for preparation and conduct of Soviet artillery fires see, pp 53-54).

Pleshakov, Constantine, *Stalin's Folly. The Tragic first ten days of WWII on the Eastern Front*. 2005.<sup>160</sup>

Reese, Roger R., *Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers. A Social History of the Red Army 1925-1941*. 1996.

Rottman, Gordon L., *Soviet Field Fortifications 1941-45*. 2007 (Osprey Publishing)

Savushkin, Col. Robert, *In the Tracks of a Tragedy (Reflections on the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War, June 1941)*. 2006 (David M. Glantz)

Sevruk, Vladimir, *Moscow/Stalingrad 1941/1942. Recollections, Stories, Reports*. 1974. (published in USSR)

Shaposhnikov, B.M. (ed.), *Razgrom nemetskikh voisk pod Moskvoi: Moskovskaia operatsiia Zapadnogo fronta 16 noiabria 1941 g. – 31 ianvaria 1942 goda. Chast' 1,2,3*. 1943. (Defeat of German Forces at Moscow. 3 vols.)<sup>161</sup>

Sharp, Charles C., *Soviet Infantry Tactics in World War II. The Rifle Units of the Red Army from Squad to Company in Combat According to the Combat Regulations of November 1942*. 1998.

Shtemenko, S.M. *The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945*. Moscow. 1985 (English edition)

Shukman, Harold (ed.), *Stalin's Generals*. 1993.<sup>162</sup>

Shilin, P.A. (ed.), *Die Wichtigsten Operationen des Grossen Vaterlaendischen Krieges 1941-1945*. 1958.

Slepyan, Kenneth, *Stalin's Guerillas. Soviet Partisans in World War II*. 2006.<sup>163</sup>

Spahr, William J., *Stalin's Lieutenants. A Study of Command under Duress*. 1997.

---

<sup>160</sup> Book based on many new Soviet-era materials that became available in 1990s. Author makes claim that Stalin secretly planning preemptive attack on Germany when struck by *Barbarossa* in Jun 41: "In the summer of 1940, under Shaposhnikov's guidance, Vasilevski started work on the preemptive strike plan." (p 56). Book also offers terrific insights into the fighting from the Soviet perspective, painting vivid scenes of fighting, terrain, civilians, etc. See, pp 199-203 for detailed insights into the situation in Belorussia in late **Jun 41**. Author also avers that Zhukov's arcs of defense – designed by the general in Stalin's study on **26.6.41** – delayed German advance for several weeks. (271-72). See my 28 pages of detailed notes in "Pleshakov file."

<sup>161</sup> Critical Soviet General Staff study of Battle of Moscow, completed in 1943 and secret for many years. Recommended by Col Glantz.

<sup>162</sup> Excellent source, using recently available materials from Soviet archives.

<sup>163</sup> This is a *social history* of the partisan movement (i.e., ethnicity, class, gender, yada yada yada); however, it offers a good up-to-date analysis of partisan movement through the winter of 41/42, using newly available archive sources, etc.



Stephan, Robert W., *Stalin's Secret War. Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazi, 1941-1945.* 2004.

*Tagebuch eines Rotarmisten: 21.1. - 22.3.42.* (Author unknown.) (Courtesy of K. Distler)<sup>164</sup>

Telpuchowski, B.S., *Die sowjet. Geschichte des Grossen Vaterlaendischen Krieges 1941-1945.* 1961.

Tumarkin, Nina, *The Living and the Dead. The Rise & Fall of the Cult of World War Two in Russia.* 1994.

Vasilevski. A.M., *A Lifelong Cause.* 1981 (abridged, English version).

Vitukhin, Igor (ed.), *Soviet Generals Recall World War II.* 1981.

Wagner, Ray (Ed.), *The Soviet Air Force in World War II.* (The official history, originally published by the Ministry of Defense of USSR). 1973.<sup>165</sup>

Werth, Alexander, *Russia at War, 1941-1945.* 1964.

Westwood, J. N., *A History of Russian Railways.* 1964.

Wetzig, Sonja, *Die Stalin-Linie 1941. Bollwerk aus Beton u. Stahl.* n.d.

Whiting, Kenneth R., „Soviet Air Power in World War II,” in: *Air Power and Warfare. The Proceedings of the 8<sup>th</sup> Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 18-20 October 1978,* Alfred F. Hurley, Colonel, USAF & Robert C. Ehrhart, Major, USAF (editors). 1979.<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>164</sup> Typed transcript of this diary prepared by M. Mieth. No further information available re: provenance of this document.

<sup>165</sup> **Note:** This is a terrific primary source on the VVS. Too many details to post here (see “VVS Notes” for more details). Among other things, the author gives virtually a weekly accounting of sorties flown by each front (numbers, types of missions, targets, etc.) Of course, the claims concerning Luftwaffe acft destroyed (on ground / in air), tanks, vehicles, trains, etc. knocked out, must be taken with a certain grain of salt. On the other hand, author seems to document compellingly that the VVS did not simply disappear for weeks (months?) following the catastrophe it experienced in the first 72 hours of “Barbarossa.” For example, during the “frontier battles” (22.6.-10.7.41), the VVS on all fronts managed some 47,000 sorties in just 18 days (p 44). During the defense of Moscow (Oct-Dec 41) the VVS logged some 51,300 sorties of all types (p 79).

<sup>166</sup> **Note:** This is a dated (1979) but useful study. Includes: a) excellent background on buildup of VVS from 1929-41, new acft designs, etc. (output of acft quadrupled from 1930 (860) to 1937 (3578)); b) Soviet aviation especially hard hit by purges; about 75% of senior officers of VVS eliminated by end of 1939; c) good background of how Stalin concentrated power in his hands from May 41; d) according to official Soviet account, VVS flew 51,300 sorties during the two-month battle for Moscow (Nov-Dec 41?), 86% of which were CAS sorties; e) evacuation of most of acft industry to the east caused a severe drop in output in second half of 1941 and first three months of 1942; after that, production accelerated rapidly; f) combat ops revealed serious shortcomings in Soviet Air Force organizational structure, the main weakness being an

Ziemke, Earl F., *The Red Army, 1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally*. 2004.

Zhukov, Georgi K., *Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov: Reminiscences and...* 1974.

Zhukov, G.K., *Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles*. 1969.

Zhukov, G.K., "The Beginning of the War," in: *Soviet Generals Recall World War II*, Igor Vitukhin (ed.), 1981.<sup>167</sup>

Zhukov, G.K., "The Battle for Moscow," in: *Soviet Generals Recall World War II*, Igor Vitukhin (ed.), 1981.<sup>168</sup>

Zolotarev, V.A. (ed.), *Bitva pod Moskvoi: Sbornik dokumentov*. Vol. 4, pt. 1, in the series: *Velikaia Otechestvennia* (14 vols). (Courtesy of Bruce Manning)<sup>169</sup>

## XVII. *Photographs:*

Photo Collection 1: ca. **250** photos provided mostly by German veterans from units including: **2. PD, 5. PD, 6. PD, 7. PD, 6. ID, 35. ID, 86. ID, 95. ID, 256. ID, 292. ID, Fsch.MG.Batl.7.**<sup>170</sup>

---

inability to concentrate air [power] in massive operations; air power was being used in piecemeal fashion; in **May 42**, Soviets began w/ the formation of "air armies," a giant step forward in mobility, concentration of forces, and central control.

<sup>167</sup> **Note:** Provides "inside" look at first days of war by Red Army Chief-of-Staff: a) hour-by-hour breakdown of first day of war; b) efforts to begin full-scale mobilization and establish institutional structures to fight the war (Stavka, GKO, etc.); c) notes that main task in days following start of "Barbarossa" was to create a defense in depth on approaches to Moscow; d) reference to **BODO** – a teletype w/ a scramble attachment; e) as early as **27.6.41**, a Stavka order to Western Front addresses the weakness in the German attack – that "first mechanized enemy echelon has broken away from its infantry for a very long distance." (i.e., growing separation of German mechanized units from following foot infantry); f) creation of State Defense Committee (GKO) on **30.6.41**, providing unity of command (Germans had no comparable deliberative and executive body); g) Battle of Smolensk – in Soviet narrative this battle lasted two months; Zhukov notes the battle's "great strategic importance" in slowing down the German advance along the main strategic axis (i.e., in the center).

<sup>168</sup> **Note:** a) Lots of data on relative strength of German-Soviet forces outside Moscow; much of these data appear to be accurate. For example, on eve of "Taifun," Zhukov states German advantage in Moscow sector was **1.25** in infantry, **2.2** times larger in tanks, **2.1** in guns/mortars, and **1.7** in acft; b) from **1.-15.11.41**, Soviet Western Front received **100,000** fighters and officers, **300** tanks, and **2000** guns as reinforcements; c) states that during the **20** days of their second offensive on Moscow (i.e., from **15.11.41**) the Germans lost more than **155,000** men, killed and wounded, about **800** tanks, not less than **300** guns, and about **1500** acft; d) Zhukov makes clear that the *original* objectives of the Soviet counter-offensive were really quite modest (given shortages of troops, tanks, etc.): "The best we could do at the time was to beat back the enemy as far as possible from Moscow and to inflict on him the greatest possible losses;" and again, "our idea was to reestablish the position which these fronts [i.e., Western, Kalinin, Bryansk Fronts] had held before the beginning of the 'Typhoon' operation. . ."

<sup>169</sup> According to Bruce, this is an excellent collection of official documents addressing the Battle of Moscow.

Photo Collection 2: **250+** photos gleaned from NARA at College Park, MD. From multiple units showing activities in summer '41.

Photo Collection 3: **50+** photos from Roger Bender (photos of German generals, tanks, aircraft, etc.)

Miscellaneous photos from David Glantz (Soviet generals, etc.); photos scanned from *Artillerie im Osten* (publ. 1944).

### XVIII. *World Wide Web (Cross-References):*

<http://www.260id.de/Webseiten/Geschichte.htm><sup>171</sup>

<http://hco.hagen.de/barbarossa> (Forum "Unternehmen Barbarossa," (Auf dem Server des Historischen Centrums Hagen))

<http://www.balsi.de> (Soldaten im 2. Weltkrieg)

<http://www.dhm.de/> (Deutsches Historisches Museum (Berlin))

<http://www.feldgrau.com> ("Feldgrau" web site)

<http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/3620> (web site "Achtung Panzer")

<http://www.jg27.de> ("Das Jagdgeschwader 27")

<http://www.iremember.ru> (Russian WWII website w/ veterans' accounts *in English*)

<http://www.islandfarm.fsnet.co.uk/> (Island Farm POW camp in Bridgend, South Wales. Excellent bios of German officers held there)

<http://www.verbrechen-der-wehrmacht.de> (HIS: Hamburger Institut fuer Sozialforschung)

[www.dasreich.ca/fritz](http://www.dasreich.ca/fritz) (2nd SS "Das Reich" division)

[www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de](http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de) (great source on weapons, units, personnel, etc.)

[www.lonesentry.com/manuals/german-infantry-weapons/index.html](http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/german-infantry-weapons/index.html)<sup>172</sup>

[www.WorldRailFans.org](http://www.WorldRailFans.org) (*German-English dictionary of railway or technical terms*)

\* \* \* \*

---

<sup>170</sup> **Note:** The photos for **MG Btn. 7** are located inside Fritz Strienitz's booklet, "Verstaendigung mit Russland." The photos are excellent!

<sup>171</sup> **Note:** Photos w/ minimal text – however, this very-professionally done website provides excellent overview of operations of **260. ID**, as well as lots of information concerning "Gefechtsstaerke" and combat losses in **1941/42**. Division ultimately destroyed during the Soviet offensive against Army Group Centre in **Jun 44**. Of particular interest are the difficult battles south of Bobruisk from **19 Jul – 8 Aug 41**: "Bei den harten u. blutigen Gefechten am **24.7.41** um Romanischtsche u. Ugly werden **51** von **60** angreifenden gegnerischen Panzer abgeschossen. Die Verluste der Division betragen **92** Tote, **510** Verwundete." See also history of **260. ID** by Werner Haupt (in division file).

<sup>172</sup> From this website, I downloaded the U.S. Army manual dated 25 May 1943, addressing "German Infantry Weapons."